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[T]here is nothing in the interests protected by international law
which is fundamentally different from those protected by
municipal and private law ... It might be said that interests of
individuals are chiefly economic, whereas those of States are
political in character; but even if this be so, it ought not to be
forgotten that, as a rule, the political activities of States in the
field of international relations are primarily devoted to
safeguarding collective economic interests, no matter under what
disguise they happen to appear.
- SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT (1927)1
It is a truism that all law is policy, in the sense that every legal
arrangement, however humble, procedural, or "technical" it may
seem, has been designed in order to achieve some preferred
social or economic objective, including objectives about the
structure of the decision-making process itself.
- W.M. REISMAN (2012)2
I. INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENCES BEYOND METAPHOR
It is a proposition frequently asserted-sometimes argued in the
tenor of self-evident truth-in contemporary international economic law
scholarship that WTO law is always instructive for international
investment law.3 The proposition seems intuitive when one visualizes a
1. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 72-73 (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION) (Archon Books, reprint
1970) (Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927).
2. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT, at 28-29 (2007
General Course on Public International Law, Hague Academy of International Law) (Martinus
Nijhoff 2012).
3. The degree of WTO influence on, and authoritativeness for, investment law, remains
much a matter of debate. See, e.g., Melaku Geboye Desta, GA7/WTO Law and International
Standards: An Example ofSoft Law Instruments Hardening Up?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
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straightforward transactional linkage between trade and investment.
Intra-firm transnational trading, for example, simultaneously involves
issues of inter-State foreign market access (between the State of the
parent firm and the State of the affiliate firm), as well as the
establishment of an investment in the host State (through the creation of
the affiliate firm responsible for direct operations).4
Viewed from fundamental principles of economics, however, the
trade-investment relationship might not seem as immediately obvious.
Modem neoclassical trade theory uses the Ricardian theory of
comparative advantage and the basic factor proportions model5 to show
how the incentive structure (and thus, the decision to trade or exchange)
depends on factor intensities and resource endowments between States
LAW AND SoFT LAW 148-90 (Andrea K. Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds. 2012); David Collins,
A New Role for the WTO in International Investment Law: Public Interest in the Post-Neoliberal
Period, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009); Anastasios Gourgourinis, Lex Specialis in WTO and
Investment Protection Law, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 579 (2010); Robert Howse et al., The Use
and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: A Reply to Jilrgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1087 (2010); Jrgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration:
Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749 (2009); Andrew Mitchell & Caroline
Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of 'Necessity' in International
Investment Law and WTO Law, CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013); Levent Sabanogullari, Most
Favoured Nation Treatment in International Trade and Investment Law - Comparing Apples and
Oranges?, 8 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 3 (2011); Greg Tereposky & Morgan Maguire, Utilizing
WTO Law in Investor State Dispute Settlement, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010, at 247-83 (Arthur Rovine ed.,
2011).
4. See Arwel Davies, Scoping the Boundary Between the Trade Law and Investment Law
Regimes: When Does a Measure Relate to Investment?, 15 J. INT'L. ECON. LAW 793 (2012).
5. Mordechai E. Kreinin & Michael G. Plummer, Economic Principles of International
Trade, ch. 37, 3-22, at 6, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS VOL. II (Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005).
In sum, each country exports the commodities that are relatively intensive in
the factor with which it is relatively well endowed. That is how it acquires a
comparative advantage in these commodities. . . . this model has considerable
explanatory power. One of its implications is that each country exports the
"factor services" of its abundant factor, as embodied in the bundle of its export
goods, and imports the "factor services" of its abundant factor, as embodied in
the bundle of its import goods. (Commodity trade and factor movements,
therefore, are substitutes, as a country can either export its factor services or its
factors.) Thus, trade raises the demands for, and the price of the abundant
factor, and lowers the demand for, and the price of, the scarce factor. The effect
of trade on the country's income distribution is at the heart of the controversy
over free trade versus protectionism in many countries: the scarce factor
lobbies for protectionism, to minimize its losses. Likewise, factors employed in
the export industries gain from trade, and those employed in import-competing
industries lose.
Id.
2014] 53
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(e.g., the relative capital/labor ratios in two States in relation to the
bundle of commodities produced). Theories of foreign direct investment
(FDI), on the other hand, attribute firms' decisions to invest abroad to
either of the following: (1) the nature of business operations in a
production cycle (e.g., innovation, growth, maturity and decline);
(2) the effect of exchange rates on imperfect capital markets (e.g.,
stronger currencies tend to reduce the volume of FDI); (3) the processes
of internalization (e.g., FDI occurs when firm-specific advantages
outweigh the costs of outsourcing operations abroad); or (4) the eclectic
theory of firms' advantages (e.g., ownership advantages, location
advantages, internalization advantages) that create a sufficient incentive
for foreign direct investment, as opposed to other transactional options
available to such firms.6
The transactional differences between trade and investment thus
translate into different sets of respective determinants for international
investment (capital) flows and international trade flows. The
International Monetary Fund's key 1991 global survey and analysis of
the determinants of global capital flows identified three major
determinants that significantly influence firms' decisions to invest
(whether in a direct manner through the establishment of operations in
the host State, or through indirect forms such as equity, securities, or
other types of portfolio investment): (1) economic fundamentals (e.g.,
"global investment opportunities available, the covariances between
expected returns on various investments, the growth of wealth in
different countries, and differences across economic agents in their
willingness to assume risk and in rates of time preference"); (2) relevant
official policies (e.g., tax policies; official guarantees; capital controls;
limitations on the entry of foreign firms into domestic markets;
restrictions on the domestic activities, products, locations and interest
rates charged by financial institutions; misaligned real exchange rates;
restrictive trade policies; debt-servicing arrears and reschedulings; and
unstable macroeconomic policies"); and (3) market distortions (e.g.,
"transaction costs and asymmetric information among market
participants"). On the other hand, a World Bank report identifies
6. Vintila Denisia, Foreign Direct Investment Theories: An Overview of the Main FDI
Theories, 3 EuR. J. INTERDISC. STUD. 53, 55-57 (2010). There are of course more new theories of
FDI decision-making. See also IMAD A. MOOSA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE (2002); A.L. Calvet, A Synthesis of Foreign Direct Investment
Theories and Theories of the Multinational Firm, 12 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 43 (1981); Olga
Vasyechko, A Review of FDI Theories: An Application for Transition Economies, 89 INT'L RES.
J. FIN. & ECON. 118-37 (2012).
7. Morris Goldstein et al., Determinants and Systemic Consequences of International
Capital Flows, in DETERMINANTS AND SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
FLOWS: A STUDY BY THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1,
19-24 (International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 77, Mar. 1991) [IMF FEE].
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different determinants of global trade flows, composed of the traditional
variables of factor endowments (e.g., capital/labor ratios and resource
endowments) and exchange rate spreads between States,8 as well as
several new determinants that have been observed from cross-country
data (e.g., productivity differences, consumer preferences, scale returns
and technology, increase in mean incomes, improvements in
information and communication technology or infrastructure, and trade
intensity as affected by country size and trade barriers). 9
Given these conceptual differences, it is unsurprising that the
separate and distinct international economic transactions of trade and
investment are governed by distinct international regulatory
architectures which, while sharing some early "common roots,"
ultimately demonstrated "diverging evolutions." 0 As Nicholas Di
Mascio and Joost Pauwelyn observed in 2008:
The trade regime is about overall welfare, efficiency,
liberalization, state-to-state exchanges of market access, and
trade opportunities - not individual rights . . . [while] the
traditional investment regime is about fairness grounded in
customary rules on treatment of aliens, not efficiency. It is about
protection, not liberalization, and about individual rights, not
state-to-state exchanges of market opportunities."
The regulatory content for international trade, as opposed to that
which has evolved for international investment, has understandably
been designed with consideration for the particularity of each subject-
matter to be regulated, as well as the respective policy purposes behind
each sphere of regulation.12
8. See Marianne Baxter & Michael A. Kouparitsas, What Determines Bilateral Trade
Flows?, NBER Working Paper 12188, Apr. 2006, available at http://cid.bcrp.gob.pe/biblio/
Papers/NBER/2006/Abril/wl2188.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); Eswar S. Prasad & Jeffery
A. Gable, International Evidence on the Determinants of Trade Dynamics, 45 IMF Staff Papers
401 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.perjacobsson.org/extemal/Pubs/FT/staffp/1998/09-
98/pdf/prasad.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
9. Julien Gourdon, Explaining Trade Flows: Traditional and New Determinants of Trade
Patterns, CERDI, Etudes et Documents E 2007.06, available at http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/55/71/25/PDF/2007.06.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
10. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 48, 51-53 (Jan.
2008).
11. Id. at 54-56.
12. See David P. Baron, Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, vol. 11, ch. 24 1347, 1349, (R. Schmalensee & R.D.
Willig eds. 1989).
Regulation involves government intervention in markets in response to some
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Nonetheless, it would be quite unrealistic to deny the existence of
any nexus whatsoever between trade regulation and foreign investment
rules.13 However, as I caution in this Article, it is also dangerous to
hyperbolize the influence of the former regime on the latter, or to
mechanistically design public policy solutions in international
investment law by mere transplant of the public policy interpretations,
methodological approaches, and institutional solutions that have
uniquely evolved within international trade law and which, to date,
have mostly achieved a mixed record of success.4 The obstacles to the
automatic transplantation of WTO law into investment law are neither
imagined nor speculative. For one, investment treaty texts may not
necessarily possess the same linguistic elasticity as trade treaty
combination of normative objectives and private interests reflected through
politics. Whatever objective the regulation is intended to achieve, the regulator
must choose policies tailored to the particular regulatory setting and to the
characteristics of the firms subject to its authority. In choosing those policies,
the regulator must take into account the strategies the firm might employ in
response to those policies.
Id.
13. See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 444 (3d ed. Routledge):
There is a complex interaction between foreign investment and trade
protection. First of all, foreign investment may occur as a means of jumping
tariff walls or avoiding harassment of imports under the trade remedy laws of
the host country (so-called "cooperative protectionism"). If much of its
comparative advantage is portable, consisting of know-how, processes and
technology, a company may avoid border restrictions simply by manufacturing
within the domestic market. Enhanced access to host-country markets generally
ranks high among the factors that industries cite as reasons for foreign
investment.
Id.
14. On the debate regarding the WTO's favorable or unfavorable impact and record on
human rights and public interest protection, see Alan 0. Sykes, International Trade and Human
Rights: An Economic Perspective, (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 188, 2003),
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/files/188.aos_.human-rights.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 10, 2013); Robert D. Anderson & Hannu Wager, Human Rights, Development, and the
WTO: The Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2006),
707-47, available at http://jiel.oxfordjoumals.org/content/9/3/707.fuill.pdf+html; HOLGER P.
HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
(2007); Peter Hilpold, WTO Law and Human Rights: Bringing Together Two Autopoietic
Orders, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 323-72 (2011), available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjoumals.org/
content/10/2/323.full.pdf+html?sid=a3056730-l db0-4cd4-8acf-247574fc4c25; JAMES HARRISON,
THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 17-68 (2007); SARAH JOSEPH,
BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 7-141 (2011); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO
Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753-814 (2002).
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provisions.' 5 Investment arbitration tribunals, operating as they do
under the parameters of a specific and limited mandate to resolve a
particular dispute, may find that their jurisdictional competence cannot
easily echo the broad judicial functions of the WTO Appellate Body,16
even if both types of tribunals adhere to some sense and understanding
of a jurisprudence constante.1 7  Finally, grafting WTO law onto
investment law would have to reckon with how this proposal would be
received within the different strategic bargaining dynamics in the
investment law system's usual tria e of a host State, its constituents,
and a prospective foreign investor, as opposed to the predominantly
inter-State bargaining dynamics within the complex, "multilevel," and
constitutionalized system' 9 in the WTO.20
Notwithstanding these contextual differences, it is curious that there
15. See Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and Supplementary Means of Interpretation ofNon-
Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 827, 882-94 (2010);
Jose E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2010-2011 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
16. See Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment
Disputes, APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 231, 235 (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2008); Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate System in International Investment
Arbitration?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1155, 1165,
(Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). On the international judicial function of the WTO Appellate
Body, see ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 159-
64 (2009) (noting that, under the "principle of non ultra petita," the WTO panels and Appellate
Body "should not decide more than is covered by their jurisdiction in a particular dispute ...
[t]he exception to this principle in appellate review is that the Appellate Body may review the
exercise of inherent powers by panels, even in the absence of a claim to that effect." VAN
DAMME, supra, at 160).
17. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1014-49 (2007); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards
as Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 265-80 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008).
18. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority, and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 465 (2005); Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment
and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT'L EcON. L. 507 (2009), available at
http://jiel.oxfordjoumals.org/content/12/2/507.full.pdf+html?sid=ab78494f-aee8-48e5-bf62-52d
2flb03a7b; JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 67-
123 (2011); Stephania Bonilla & Rosa Castro, A Law and Economics Analysis of International
Investment Treaties: Latin America, Oct. 2006 unpublished paper, available at http://www.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paperscfm?abstract_id= 1007684 (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
19. Famously coined and conceptualized by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. See Among Others
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel
Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 5-58 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
eds., 2011); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS
2-7 (2012).
20. See generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (2002).
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remains an enduring scholarly purchase to the proposition that WTO
law is always instructive for investment law. To some, importing trade
interpretations into investment treaty standards ultimately means taking
a crucial ideological position favoring the discursive unit y, rather than
normative fragmentation, of international law in general. Where one
accepts this theoretical prism of unity and the coherence of international
economic law (IEL) as a system 2 2 (or for that matter, IEL's unity with
international law at large),3 it would seem that there is nothing at all
21. Among the voluminous literature on the subject of fragmentation vis-ai-vis unity
between international trade and international investment law, see Jose Manuel Alvarez-Zarate,
Searching for Coherence in Trade and Investment Arbitration: Domestic Policies under Siege,
Working Paper No. 2012/48, Society of International Economic Law Global Conference, July
2012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2102665 (last accessed
Jan. 10, 2013); RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW:
MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL GOVERNANCE ch. 1 (2011) (Introduction); Jurgen
Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International Investment
Law and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW ch.8
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); David Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity.in International
Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?, J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 20 (2011),
available at http://jids.oxfordjoumals.org/content/2/2/47I.full.pdf+html?sid=8f094943-182f-413
3-9742-a3467ea56fl0.
It is worth underscoring that having resort to the WTO system is to seek out
reinforcements entirely in sync with the project of spreading economic
liberalism worldwide. Having recourse to the world trading regime precedent is
to look for a reliable and steady ally whose international rationality differs little
from the investment rules regime.
Id.; Julien Chaisse & Philippe Gugler, Foreign Investment Issues and WTO Law - Dealing with
Fragmentation While Waiting for a Multilateral Framework, in ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 135-71 (Julien Chaisse & Tiziano Balmelli eds., 2008).
22. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 33 (1996); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law in
the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3-39 (2001),
available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/1/3.full.pdf+html?sid=38d71102-c873-4a2f-
b2f3-6la7f4ecdcle; Bradly J. Condon, Trade, Environment and Sovereignty: Developing
Coherence Between WTO Law, International Environmental Law, and General International
Law, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (2004), available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1018&context-theses (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); Thomas Cottier et al.,
Introduction: Fragmentation and Coherence in International Economic Regulation: Analysis
and Conceptual Foundations, in THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: FROM
FRAGMENTATION TO COHERENCE 1, 52 (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2011).
23. On the general systems coherence of international law despite the proliferation of
numerous functional and specialized regimes, see Christian Tomuschat, International Law as a
Coherent System: Unity or Fragmentation?, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
W. MICHAEL REISMAN 323-54 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al., 2010). An incipient proposal
suggests transposing systems theory into the analysis of international investment law. See Julia
Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach,
unpublished draft for the ASIL International Economic Law Interest Group dated Nov. 16, 2012,
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unusual in the rising clamor for international investment law to increase
its receptiveness to trade law.24 Tomer Broude has recently gone so far
as to argue in favor of the pure consolidation of international trade and
investment law into one system of law altogether, stressing that:
The regulation of trade and the law of investment have inevitably
gravitated towards each other, drawing on their common genetic
makeup. However, the convergence is far from true
consolidation. Rather, it is piecemeal and unplanned, lacking a
unifying logic. . . . From a policy perspective, it seems difficult
to justify such a continued bifurcation. [In regard to] subsidies,
one wonders if it makes any sense to effectively proscribe
subsidies that influence the physical movement of goods as
inefficient, while at the same time, at least by default, sanctioning
subsidies that create an inefficient global allocation of investment
resources. Much the same could be said about other specific areas
of regulation - discriminatory treatment of goods and services
compared to discriminatory treatment of investment; the
treatment of intellectual property as trade-related issues when
they are no less related to international investment; increased
access to goods and services markets when access to capital
markets remains constrained; incongruous limitations on trade
and investment-related based on the same "non-economic"
considerations; differences between regional trade arrangement
and regional investment structures. The list goes on.
Evidentl; the tribe of enthusiasts for some kind of "systemic
integration" between WTO law and investment law is increasing. The
academic literature alone is rife with many innovative WTO law qua
investment law proposals. On one end of the spectrum, there are those
who concede a minimum of normative and ideological convergence
available at http://www.asil.org/iel-biennial/files/Maupin%20paper.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10,
2013).
24. Jose Manuel Alvarez-Zarate, Searching for Coherence in Trade and Investment
Arbitration: Domestic Policies Under Siege, (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law Working Paper No.
2012/48, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2102665.
25. Tomer Broude, Investment and Trade: The 'Lottie and Lisa' of International
Economic Law? (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 10-11), in NEW
DIRECTIONS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 12,
19 (Pierre Sauve & Robert Echandi eds., 2012).
26. The coinage and concept is attributable to Professor Campbell McLachlan. See
Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279-320 (2005), available at http://joumals.cambridge.org/
action/displayFulltext?type=l&pdftype=1&fid=1 531876&jid=ILQ&volumeld=54&issueld=02&
aid=1531868.
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between WTO law and investment law-at least enough to regard WTO
law as having some "persuasive" effect on the interpretation and
application of investment treaty norms.2 7 Some plumb the conceptual
commonalities between substantive standards in investment treaties
(such as the most favored nation clause and the national treatment
clause) with their trade law counterparts, to push for a shared normative
interpretation within a broader epistemic and interpretive community of
law-appliers. 28 At the opposite extreme, there are those who find little or
no conceptual divide between WTO law and investment law, such that
WTO law and jurisprudence may, ought, or should be incorporated as
much as possible as "authoritative" sources of law in the interpretation
27. See Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the
Concept of 'Necessity' in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 93
(2013) (proposing the adoption ofjudicial methodologies developed by WTO panels, particularly
proportionality analysis for necessary measures in GATT exceptions); Thomas Klein, Judicial
Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential ofBalancing in International Economic Law, in
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 251, 274-77 (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds.,
2012); ROLAND KLAGER, 'FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT' IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 104-12 (2011) (advocating an "integrative" interpretation of the FET standard that could
include references to WTO law); Robert Howse, The Relevance of WTO Law and Jurisprudence
to Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Notes for Panel Discussion, Investment Treaty Forum,
British Institute for International and Comparative Law, Sept. 9, 2011, available at
http://www.biicl.org/files/5638_roberthowse.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013) (noting specific
investment treaty concepts and principles originating from the GATT/WTO acquis and the
dangers of re-litigation of the same issues in parallel trade vis-a-vis investment arbitration
proceedings, but also cautioning that "the use of WTO law and jurisprudence in investor-state
dispute settlement requires careful attention to contextual differences and a range of other
considerations"). Although note that arguments have been advanced in favor of a strict
separation between WTO law and investment law. See Cesar Giovanni Chaparro Rincon, The
Relationship Between International Investment Agreements and the WTO Legal System -
Conflicts and Sustainable Development, 8 TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. 33-42 (2011) (finding that
"complementary relationship between WTO [law] and IIA [international investment agreement]
is unfeasible").
28. KLAGER, supra note 27, at 110; Michael Ewing-Chow, Thesis, Antithesis and
Synthesis: Investor protection in BITs, WTO and FTAs, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 548-71 (2007);
Martins Paparinskis, Equivalent Primary Rules and Differential Secondary Rules:
Countermeasures in WTO and Investment Protection Law, in MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 259-88 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011); Jilrgen
Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International Investment
Law and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW ch. 8
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relieffor Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 493,
503-06 (2003) (arguing that WTO law and jurisprudence are relevant external rules to
international investment treaties, applying Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties). On fundamental conceptual differences between the assessment of discrimination in
WTO law as opposed to that undertaken in investment law, see Thomas Wilde, The Serbian
Loans Case - A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection of Foreign Debt?, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL
TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 383,411-14 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
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of investment treaties. 29  Full convergence and cross-fertilization
between WTO law and investment law, according to this view, would
29. Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 27. For the famous investment law case that directly
used WTO law to interpret investment treaty norms, see Continental Casualty Company v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of Sept. 5, 2008, if 192-94 (using
GATT Article XX exceptions to interpret Article XI of the Argentine-U.S. bilateral investment
treaty). Other tribunals have not gone as far as the Continental Casualty tribunal in directly
incorporating WTO law and jurisprudence to interpret an investment treaty norm. For example,
the interpretation of WTO law of national treatment was not deemed pertinent by the tribunal in
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. U.N. 3467,
Award of July 1, 2004, 173-76.
The Tribunal is mindful of the discussion of the meaning of "like products" in
respect of national treatment under the GATT/WTO. In that context it has been
held that the concept has to be interpreted narrowly and that like products are
related to the concept of directly competitive or substitutable products . . .
However, those views are not specifically pertinent to the issue discussed in
this case. In fact, the purpose of national treatment in this dispute is the
opposite of that under the GATT/WTO, namely it is to avoid exporters being
placed at a disadvantage in foreign markets because of the indirect taxes paid in
the country of origin, while in GATT/WTO the purpose is to avoid imported
products being affected by a distortion of competition with similar domestic
products because of taxes and other regulations in the country of destination.
Id. The tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, Ad hoc
(UNCITRAL), Award of Jan. 26, 2006, 37 acknowledged the further development of the
concept of "transparency" and "legitimate expectations" in WTO law and jurisprudence. In
Canfor Corporation v. United States, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL), Decision on Preliminary Question
June 6, 2006, 183, the tribunal took into account the fundamental principle that the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reflects "compatibility with GATT/WTO law."
WTO law was cited as an additional source to provide evidence of the existence of the general
principle of good faith in Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5,
Award of Apr. 15, 2009, 77. The tribunal in Methanex Corporation v. United States, Ad hoc
(UNCITRAL), Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, Aug. 3, 2005, T 5-6, was careful to
avoid adjudicating allegations that the United States had violated GATT law, but initially
conceded that
[w]hen it comes to interpreting the provisions of Section A of Chapter 11, in
particular in the instant case Article 1102, the Tribunal may derive guidance
from the way in which a similar phrase in the GA TT has been interpreted in the
past. While such interpretations cannot be treated by this Tribunal as binding
precedents, the Tribunal may remain open to persuasion based on legal
reasoning developed in GATT and WTO jurisprudence, if relevant. If (as
appears to be the case) Methanex's argument amounts to no more this, it
accords with the approach taken by the Tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately, the tribunal's textual examination of NAFTA Article 1102
revealed that the incorporation of GATT criteria on "like goods" had not been intended by the
NAFTA drafters: "the intent of the drafters to create distinct regimes for trade and investment is
explicit in Article 1139's definition of investment" (Methanex, % 33-35).
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ostensibly cure further "fragmentation" and abate growing "dissonance"
among arbitral tribunals within the international investment law
regime.30
Apart from the foregoing ideological motivations, acceptance of the
WTO law qua investment law proposition also unmasks certain
methodological and institutional preferences. Some endorse the
interpretive methodologies of WTO panels or the Appellate Body to
investment arbitrators dealing with open-textured or ambiguous treaty
clauses such as non-precluded measures or necessity.31 Others hold up
the centralized system of interpretation in the WTO as the functional
paradigm to be emulated by the diffuse and decentralized investment
law regime.32 In recent years, some investment treaty-making practices
have started reflecting States' decisions to favor direct incorporation of,
or specific reference to, trade law provisions within investment
treaties.
30. Of course, this assumes that "dissonance" among investment arbitral awards is itself a
problem, in the first place, and not merely an expected phenomenon in a treaty regime governed
by a universe of over 3000 international investment agreements to date. It has been argued that
this dissonance is characteristically expected of the particular "system design" for investment
law. See R. Doak Bishop & Margrete Stevens, A Systemic Perspective of the Foreign Investment
Dispute Settlement System: Feedback, Adaptation, and Stability, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2011, at 25-59 (Arthur W.
Rovine ed., 2012). It has also been proposed that dissonance in the international investment law
regime can be overcome internally by adopting a public law conceptual perspective in
investment treaty arbitration. See Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52
VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 78-85 (2011).
31. Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 27. See also Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, New
Approaches to the State of Necessity in Customary International Law: Insights from WTO Law
and Foreign Investment Law, unpublished paper, available at http://biblioteca.ucp.edu.
co/OJS/index.php/paginas/article/viewFile/916/838. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 504 (2009) ("IIA
tribunals should consider applicable interpretive principles drawn from WTO jurisprudence on
Article XX GATT. . ."). For a regime-specific analysis of methodologies in WTO jurisprudence
regarding necessity exceptions, see Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law:
Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L
153 (2009), available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/1/153.full.pdf+html?sid=
dfd01605-e443-4de3-bO9d-6931c26f8c31.
32. Collins, supra note 3, at 3-4 ("WTO principles may further some of the key public
interest issues that could arise in the investment context . . . the inclusive and internally coherent
nature of WTO dispute settlement is more responsive to public interest concerns than the private,
largely inconsistent commercial arbitration of investment disputes."); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,
supra note 31, at 503-04. On the increasing resort to WTO/GATT language for new generations
of investment treaty standards, see Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New
Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 1037 (2010), available
at http://jiel.oxfordjoumals.org/content/13/4/1037.full.pdf+html?sid=83d81b7c-8c86-4328-82c6-
d839eff90f92.
33. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement arts. 17-18 (reproducing
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It is not my intent to seek a sharp and indissoluble line of separation
between WTO law and investment law for any and all cases. Where it
can be shown that States' investment treaty practices purposely and
discernibly adopt GATT/WTO treaty language, the unitary system of
treaty interpretation would itself require law-appliers to refer to WTO
law and jurisprudence. 34 Rather, for purposes of this Article, I invite
scrutiny to the deployment of the WTO law qua investment law
proposition in "public interest" narratives much in vogue now with
certain quarters of international investment law scholarship, 35 and which
tacitly assume that WTO law contains the veritable and venerable
public policy toolbox for solving the "legitimacy crisis"36 in investment
GATT Articles XX/GATS Article XIV and GATT Article XXI), available at http://www.thaifta.
com/thaifta/Portals/O/acia.pdf; Energy Charter Treaty arts. 3 & 4 (explicitly referring to GATT
provisions and related instruments), available at http://www.ena.It/pdfai/Treaty.pdf; United
States/Estonia BIT (1994) art. II (expressly stating that "[t]he free trade area exception in this
Treaty is analogous to the exception provided for with respect to trade in the GATT"), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43560.pdf; Japan/Cambodia BIT (2007) art. 18
(providing for direct incorporation of GATT and related instruments, e.g. "For the purposes of
this Agreement other than Article 13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 arts. XX &
XXI; bis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in Annex IB arts. XIV & XV.
The GATS are incorporated into and from part of this Agreement, "mutatis mutandis.");
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, nn.10- I1, arts. 16(1) & (2), available at http://www.miti.
gov.my/storage/documents/46f/com.tms.cms.document.Document d5b6cac4-cOa8I 573-5b605
b60-f919ea54/l/ACFTA%201nvestment%20Agreement%20-%20ASEAN%20Version%20%
20(19%20Nov% 202008%20clean).pdf
34. DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY
IN MODERN TREATY INTERPRETATION 234 (2012); Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future
Investment Treaties: Balancing Investors' Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States, in
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Special Issue: International
Investment Law and EU Law) 145, 169 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties arts. 31 & 32, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/_1_1 969.pdf.
35. Collins, supra note 3. See also Kevin P. Gallagher, Policy Space to Prevent and
Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements, U.N. G-24 Discussion Paper No.
58 (May 2010), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edulgdae/Pubs/rp/KGCapCdntrolsG-24.pdf
(last accessed Jan. 10, 2013) (concluding, among others, that investment treaty provisions on
capital controls should adopt provisions already found in free trade agreements on balance of
payments, essential security exceptions, and a state-to-state dispute resolution process);
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 66-76, 127-
66, 179-88 (2012) (referring to proportionality, necessity, and balancing tests in WTO
jurisprudence on GATT Article XX exceptions).
36. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521
(2005); Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1-42 (2012), available at
http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/95.full.pdf+html?sid=000f2776-6a36-4227-b860-fc3
be7ddO6O4; Christina Cathey Schuetz, Legitimacy and Inconsistency: Is Investment Arbitration
Broken and if so, Can or Should it Be Fixed, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ch.12 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010); Charles N. Brower &
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law. Those doubtful of the investment law regime's ability to enable
States to continue vindicating and defending public interest would often
contrast the alleged paralysis in investment law against the evolution of
WTO adjudicative practices toward balancing human rights compliance
with foreign market access demands of liberalization and free trade. 37
For some, the public policy dialogue in WTO law might appear more
settled, well-reasoned, and coherent in the multilateral and plurilateral
trading system, more so than the oft-alluded current quest for "policy
space" across constellations of thousands of bilateral and regional
investment treaties.38 At this point in the ongoing public policy and
regulatory freedom debate in the international investment law regime,
one might be led to believe that trade law's engagement with human
rights and public policy has never looked rosier.
This Article suggests there is need to pause and rethink the
proposition that WTO law could, and indeed should, be grafted into
investment law in order to resolve the latter's current controversies on
States' regulatory freedom to vindicate the public interest and human
rights. I advance three contextual policy reasons to dial back some of
the current enthusiasm, or even over enthusiasm. First, I submit that the
public interest and human rights dialectics have evolved and are
Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471 (2009).
37. Davies, supra note 4; Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 27; Anthea Roberts, Clash of
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45
(2013); William w. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 333-43
(2010); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors'
Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - the Concept of Proportionality, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75-106 (Stephan W. Schill
ed., 2010). On emulating the increased participation rights found in regional free trade
agreements, see Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 807-18 (2008).
38. See Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative
Perspective, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 371 (2007); Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in
International Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT
LAW 355, 366 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011).
[G]eneral exceptions are intended to provide greater regulatory flexibility to
host States in pursuing the specific legitimate objectives established in the
exceptions. Since the inclusion of GATT and GATS-like exceptions in IIAs is
quite exceptional, an effet utile interpretation might suggest that the parties
intended to provide the host State greater regulatory flexibility and a
corresponding lower level of investment protection than other IIAs without
general exceptions.
Id. (indicating an interpretation of general exceptions).
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evolving within the WTO and investment treaty regimes according to
unique and separate trajectories, to the point that the years of entrenched
and embedded treaty texts as well as institutionalized functional
decision-making practices in each regime, militate against the automatic
transposition of WTO law into investment law. Part II lays-out and
synthesizes fundamental differences between treaty language,
communities of law-appliers and treaty interpreters, and institutional
structures in both WTO law and international investment law, which
have heretofore yielded nonlinear interpretations and constructions of
the "public interest" and "human rights" norms in both the dispute
settlement process and the law-making processes of each treaty
regime. 3 9 As aptly observed by one scholar, the very concept of "public
interest" itself remains as "ambiguous" for human rights law as for trade
law.40
39. On human rights and the public interest in WTO law, see among others Viktoriia
Kotsiubska, Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Anti-Dumping
Disciplines, unpublished Master's Thesis for the World Trade Institute, Sept. 2011, available at
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/userupload/wti.org/I master-programme/pdfs/Masters thesis
Viktoriia%20Kotsiubska.pdf; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic
Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights Constitution, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 29, 54-56
(Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006). On the proposed taxonomy of "conditionality-based
measures" (e.g., measures taken by one WTO Member State in order to promote or protect the
human rights of persons in another WTO Member State through trade restrictions or incentives),
"compliance-based measures" (e.g., measures taken by a WTO Member State in order to protect
and promote the human rights of persons in its own country, usually distributive rights such as
economic, social and cultural rights), and "cooperation-based measures" (e.g., States cooperate
in order to protect and promote the human rights of individuals in another State, usually for the
protection of distributive rights), see JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 175-79 (2007). On human rights and the public interest in
international investment law, see among others Susan L. Karamanian, Human Rights Dimensions
ofInvestment Law, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 236-71
(Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012); Jorge E. Vinuales & Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Human
Rights and Investment Disciplines: Integration in Progress, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(M. Bungenberg et al. eds., 2012); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Human Rights and International
Investment Law: A Case for Fragmentation or Unity of Public International Law?; Christoph
Schreuer & Clara Reiner, Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al.
eds., 2009); Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface Between International
Investment Protection and Human Rights, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - LIBER
AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 165-89 (August Reinisch & Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007);
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 573 (July 2011), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=
I&fid=8351571&jid=ILQ&volumeld=60&issueld=03&aid=8351569&bodyld=&membershipN
umber-&societyETOCSession=; Aligning Human Rights and Investment Protection, 10
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2013), available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.
com/article.asp?key=1925.
40. SIMONE PETER, PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMON GOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 200
2014]1 65
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Furthermore, the severance of investment law from WTO law in the
aftermath of failed negotiations on a multilateral investment regime,4 1 1
submit, is by no means a historical accident. The competing individual
State and non-State interests that resulted in the failure to reach a
multilateral investment accord in 1997, have since crystallized into
different political and sociological configurations of dispersed public
and private sector constituencies, each affecting numerous individual
investment treaty negotiations and the eventual contours of the first to
third generations of investment treaties.42 It should be of little surprise
then that in the earliest investment treaty generations, public interests
through human rights had scarcely any visibility either in treaty
43language or institutional design.4
After the failure of the Doha Development Round44 and the
increasing proliferation of regional free trade agreements, 4 5 there has
been an incremental rise of new investment treaty provisions carving
out State regulatory freedom to vindicate public interest and human
rights in recent generations of investment treaties (particularly model
BITs of the United States and Canada).46 The current proposal of the
(2012).
41. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 13, at 458-60; Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (M4I) and the Absence of a Global Public Policy
Network, unpublished paper for the U.N. Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks,
available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/TielemanMAI GPPNetwork.pdf.
42. On alternative visions of the ideological and political histories behind the emergence
of the international investment law system, see generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 19-120 (2010); M. SORNARAJAH,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 18-29 (2d ed. 2004); NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 31, at 1-74; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 25-64 (2009); Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign
Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
supra note 23, at 607-40.
43. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT RULE-MAKING: STOCKTAKING, CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD 9-20, 28-32,
41-48, 53-77 (2008), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf.
44. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS
419-35 (2012) (detailing the failed negotiations and lack of political support for human rights
approaches to the Doha Round Agreements).
45. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES at 84-85,
99-103, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir201 2embargoed en.pdf
(last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); Susan Ariel Aaronson, Human Rights, at 443-66, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/C21.pdf (last accessed Jan.
10, 2013) (surveying and summarizing the human rights provisions that have proliferated in
preferential trade agreements of Canada, the European Union, the European Free Trade
Association, and the United States).
46. On the negotiation of investment chapters within free trade agreements between Latin
American countries and the United States, see Roberto Echandi, A New Generation of
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U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), entitled
"Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development," puts
forward various policy options and recommendations for host States to
design various elements in their international investment agreements
that would contribute to the achievement of development objectives.47
Some of these recommendations are drawn from experiences in WTO
law and adjudication, and, in my view, require careful analysis of their
ultimate applicability to investment law. In an UNCTAD investment
policy hub exchange I recently had with Andrew Mitchell and Caroline
Henckels on their proposed adoption of "necessity tests" in WTO
jurisprudence on GATT Article XX exceptions for investment law, I
expressed some reservations primarily due to the lingering contextual
and textual differences between WTO law and investment law. WTO
Counselor for Legal Affairs Gabrielle Marceau concurred,
acknowledging that
[o]ne should be prudent about pursuing this route. The
"necessity" provisions under WTO, those in investment treaties,
and the necessity principle in general international law in general
international law respond to different wordings, objectives,
purposes and contexts ... investment tribunals may gain from the
WTO experience in the necessity test, but a mere transposition of
the WTO's approach to the necessity analysis with the view of
guiding investment tribunals should take into account the
specificity [of] investment treaties concerned.
Understandably, more than a decade of the legal, adjudicative, and
policy dialogue on human rights in WTO law and jurisprudence have
engineered sufficient practical, as well as theoretical, sedimentation of
"trade and human rights" approaches49-at least enough to attract
International Investment Agreements in the Americas: Impact of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement over Investment Rule-Making, available at http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/
communications/pdf/2006/20211006/ses 3_echandi.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
47. I examine some of the WTO law-based proposals (particularly proportionality analysis
for exceptions, and special and differential treatment provisions) in the IPFSD in Part III. See
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INVESTMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2012), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Publications
Library/webdiaepcb20l2d6 en.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
48. See ANDREW D. MITCHELL & CAROLINE HENCKELS, THE CONCEPT OF 'NECESSITY' AND
NON-PRECLUDED MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THREE LESSONS FROM WTO
TRIBUNALS 8 (2013); Diane A. Desierto Jan. 29, 2013 comment and Gabrielle Marceau Jan. 30,
2013 comment, available at http://www.investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Views/Public/Featured
DiscussionDetails.aspx?fdid=18 (last accessed Feb. 1, 2013).
49. On the counter-narrative showing how the history of international trade has always
contained certain ideas related to the protection and promotion of human rights, albeit reflecting
different ideological compromises over time at each stage of political actors' engagement with
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interest in the possibility of transplanting these public policy
interpretations and methodologies in WTO law into the supposedly
beleaguered international investment law regime. However, one must
also deal with a counterpart reality in the investment treaty regime.
Years of entrenchment of diverse treaty texts and institutional dynamics
in separate "investor-home State-host State" configurations across the
globe have also resulted in unique law-making processes and
institutional practices, along with an investor-host State dispute
settlement mechanism that emerged as a fully distinct enforcement
process from that of the inter-State extended litigation process in the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).5 As I explain further
in Part II, disparate treaty texts, functional practices, and institutional
structures, pose some substantive and procedural hurdles for law-
appliers and authoritative decision-makers to accept a priori the WTO
law qua investment law proposition.
Part III then proceeds to develop my second argument-namely, that
while the issue of domestic policy space appears common to both WTO
law and investment law (or for that matter, mirrors the perennial tension
in the interplay of international law and the domaine reservi51), they are
addressed to different operational questions. WTO interpretations and
dialectical conceptions of States' regulatory freedom have been framed
according to the interacting ratione materiae of market access issues,
non-discrimination issues, standards regulation, and extensive
52
exceptions, and as such are not so analogous or easily transplantable
neoliberalism, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 23-60 (2011).
50. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has long recognized the unique
differences and challenges in achieving human rights protection for different forms of
investment. See Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Human Rights, Trade and Investment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, July 2, 2003, % 7-
12.
51. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law - Governance,
Democracy, and Legitimacy, Za6RV 64, 547-62 (2004), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/64_
2004/64 2004 3 a 547_562.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); Galina G. Shinkaretskaya,
Content and Limits of 'Domaine Reservd,' in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 123-42
(Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin & Riidiger Wolfrum eds., Duncker & Humblot 1988); JEAN L.
COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 165-222 (2012).
52. Erich Vranes, The WTO and Regulatory Freedom: WTO Disciplines on Market
Access, Non-Discrimination and Domestic Regulation Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
12 J. INT'L EcON. L. 4, 953-87 (2009); J6rg Mayer, Policy Space: What, for What, and Where?,
27 DEV. POL'Y REV. 4, 373-95 (2009); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Comparative Analysis of
Policy Space in WTO Law (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law
Research Paper Series, No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1309526 (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); Christine Breining-Kaufmann, The Legal
Matrix of Human Rights and Trade Law: State Obligations Versus Private Rights and
Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 95-136 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds.,
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to issues of regulatory freedom that States confront in international
investment law, particularly in matters of expropriation, legitimate
expectations in the fair and equitable treatment standard, national
treatment, and non-precluded measures.53
Moreover, one can expect that the respective institutional
understandings of State regulatory freedom within WTO law and
investment law would accordingly cycle back to future treaty-drafting
and rule-making processes in each treaty regime. State regulatory
freedom in WTO law, for example, is not simply a matter of
interpretation for the DSU Panels and the Appellate Body, 54 but rather,
is also manifested as a continuing legislative issue to be politically
mediated and coordinated between States, non-State actors, and the
WTO in processes such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism,55 the
negotiation of special and differential treatment (SDT) rules in various
56trade agreements, the authentic interpretations of the General Council
and the Ministerial Conference,57 the use of the waiver power in the
WTO,58 among other internal procedures and functions. By contrast,
international investment law remains devoid of any centralized
mechanism for States to periodically and transparently review,
renegotiate, or authentically interpret investment treaty provisions that
involve the issue of States' regulatory freedom to vindicate the public
2005).
53. Spears, supra note 32; Jilrgen Kurtz, Balancing Investor Protection and Regulatory
Freedom in Investor-State Arbitration: The Complex Search for State Purpose in a National
Treatment Inquiry, Jan. 19, 2012 unpublished draft, available at http://www.iilj.org/research/
documents/KurtzBalancinglnvestorProtectionandRegulatoryFreedomPaper.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 10, 2013); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPROPRIATION (UNCTAD
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 2012), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013);
Howard Mann, The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law, Nov. 2002
unpublished paper, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investmentright-toregulate.pdf
(last accessed Jan. 10, 2013); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE PROTECTION
OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN HAs (UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for
Development 2009), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20085_en.pdf (last
accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
54. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 LAIRD EUR. J.
INT'L L. 4, 753-814 (2002).
55. See SAM LAIRD & RAYMUNDO VALDES, The Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2012); ANTHONY E. CASSIMATIS,
HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TRADE MEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (2007).
56. Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO:
Beyond Special and Differential Treatment (Oct. 2004) (unpublished paper), available at
http://wwwdfidgov.uk/pubs/files/itd/operationalizing-sdt.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
57. See Barnali Choudhury et al., A Call for a WTO Ministerial Decision on Trade and
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 52, at 323-58, 343.
58. See Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political
Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (2009).
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interest and human rights.59
The immediate consequence of the interpretive/legislative gap is that
the concept of State regulatory freedom in WTO law might not have as
much traction or utility to the design of States' regulatory freedom in
international investment law. As I also show briefly in Part III, they
generate some interpretive complications already for a few new
investment treaties that expressly adopt GATT Article XX or GATS
Article XIV. It is more than likely that parallel, rather than identical
visions of State regulatory freedom are emerging in both treaty regimes.
Thus, while WTO law might present a convenient template for
investment treaty language, one has to carefully assess whether the
former's treaty design assumptions and drafting history would indeed
apply, and truly benefit, the latter.
Thirdly, I submit in Part IV that WTO law and jurisprudence itself
does not possess an unvarnished record in successfully vindicating the
public interest through human rights. 60 Despite some well-known
victories (such as the TRIPS waiver on compulsory licensing to make
essential drugs available to developing countries,61 and the Kimberley
Process Certification waiver to prevent the further proliferation of
59. Note, however, some recent investment treaties have started providing for joint
decision mechanisms, a standing treaty monitoring and/or interpretative inter-State body, or
consultation mechanisms. Diane Desierto, Joint Decisions by States Parties: Fair Control of
Tribunal Interpretations?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 8, 2012), http://kluwerarbitration
blog.com/blog/2012/06/08/joint-decisions-by-state-parties-fair-control-of-tribunal-interpretati
ons/ (on inter-State joint decision and consultation mechanisms within investment treaties). See
also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 32, at 61 (on renegotiation and new model
international investment agreements); Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence of NAFTA
Chapter 11 in the BIT Landscape, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 112 (2005) (on
procedural mechanisms from NAFTA such as binding notes of interpretation).
60. For some skeptical findings showing human rights failures under the WTO system,
see Sandrine Dawar, Trade and Human Rights; Exploring the Impact of WTO Law on State
Capacity to Protect, Promote and Fulfill the Human Right to Health (May 2004) (unpublished
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis for Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts
University) (on file with author); Allison Carnegie, Instruments of Coercion: Aid and Trade as
Substitute Policy Levers (Nov. 7, 2012) (unpublished paper), available at http://ncgg.princeton.
edu/IPES/2012/papers/S400_rml.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013) (demonstrating that states
punish illiberal policies of fellow WTO member states by decreasing aid allocations, rather than
by increasing trade protection); Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb, Does the WTO
Help Member States Clean Up? (Aug. 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Institute for
International Economic Policy, George Washington University), available at http://www.gwu.
edu/-iiep/assets/docs/papers/Aaronson IIEPWP2011-13.pdf (last accessed Jan. 10, 2013)
(finding that "empirical analysis did not show that GATT/WTO accession or membership over
time improves governance outcomes . . . new members of the WTO did not improve their
performance on our measures of due process, access to information and even-handedness during
the accession process or as members.").
61. See Decision of General Council, TRIPS Waiver for the Exportation of Essential
Drugs Under Compulsory Licensing, WTIMIN(01)DEC/2 (Aug. 30, 2003).
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conflict diamonds 62), full acceptance of States' regulatory freedom to
enact policies that vindicate public interest or human rights concerns
remains very much a work-in-progress throughout the WTO system. 63
Human rights obligations are, to date, still thinly incorporated in the
WTO commitments.64 Interpretations of trade law exceptions in WTO
jurisprudence still struggle for full consistency with human rights.6 5
Clearly, the jury is still out on whether WTO law has indeed succeeded
in facilitating human rights compliance in a post-Doha era. 66 This casts
some doubts for inducing investment law authoritative decision-makers
to follow where WTO law has not even clearly or certainly succeeded.
Pending the full convergence of treaty language and epistemic
interpretive communities between WTO law and investment law, I
submit that questions of public policy and human rights will continue to
filter through different channels, albeit with some occasional normative
and experiential resemblances that could inform future treaty and
institutional design developments in each regime. In Part V, I explore
how each treaty regime would likely regard and accommodate State
defenses anchored on competing obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and
why this next dialogue will take place on different terms within each
regime.
By way of Conclusion, I offer some further reflections on the
broader theme of systemic integration and the chimera of attaining a
62. See Decision of the General Council of May 15, 2003, Waiver Concerning Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003).
63. On the other hand, for promising findings on achieving human rights compliance
under the international trading system, see Drusilla K. Brown et al., Labor Standards and Human
Rights: Implications for International Trade and Investment (Univ. of Michigan, IPC Working
Paper Series No. 119, 2011), available at http://ipc.umich.edu/working-papers/pdfs/ipc-l19-
brown-deardorff-stern-labor-standards-human-rights-international-trade-investment.pdf (last
accessed Jan. 10, 2013); HAKAN NORDSTROM & ScoTr VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
(1999); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements
Influence Government Repression, 59 INT'L ORG. 593, 593-629 (2005); Michael J. Trebilcock,
Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization, I J. INT'L L. & INT'L RELATIONS 213-38
(2005).
64. See HOLGER P. HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra 52, at 205-31.
65. Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DSIO/R (Nov. 7, 1990); Report of the Panel, United States -
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991); Report of the Panel,
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994); Report of
the Panel, United States -Taxes on Automobiles, GATT Doc. DS3 1R (Oct. 11, 1994).
66. On the imminent failures of abandoning the Doha Round, see Petros C. Mavroidis,
Doha, Dohalf or Dohaha? The WTO Licks Its Wounds, 3 DAVIS TRADE L. & DEV. 367, 367-81
(2011).
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fully "closed system" for governing different forms of international
economic relations. Fragmentation becomes a "problem" only as a
matter of perspective-one wrestles with it only if we persist in
regarding international law through a kind of "gestalt," always
preferring to see an elegant and integral whole much greater than the
sum of its parts. The realities of political deadlocks, institutional
rigidities, and international negotiations that define the processes of
authoritative decision-making in our modern international economic
law, policies, and institutions, however, impel us to reject such a
utopian view.
II. TEXTS, APPLIERS AND STRUCTURE: NONLINEAR INTERPRETATION
OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As will be seen in the following subsections, the legal universes in
WTO law and international investment law are fundamentally
comprised of different bases of obligation, authoritative decision-
makers, and constitutive decision-making processes. The following
subsections show how plural understandings of the "public interest" and
human rights abound in each of those different constitutive elements.
A. Hard and Soft Texts: Bases of Obligation in WTO Law Vis-d-vis
International Investment Law
1. WTO Law
As the WTO itself states, its core rules are contained in around sixty
agreements, annexes, decisions, and understandings, mostly concluded
during the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round, spanning the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO, and agreements in trade in goods,
trade in services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, and
government trade policy review.67 The WTO categorizes these
agreements into three: (1) "broad principles" (e.g., the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights); (2) "extra agreements and annexes dealing with the
special requirements of specific sectors or issues"; and (3) "detailed and
lengthy schedules (or lists) of commitments made by individual
countries allowing specific foreign products or service providers access
to their markets."68 While it is usually observed that individual rights
67. See Navigational Guide to the WTO Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis e/tif e/agrml e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
68. Id.
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are nowhere found in most of the WTO agreements,69 Steve Charnovitz
famously showed that "individuals secure rights indirectly from the
WTO," (e.g., from individual property rights guaranteed in the TRIPS
agreement, rights to standard of treatment under the MFN and national
treatment clauses, to transparency and due process rights and remedial
procedures that could be asserted by individuals against their own
governments), as well as certain direct procedural rights (e.g., rights
under the grievance procedure for exporters under the Agreement on
Preshipment Inspection).7 1 Apart from the WTO agreements, other
sources of WTO law (alternatively dubbed as soft law72 in the WTO)
that may "clarify or define the law applicable between WTO
Members"73 include: the WTO dispute settlement reports, the acts of
WTO bodies, agreements concluded in the context of the WTO,
customary international law, general principles of law, other
international agreements, subsequent practice of WTO Members,
teachin s of the most highly qualified publicists, and the negotiating
history.
The WTO Agreements usually do not explicitly contain any
references to international human rights law. At best, the general
exceptions clauses in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV justify
States to adopt trade-restrictive measures necessary for protecting
various public interest concerns, such as the protection of public morals;
human, animal or plant life or health; ensuring compliance with
domestic laws and regulations on fraud, deceits, data protection, and
69. Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 52, at 102.
70. Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 36 INTERECONOMICS 98
(2001).
71. Id.
72. Mary Footer identifies soft law instruments in the WTO as
the resolutions adopted by the organisation's institutional bodies. These include
not only ministerial declarations and decisions but also the decisions of the
various councils and committees, which may embody understandings,
guidelines, notes produced by the WTO Secretariat at the request of the
members, Chairman's statements and so on. While they are not intended to be
legally binding they may nevertheless have practical effect and may prove
legally relevant . . .. [soft law in the WTO] has proven to be particularly useful
where there is broad lack of agreement or a lack of coordination among WTO
members, where an issue is highly contestable or where cooperation gives rise
to distributive conflicts.
See Mary E. Footer, The (Re)turn to 'Soft Law' in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO Law, II
MELB. J. INT'L. L. 241, 247-48 (2010).
73. PETER VAN DEN BossCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (2d ed. 2008).
74. Id. See also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40-52 (2003).
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safety; labor; cultural heritage; and national resource conservation.7 5
There is now a substantial body of jurisprudence authoritatively
interpreting these provisions, following a two-tier test adopted by the
WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body: a challenged
trade-restrictive measure must first be provisionally evaluated or
justified according to any of the specific enumerated exceptions (e.g.,
ten exceptions in GATT Article XX (a) to (j), or five exceptions in
GATS Article XIV (a) to (e)). If this first tier test is met, then the
second tier of analysis requires examining the measure's compliance
with the provision's chapeau.76 The chapeau imposes the requirement
that the challenged measure should not be "applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade."77 The chapeau has been progressively
linked to the principle of good faith in international law.78
75. See Thomas Cottier et al., art. XIV GATS: General Exceptions, in MAX PLANCK
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, WTO - TRADE IN SERVICES, vol. 6, at 287 (Ridiger
Wolfrum et al. eds., 2008); TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 13, at 507-87; CASSIMATIS, supra
note 55, at 334.
76. RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE 531-33 (2005); VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 73, at 620, 653; Appellate
Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 22,
WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29, 1996).
77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 art. XX
(1999); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 art. XIV
(1999); see Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, T 150, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
78. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 Oct. 1998, 158. See also Brazil- Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, Dec. 3,
2007,1224.
[T]he function of the chapeau is the prevention of abuse of the exceptions
specified in the paragraphs of Article XX . . . the task of interpreting and
applying the chapeau is the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under
Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive
provisions (e.g. art. XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing
rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the
balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in
that Agreement.
Id. (The location of this line of equilibrium may move "as the kind and the shape of the measures
at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ."); China - Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Products and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, Dec. 21, 2009, 306 (clarifying that
the chapeau element of "disguised restriction on international trade" must
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Notwithstanding the established nature of the two-tiered test for
general exceptions, it cannot be lightly assumed that the Appellate Body
(and/or the dispute settlement panels in the WTO) has consistently
applied the test uniformly and consistently in actual disputes brought
before them. The "public morals" exception under GATT Article XX(a)
and GATS Article XIV(a) presents a classic example of how the
Appellate Body can purposely choose to develop or flesh out its pre-
existing interpretations or methodologies.
In China-Publications and Audiovisual Products,79 the WTO
Appellate Body affirmed that-similar to other jurisprudence on GATT
Article XX and GATS Article XIV 8 0-the method of interpreting the
"public morals" exception under GATT Article XX(a) would be
through "a sequential process of weighing and balancing factors
involved."8  The 2009 Appellate Body ruling in China-Publications
and Audiovisual Products was the first case to interpret the "public
morals" exception under GATT Article XX(a). Before then, the only
comparable interpretation of the "public morals" exception was that
issued by the Appellate Body in 2005, in relation to GATS Article
XIV(a) in United States-Gambling Services.82
be applied in the light of the specific obligation of the covered agreements that
the respective measure infringes. The assessment of the restrictive effect to be
taken into account in a particular dispute may, in appropriate cases, extend
beyond an assessment of the restrictive effect on imported products, as this
assessment must be undertaken in the light of the measure at issue, the specific
obligation of the covered agreements that the measure infringes, and the
defence being invoked.
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 158; see also
Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 224,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Products and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
306, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).
79. See generally Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).
80. Id. 239 (citing Korea - Various Measures on Beef in the context of Article XX(d) of
the GATT 1994); see Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (in the
context of Article XIV(a) of the GATS); see Brazil- Retreaded Tyres (in the context of Article
XX(b) of the GATT 1994).
8 1. China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, % 239-42.
82. United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, Apr. 7, 2005, TT 306-11:
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306. The process begins with an assessment of the "relative importance" of the
interests or values furthered by the challenged measure. Having ascertained the
importance of the particular interests at stake, a panel should then turn to the
other factors that are to be "weighed and balanced." The Appellate Body has
pointed to two factors that, in most cases, will be relevant to a panel's
determination of the "necessity" of a measure, although not necessarily
exhaustive of factors that might be considered. One factor is the contribution of
the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it; the other factor is the
restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.
307. A comparison between the challenged measure and possible alternatives
should then be undertaken, and the results of such comparison should be
considered in the light of the importance of the interests at issue. It is on the
basis of this "weighing and balancing" and comparison of measures, taking into
account the interests or values at stake, that a panel determines whether a
measure is "necessary" or, alternatively, whether another, WTO-consistent
measure is "reasonably available."
308. The requirement, under Article XIV(a), that a measure be "necessary"-
that is, that there be no "reasonably available," WTO-consistent alternative-
reflects the shared understanding of Members that substantive GATS
obligations should not be deviated from lightly. An alternative measure may be
found not to be "reasonably available," however, where it is merely theoretical
in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking
it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties. Moreover, a "reasonably
available" alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve for the
responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with
respect to the objective pursued under paragraph (a) of Article XIV.
309. It is well-established that a responding party invoking an affirmative
defence bears the burden of demonstrating that its measure, found to be WTO-
inconsistent, satisfies the requirements of the invoked defence. In the context of
Article XIV(a), this means that the responding party must show that its measure
is "necessary" to achieve objectives relating to public morals or public order. In
our view, however, it is not the responding party's burden to show, in the first
instance, that there are no reasonably available alternatives to achieve its
objectives. In particular, a responding party need not identify the universe of
less trade-restrictive alternative measures and then show that none of those
measures achieves the desired objective. The WTO agreements do not
contemplate such an impracticable and, indeed, often impossible burden.
310. Rather, it is for a responding party to make a prima facie case that its
measure is "necessary" by putting forward evidence and arguments that enable
a panel to assess the challenged measure in the light of the relevant factors to
be "weighed and balanced" in a given case. The responding party may, in so
doing, point out why alternative measures would not achieve the same
objectives as the challenged measure, but it is under no obligation to do so in
order to establish, in the first instance, that its measure is "necessary." If the
panel concludes that the respondent has made a prima facie case that the
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In China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, China had
invoked GATT Article XX(a) to justify a range of measures that
regulated the entry of foreign publications, audiovisuals and other
media forms, under a content review mechanism and system for the
selection of import entities, in order to protect public morals in China.83
China had essentially argued that the public policy function behind the
regulations (particularly the cultural nuances of Chinese public morals),
made it inevitable that content review for such media could only be
conducted by State-owned entities.84 In its analysis of the public morals
defense under GATT Article XX(a), the Appellate Body declared the
following:
(1) "China did not establish a connection between the exclusive
ownership of the State in the equity of an import entity and that entity's
contribution to public morals in China."85 The same reasoning was
likewise extended to the prohibition against foreign-invested enterprises
from engaging in importing;8 6
(2) China had not met its burden of proof to show that a certain
(unsubstantiated) State plan that would supposedly indicate the total
number, structure, and distribution of publication import entities, would
indeed contribute to the protection of public morals in China by feasibly
enabling content review;
challenged measure is "necessary"-that is, "significantly closer to the pole of
'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution
to'"-then a panel should find that challenged measure "necessary" within the
terms of Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
311. If, however, the complaining party raises a WTO-consistent alternative
measure that, in its view, the responding party should have taken, the
responding party will be required to demonstrate why its challenged measure
nevertheless remains "necessary" in the light of that alternative or, in other
words, why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, "reasonably available." If a
responding party demonstrates that the alternative is not "reasonably available,"
in the light of the interests or values being pursued and the party's desired level
of protection, it follows that the challenged measure must be "necessary"
within the terms of Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
f 306-11.
83. Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 17.712, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12,
2009).
84. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 255-68.
85. Id.1268.
86. Id. 1276-77.
87. Id. f 294-97.
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(3) The "less restrictive means" element as part of the sequential
weighing and balancing test of "necessity" in GATT Article XX(a), for
this particular case,
must be applied in the light of the specific obligation of the
covered agreements that the respective measures infringes . . .
[and that] the assessment of the restrictive effect to be taken into
account in a particular case, may, in appropriate cases, extend
beyond an assessment of the restrictive effect on imported
products, as this assessment must be undertaken in the light of
the measure at issue, the specific obligation of the covered
agreements that the measure infringes, and the defence being
invoked,
and thus, who could enga e in such trading was part of determining the
least restrictive means. The Panel had rightly identified a less
restrictive means than the State-ownership requirement and the import
prohibition on foreign-invested entities (e.g., the State plan previously
mentioned, had China sufficiently presented evidence to develop the
actual contours of this alternative);90 and
(4) China had failed to show that there were no other reasonably
available means before it, such as for the Chinese government to itself
uniformly conduct the content review. China had failed to show that this
reasonably available means would cause such an "undue burden" (e.g.,
financial, administrative burden, technical difficulties) upon it given the
evidence submitted. 91
Two matters stand out in China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products from the interpretive practices of the Appellate Body, that did
not feature in the Body's interpretation of the identically-worded
"public morals exception" in GATS Article XIV(a) in United States-
Gambling Services. First, the Appellate Body in China-Publications
and Audiovisual Products acknowledged that, while GATT Article
XX(a) did not provide any explicit guidance "on the question of
whether, in assessing 'necessity,' a panel may take into account only the
restrictive effect the measures have on imports of relevant products, or
whether a panel may also consider the restrictive effect of the measures
88. Id. 306 (emphasis added).
89. Id. 308.
90. Id. 310.
91. Id.11327-32; 335.
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on importers or potential importers,"92 there may be cases where it
would be appropriate to further differentiate restrictive impacts on
international commerce. In China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products the Panel had applied the "less restrictive means" test in the
sequential weighing and balancing test of necessity for GATT Article
XX(a) to consider two types of restrictive impact-first, a restrictive
impact on the actual importation of the subject goods, and second, the
restrictive impact of the measures on the right to trade of those who
wish to engage in such importation in the future.93 This was a nuance
not found in United States-Gambling Services, where the Appellate
Body simply identified, and did not elaborate on, two factors
that, in most cases, will be relevant to a panel's determination of
the "necessity" of a measure, although not necessarily exhaustive
of factors that might be considered. One factor is the contribution
of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it; the
other factor is the restrictive impact of the measure on
94international commerce.
The Appellate Body in China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products deemed it valid to consider both the restrictive impact on
imports as well as the rights to trade of enterprises, due to the particular
content of China's obligations to grant the right to trade under its
Accession Protocol to the WTO.95
Second, the Appellate Body in China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products appeared somewhat unclear as to how it allocated the
evidentiary burdens with respect to other "reasonably available means"
or alternatives. It may be recalled that in United States-Gambling
Services, the Appellate Body clearly stated that it was not the burden of
the responding party to show that there were no reasonably available
alternatives whatsoever.96 Rather, it is only when the complaining party
"raises a WTO-consistent alternative measure that, in its view, the
responding party should have taken," that the "the responding party will
[then] be required to demonstrate why its challenged measure
nevertheless remains 'necessary' in the light of that alternative or, in
other words, why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, 'reasonably
92. Id. 1303.
93. Id. 1300.
94. United States -Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, 306 (emphasis added).
95. China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, T 307.
96. Id. 1319.
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available."' 97
Among its proposals for other "reasonably available alternatives" in
China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, the United States
proposed that the Chinese Government assume sole responsibility for
conducting content review.98 While the Panel found this proposal to be
a reasonably available alternative, it is not entirely clear from the
Panel's discussion that the burden of proof had at least been placed first
on the United States to prove the feasibility of its proposal. In several
instances it almost seems as if the Panel indulged in unverified
assumptions about the efficiency and quality of China's administrative,
institutional, and bureaucratic capabilities, as well as the supposed
sufficiency of its domestic laws, 99 and that what proved decisive for the
Panel was that China had failed to present sufficient evidence in extenso
of the infeasibility or unreasonableness of the proposal.o The United
States had mainly argued that the Panel already had ample evidence
before it that China was capable of conducting some form of content
review, such as those China was already conducting for films imported
for theatrical release, electronic publications, and audiovisual
products.o'0 The Appellate Body endorsed the method taken by the
Panel as the "appropriate" one for determining whether reasonably
available means existed, but appeared quite silent on the quantum (and
specificity) of proof that it ultimately required the United States to
establish as the complaining party making the proposal, vis-c'r-vis China,
as the responding party who supposedly was not obligated to furnish
proof until the complaining party had been able to establish a WTO-
consistent measure was a reasonably available alternative.102 At a
minimum, these differences in China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products and United States-Gambling Services provides some telling
insight as to the scope and breadth of the Appellate Body's discretion
over the methodology it would adopt to interpret the "public morals"
exception in GATT Article XX(a) and its identical counterpart, GATS
Article XIV(a).
Beyond the development of legal tests of "necessity" in relation to
the public morals exception in GATT Article XX(a), however, it is also
97. United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, 1311.
98. China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 1312.
99. Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, % 7.888-7.891,
WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009).
100. Id. %7.888-7.893.
101. China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, T 323.
102. Id. % 327-32.
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significant that there was hardly any discussion in China-Publications
and Audiovisual Products on the State's regulatory freedom in relation
to GATT Article XX(a). Rather, the Appellate Body dealt with the right
to regulate in the context of interpreting the introductory paragraph 5.1
in China's Accession Protocol to the WTO (e.g., "Without prejudice to
China's right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO
Agreement").103 The Appellate Body held in China-Publications and
Audiovisual Products that the Panel erred in omitting to resolve the
issue of whether GATT Article XX applies to other agreements apart
from the GATT such as paragraph 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol to
the WTO, and determined to resolve the issue itself.104 The Appellate
Body then interpreted the phrase "right to regulate trade in a manner
consistent with the WTO Agreement" to refer to two types of rights: (1)
"rights that the covered agreements affirmatively recognize as accruing
to WTO members, namely, the power of Members to take specific types
of regulatory measures in respect of trade in goods when those measures
satisfy prescribed WTO disciplines and meet specified criteria" (e.g.,
WTO-consistent import licensing, SPS and TBT measures); and (2)
"certain rights to take regulatory action that derogates from obligations
under the WTO Agreement - that is, to relevant exceptions."ms The
Appellate Body ultimately interpreted China's right to regulate as that
which is "protected under the introductory clause of paragraph 5.1. only
if it is consistent with the WTO Agreement."' 06
This interpretation of the right to regulate would spur another
attempt to export GATT Article XX to agreements not covered by
GATT. In China-Raw Materials,0 7 China unsuccessfully attempted to
invoke GATT Article XX as a defense to its export duties found
inconsistent with paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol,'
contending that its right to regulate trade to promote conservation and
health is an individual "inherent right" not dependent on the terms of its
Accession Protocol.109 While the Appellate Body acknowledged that the
Preamble to the WTO Agreement lists various objectives, "including
'raising standards of living,' 'seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment,' and 'expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing trade in goods and services, while allowing for
103. Id.1205.
104. Id.1215.
105. Id. 223.
106. Id. ? 230 (emphasis added).
107. See generally Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30,
2012).
108. Accession ofthe People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, Nov. 23, 2001.
109. China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 1300.
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the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objectives of sustainable development,"' such that the WTO Agreement
"reflect(s) the balance struck by WTO Members between trade and non-
trade-related concerns,"' 10 the Appellate Body nevertheless declined to
find that the Preamble to the WTO Agreement provided any guidance
on the issue of the applicability of GATT Article XX to other
agreements not covered. The Appellate Body thus delimited the
possible scope of using GATT Article XX as public policy and public
interest defenses, since, following this 2012 ruling in China-Raw
Materials, GATT Article XX exceptions would not apply as legal bases
for States to invoke their rights to regulate and spaces of regulatory
freedom under non-GATT agreements.
There are a myriad of other examples from the Appellate Body's
jurisprudence, which demonstrate the breadth of its methodological and
evidentiary discretion when it comes to developing legal and
evidentiary tests for the application of health exceptions under GATT
Article XX(b),1 2 domestic policy exceptions under GATT Article
XX(d)," 3 and environmental conservation exceptions under GATT
Article XX(g)." 4 Neither may it be said that the jurisprudence of the
I10. Id. 306.
111. See Danielle Spiegel Feld & Stephanie Switzer, Whither Article XX? Regulatory
Autonomy under Non-GATT Agreements after China - Raw Materials, 38 YALE J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 17-30 (2012), available at http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-38-feld-switzer-whither-
article-xx.pdf (last accessed Feb. 1, 2013).
112. See among others Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, 161, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
Panel Report, China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 7.479-
7.480, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011). Panel Report, Brazil -
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, T 7.98, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007). Panel
Report, United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, TT 7.67-
7.69, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010). Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, i 7.306-7.309, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011). Panel
Report, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 75
DSIO/R - 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990). Panel Report, European Communities - Conditions for the
Granting of Tarff Preferences to Developing Countries, T 7.209-7.210, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1,
2003). Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, TT 5.26-5.27, DS2 1/R-
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991).
113. See among others Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef TT 157, 161, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DSl69/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000). Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
T 69, WTIDS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006). Panel Report, United States - Customs Bond Directive
for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties, 16.13, WT/DS345/R (Feb. 29,
2008). Panel Report, Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, T 5.2.2.3.
L/6253-35S/163 (Feb. 2, 1988).
114. China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, TT 355-56.
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, T 128-29.
Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
82 [Vol. 26
PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TRADE LAW
WTO Appellate Body and the dispute settlement panels demonstrate
full unanimity in their conceptions of "public interest" in the GATT
Article XX or GATS Article XIV exceptions, the spaces of regulatory
freedom acceptable under each exception, as well as in their methods
for determining the "necessity" of a State's trade-restrictive measure in
relation to the asserted "public interest" objective. 15 Rather, what
stands clearly from both the WTO legal texts themselves, as well as the
"soft" sources of WTO law (as seen in the Appellate Body decisions
and reports of dispute settlement Panels), is that they are pliable on the
question of States' trade-restrictive measures taken in the exercise of
regulatory freedom to vindicate the public interest. This question was
purposely anticipated in the drafting of GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV exceptions.11 6 Arguably, the issue of a State's regulatory
freedom to vindicate the public interest, which could also result in non-
conformity with trade liberalization obligations, was part of the shaping
of WTO law since its inception.
Thus, even without direct incorporation of international human
rights instruments, WTO law possesses an inherent suppleness to
accommodate and reconcile a State's right to regulate for human
rights." 7  It is also acknowledged to have greater structural and
institutional potential than bilateral and regional trade agreements to
achieve the aims of human rights protection. is From this standpoint, it
at 18, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
115. See Tenu Avafia, Does the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding Promote
Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAW 259-71
(Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger eds., 2005).
116. See STEFAN ZLEPTNIG, NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN WTO LAW: JUSTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF GATT, GATS, SPS AND TBT AGREEMENTS, ch. 4 (2010); DESIERTO, supra note
34, ch. 5.
117. Marceau, supra note 14, at 779-88.
118. HARRISON, supra note 14, at 180-81.
[A]lthough there are almost 300 bilateral and regional trade agreements which
contain some kind of explicit human rights clause, this does not mean that the
clauses within those agreements ensure a holistic human rights approach to the
agreements in question, based on acceptable international norms and standards.
There is a big difference between a trade agreement that contains a human
rights clause, and agreements that systematically ensures the protection and
promotion of human rights in all aspects of the obligations created by those
agreements . .. A world trading system helps to ensure that trading rules are not
decided by power politics or 'aggressive unilateralism'. Rules help to bind all
governments, including the most powerful, to act according to established and
agreed principles and regulations. Adherence to such a rule-based system is
generally beneficial from a human rights perspective, as it benefits smaller and
more vulnerable States (whose populations human rights are most likely to be
violated) as opposed to power-based diplomacy where more powerful States
dominate.
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is conceivable that the interaction between WTO law and human rights
law has been described as one anchored on "coordination," rather than
conflict, tending towards the "accommodation of human rights interests
by the WTO."' Most importantly, in achieving such coordination, one
cannot deny the central role of WTO organs, especially the WTO
dispute settlement system, which enables such interpretive
"cooperation" in the first place.' 20 As I show later in Part II.B.1, the
particular mandates and functional competences of the WTO political
and legal organs afford them much latitude to purposely develop WTO
law with consideration for a State's regulatory freedom to pursue and
defend public interests and human rights concerns. But first, the
following section discusses the contrast of the "sunburst" scattered law-
making trajectory of the international investment treaty regime.
2. Investment Law
Unlike WTO law, the investment treaty systeml21 is comprised of a
defense and "automized"l122 network of thousands of bilateral and
regional international investment agreements (HAs). While a few HAs
are negotiated within the context of broader inter-State trade
negotiations,123 for the most part many of the current investment treaties
were separately concluded by states according to their own foreign
policy agendas, economic priorities, and political programs.124 Long
before the controversial collapse of multilateral negotiations in 1997 in
regard to the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),125
Id.
119. Peter Hilpold, Human Rights and WTO Law: From Conflict to Coordination, 45
ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 4, 484, 509, 513 (2007).
120. Joost Pauwelyn, Cooperation in Dispute Settlement: Human Rights in WTO Dispute
Settlement, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 52, at 205-31.
121. Stephan Schill has been the foremost proponent of viewing the network of
international investment agreements as leading towards a genuine multilateral system. See
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 65-117
(2009).
122. Anna Joubin-Bret et al., International Investment Law and Development, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 38, at 19.
123. See Diane A. Desierto, Development as an International Right: Investment in the New
Trade-Based IIAs, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 296 (2011).
124. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT. L. & POL'Y 157 (2005).
125. See Eric Neumayer, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Lessons for the WTO from
the Failed OECD Negotiatons, 46 WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE BLATTER 618 (1999). Trebilcock and
Howse have also described the political dynamics that took over the MAl negotiations and
ultimately led to their breakdown.
By May 1997, agreement had been reached between the negotiators on many
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States had already been concluding IIAs on a bilateral basis, beginning
with the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) concluded by Germany
elements of the basic architecture of the MAI [Multilateral Agreement on
Investment], including MFN and National Treatment. However, important
differences of view between countries were surfacing with respect to the
relationship of the MAI to environmental and labour standards and cultural
policies. As well, considerable disagreement existed concerning whether and
how investment incentives should be disciplined, the result being that
incentives were simply not dealt with in the draft. At the same time, however, a
vigorous public debate was beginning in OECD countries such as Canada, the
United States and Australia concerning the impact of the MAI on the
democratic regulatory state in general, and on environment, labour rights and
cultural protection more specifically. Canadian activist groups were at the
forefront of bringing the MAl negotiations into public view. In January 1997,
when no public version of the negotiating text was available, Canadian activists
obtained a confidential version, and began circulating it to like-minded groups,
using the internet as an effective dissemination tool. In April 1997, accounts of
the MAI began to appear in the popular press, and governments were placed on
the defensive to justify their negotiating positions to the public at large. Some
of the groups in question had unsuccessfully challenged the Canada-US FTA
and the NAFTA, often making grossly exaggerated and hypothetical claims
about the damage likely to flow from these agreements to the welfare state.
With the MAI, their approach was shrewder and more careful. They linked a
more general critique of globalization driven by corporate interests with a
highly plausible analysis of specific provisions of the draft MAI, or omissions
from it, as well as a critique of the way it was negotiated. While many groups
took different and overlapping positions, the thrust of the overall attack is well
expressed by Tony Clarke and Maude Barlow:
We do not wish to leave the impression that we reject the idea of a global
investment treaty. We are well aware that transnational investment flows have
been accelerating at a rapid pace and that there is a need to establish some
global rules. But the basic premise on which the draft versions of the MAI have
been crafted is, in our view, largely flawed and one-sided. It expands the rights
and powers of transnational corporations without imposing any corresponding
obligations. Instead, the draft treaty places obligations squarely on the
shoulders of governments . . . Meanwhile the MAI says nothing about the rules
that transnational corporations must follow to respect the economic, social,
cultural, and environmental rights of citizens.
The secrecy surrounding the negotiations and the usual cloak-and-dagger
behavior by foreign ministries when faced by early enquiries about the course
of the negotiations gave prima fade credence to a conspiratorial view of the
whole undertaking. The fact, noted above, that the draft MAI did not contain an
environmental or health and safety exception even comparable to that existing
in the 1947 GATT lent credibility to the notion that only the interests of capital
were reflected in the Agreement.
See TREBILCOCK & HoWSE, supra note 13, at 458-60.
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and Pakistan in 1959 and entering into force in 1962.126
The progressive march of investment treaty texts (and their
underlying bargaining histories) gives tangible evidence of the
ideological shifts that accompanied the evolving global economic order,
from the postcolonial emergence of new capital-importing States and
the initial dominance of capital-exporting States in North-South treaty
negotiations to the recent rise of emerging market players and
developing countries as new capital-exporters in more complex South-
South and South-North configurations.127 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
describes the "first generation" of BITs as those that were concluded
from 1959 until around 1969 between countries of the capital-exporting
and developed North and the capital-importing and developing South,
and whose standards of protection were minimally designed to reduce
"the legal insecurity resulting from the post-colonial disagreements on
the customary international 'minimum standard' for the protection of
foreign property and the payment of 'full, prompt, and effective
compensation' in case of expropriation of foreign property."l 28 He
describes the "second generation" of BITs (treaties concluded from
1969 until about 2003) as reflecting a
more "common form". . . based on uniform objectives, structures
and standard clauses providing also for investor-state arbitration
. . . [t]he increasingly comprehensive legal and judicial protection
of foreign investments was also due to increasing recognition that
"FDI-led industrialization" tended to promote more competitive
industries than the widespread policies of 'infant industry
protection' since the 1960s. 9
It is the third, or the "new" generation of BITs (concluded from 2003
onward) that, in Petersmann's view, already acknowledges "the need for
'rebalancing' [of] the private and public interests involved in foreign
investments . .. clarifying the state's rights and duties to regulate and
protect public interests."1
Given the tremendous diversity of IIA texts, it would be impossible
126. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., The Entry Into Force of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs), IIA Monitor No. 3 (2006), at 3, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/
webiteiia20069 en.pdf.
127. See Kate Miles, International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and
Conceptualizing the Environment, 21 COL. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2010); VANDEVELDE,
supra note 42, at 19-74; Ahmad Ali Ghouri, The Evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Investment Treaty Arbitration, and International Investment Law, 14 INT'L ARBITRATION L. REV.
189(2011).
128. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 289-90.
129. Id. at 290.
130. Id.
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to identify all the treaty provisions that trigger the issue of a State's
regulatory freedom to pursue public interest or human rights
concerns. 13 1 What is clear, thus far, is that host State defenses anchored
on regulatory freedom to ensure compliance with human rights have not
made much headway yet in investment arbitral jurisprudence,' 32 usually
due to the lack of development of the argument by the State
concerned,133 or the fact that amicus submissions have not yet
succeeded in speaking directly and in depth to the precise legal and
factual issues of an investment arbitration when they put forward
arguments based on human rights and the public interest. 4 In Suez v.
Argentina, for example, after a thirty-page amicus submission that
generally discussed the significance of the rights to water and to health
in the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal simply observed that Argentina
"was subject to both international obligations, i.e. human rights
obligations and treaty obligations, and must respect both of them
equally. Under the circumstances of these cases, Argentina's human
rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not
inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive."' 35 While host States
have generally raised the issue of State regulatory freedom to pursue
public interest or human rights concerns as a defense in numerous
131. See Suzanne A. Spears, Making Way for the Public Interest in International
Investment Agreements, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New
Generation ofInternational Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1037 (2010).
132. See Diane A. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights and Investment in Economic
Emergencies: Prospects of Treaty and Valuation Defenses, 9 MANCHESTER J. INT'L EcON. L. 162
(2012) [hereinafter Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights]; Diane A. Desierto, Conflict of
Treaties, Interpretation, and Decision-Making on Human Rights and Investment During
Economic Crises, 10 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Desierto, Conflict of
Treaties].
133. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights, supra note 132; Desierto, Conflict of Treaties,
supra note 132; see Siemens AG v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (2007).
[Tihe "tribunal notes the reference made by Argentina to international human
rights law ranking at the level of the Constitution after the 1994 constitutional
reform and implying that property rights claimed in this arbitration, if upheld,
would constitute a breach of international human rights law. This argument has
not been developed by Argentina. The Tribunal considers that, without the
benefit of further elaboration and substantiation by the parties, it is not an
argument that, prima facie, bears any relationship to the merits of this case.
See also Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment
Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82, 89-90
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et. al. eds., 2009).
134. See Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The
Implications ofan Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 200 (2012).
135. Suez v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (2010), 1 262.
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investment treaty arbitrationsl36 involving alleged breaches of different
treaty standards, such as indirect expropriation 3 7 or the fair and
equitable treatment standard,138 ultimately the success (or failure) of
these defenses turned on the arbitral tribunals' interpretation of the IIA
standards involved.139  This has spurred newer HAs to include
substantive standards that could facilitate a host State's polic
flexibility, such as: (1) "in accordance with host State law" clauses;
(2) stabilization clauses;141 (3) exceptions clauses or "measures not
precluded" clauses;142 (4) the investment definition clause or similar
136. Although there are cases involving other states such as Unglaube v. Costa Rica,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1 (2012) (involving an expropriation finding arising from
regulatory actions taken by Costa Rica to create an ecological zone protecting the endangered
leatherback sea turtles and their nesting sites), as well as Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v.
Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (2003) (also involving an expropriation
finding in relation to a Mexican government agency's Resolution ordering closure of a landfill
for environmental reasons), the cases involving the Argentina financial crises of 2000-2002 are
probably the most famous examples of failed attempts to justify social protection measures on
the basis of human rights, public policy, or public interest reasons. For a list of cases, see infra
note 159.
137. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Expropriation, UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements 11 (2012), at 78-90 (surveying State assertions of their right
to regulate, as seen in both investment jurisprudence and treaty practices), available at
http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia 2011 d7_en.pdf.
138. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Fair And Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series
on Issues in International Investment Agreements 11 (2012), at 68-77 (surveying the "legitimate
expectations" element in the FET standard and State assertions of the right to regulate in
investment jurisprudence), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia201Id5_en.pdf.
139. For a more optimistic assessment of human rights-inclusive interpretation of IIA
standards, see Susan L. Karamanian, Human Rights Dimensions of Investment Law, in
HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 236 (Erika De Wet & Jure
Vidmar eds., 2012).
140. Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, From Individual to Community Interest in
International Investment Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 1079, 1095 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds. 2011) [hereinafter
FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST]; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather than
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human
Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra
note 133, at 59-60.
141. On the argument that foreign investors and host states effectively contract around the
risk of changes in the applicable regulatory framework to the investment, see Sam Foster Halabi,
Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization
Clauses, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 261 (2011). Note that an arbitral tribunal has ruled that
stabilization clauses "do not 'cap' damages for the purposes of valuing the Claimants' rights, nor
do they establish a ceiling of compensation beyond which the Claimants could not have
legitimately expected to recover in the event of an expropriation." Kardassopoulos v. Ga.,
Award, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15 (2010), 1485.
142. DESIERTO, supra note 34, at 167-70; U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., The
Protection of National Security in IIAs (2009), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia
20085_en.pdf.
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treaty applicability provisions;143  and (5) balance of payments
* 144
provisions and other financial crises provisions.
The "in accordance with host State law" clauses in IIAs (e.g., treaty
provisions that require that an investment be made "in accordance with
host State law") have been put forward as possible gateways for
international human rights treaties when the latter is incorporated in
host State law.145 However, this theory has not yet been tested in actual
investment jurisprudence. Thus far, arbitral tribunals have tended to
interpret these kinds of clauses in a circumscribed manner. For one, the
"in accordance with host State law" clause does not require an
investment's compliance with every host State regulation,
administrative issuance, or law-it generally refers to those species of
host State law that are of such fundamental importance that they must
be included in the due diligence to be conducted by the investor and the
host State.146 While there is a line of arbitral awards that narrowly
identifies host State's corporate registration requirements as the only
"law" contemplated by this clause,' there are also other arbitral awards
143. See Desierto, supra note 123; see also Diane A. Desierto, Deciding HA Applicability:
The Development Argument in Investment, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE (Freya Baetens ed., 2013). For a list of cases, see infra note
163.
144. 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 16, Feb. 26, 2009; 2008
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Japan and Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 21; 2009 Agreement on Investment under the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of
the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea
art. I1, June 2, 2009; 2009 Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
the People's Republic of China art. 11, Aug. 15, 2009.
145. From BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST, supra note 140; HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 133.
146. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25 (2007), 396.
When the question is whether the investment is in accordance with the law of
the host State, considerable arguments may be made in favour of construing
jurisdiction ratione materiae in a more liberal way which is generous to the
investor. In some circumstances, the law in question of the host State may not
be entirely clear and mistakes may be made in good faith. An indicator of a
good faith error would be the failure of a competent legal counsel's legal due
diligence report to flag that issue.
Id. On the other hand, a host state unsuccessfully attempted to argue the "non-resident" character
of tax treatment in order to deny that an investment met the territorial requirement "in
accordance with its laws and regulations." Societe Generale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004), 99-112.
147. Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA
Case No. AA 228 (2009), 1 20-21; Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte v. Myanmar, 42 ILM 540
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that suggest that the clause applies to other sources of law that are
consistent with the teleological purposes of an IIA,148 such as anti-
dummy legislation, bribery laws, contractual fraud, and central bank
regulations. 149 In order to avail of this clause to justify its exercise of
regulatory freedom to pursue public interest or human rights concerns,
the host State would have to show that its ongoing compliance with the
mass of its international human rights obligations also belongs to those
corpus of "fundamental" laws notified to the investor at the outset as
necessary to qualify the investment as a covered or protected investment
under the IIA.150 This approach contains its own set of complexities,
least of which is building the approriate due diligence process and
transparent information infrastructure 1 for the investor to be genuinely
and timely notified of a host State's continuing international human
rights obligations (including how the investment may or may not affect
compliance with such obligations) in order to avoid any pretextual or
trope assertions of human rights defenses by the host State during the
life of the investment. 152
Stabilization clauses have also not featured prominently in
investment jurisprudence, although there is considerable literature
advocating their inclusion in both foreign investment contracts as well
as IIAs to ensure that host States' international human rights obligations
are also deemed part of the investment regulatory framework. 3 A
(2003), 1 62; Siag v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15 (2007), %
198-201; Middle E. Cement Shipping & Handling Co. v. Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/99/6 (2002), % 131-38.
148. Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4
(2001), 146. This standard was expressly adopted by the arbitral tribunal in Mytilineos Holdings
v. Serbia and Montenegro, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, UNCITRAL (2006), 1 152.
149. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Philippines, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25 (2007) (involving local anti-dummy legislation); World Duty Free Co. v. Kenya,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (2006) (involving local bribery laws); Inceysa Vallisoletane
v. El Salvador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 (2006) (involving local contract principles
against undue enrichment and fraud); Anderson v. Costa Rica, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/07/3 (2010), 1f 55-59.
150. Desierto, Conflict of Treaties, supra note 132, at 80.
151. See Markus W. Gehring, Impact Assessments of Investment Treaties, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 38, at 145-70; Bruno Simma, Foreign
Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011).
152. One is minded to recall a famous essay pointing out the broad abstractions involved in
marshalling human rights arguments in trade law disputes, or assuming that dispute settlement
tribunals will find human rights norms to be decisive in resolving trade disputes. Robert Howse,
Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 651 (2002).
153. See Lorenzo Cotula, Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution ofEnvironmental
Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses, 1 J. WORLD
ENERGY L. & Bus. 158 (2008); Sheldon Leader, Risk Management, Project Finance and Rights-
based Development, in GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE
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provisions "on the mutual obligation of parties to provide 'full
protection and security' and to ensure 'fair and equitable treatment' of
investments . . . may confer treaty status on the stabilization clauses in
an investment contract."1 54 Some recent innovations to the design of
stabilization clauses expressly exempt from stabilization those changes
in law, regulations, or policies, which are reasonably required to ensure
that host States to meet international human rights obligations.'5 5 These
are likewise incipient proposals untested thus far in investor-State
arbitration.
Owing largely to the arbitrations involving measures taken by the
Argentine government during its 2000-2002 financial crisis, arbitral
tribunals in the past decade have had more occasions to engage in the
interpretation of exceptions clauses or "measures not precluded"
clauses.156 What is immediately evident from the genre of exceptions
clauses in IIAs is that they are not all similarly worded, with some
reflecting detailed language resembling GATT Article XX and GATS
DEVELOPMENT 107, 121 (Sheldon Leader & David Ong eds., 2011).
If lenders and borrowers are to create projects able to give adequate place to the
avoidance of damage . . . it may be necessary at certain points to carve out
exceptions to the classic non-recourse model . . . this might only be a realistic
prospect if either the sponsor is required to help meet the company's shortfall
in funds, or the lender relaxes its reimbursement schedule to make room for
such delays. Negotiation among the parties, reflecting the impact of CSR would
add this necessary element of flexibility to the positions ...
Id.; Lorenzo Cotula, Freezing the Balancing Act? Project Finance, Legal Tools to Manage
Regulatory Risk, and Sustainable Development, in GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 142, 144, 162 (observing that while "increasingly
broad stabilization clauses tend to ensure a level of regulatory stability that far exceeds that
accorded by international law under regulatory taking doctrine," while proposing two options for
the construction and treatment of stabilization clauses to reflect sustainable development
compliance-"(a) carefully limiting the scope of stabilization clauses; and (b) adopting an
evolutionary approach to their application.").
154. Evaristus Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts:
Legal, Economic, and Social Implications for Developing Countries, 10 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS.
& TRADE L. 1, 25 (2010). Although note that an arbitral tribunal expressly rejected viewing an
IIA's fair and equitable treatment standard as bearing the same purpose as stabilization clauses
specifically granted to foreign investors. See EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/13 (2009), 218.
155. See also Jernej Letnar Cernit, Corporate Human Rights Obligations Under
Stabilization Clauses, 11 GERMAN L.J. 210 (2010) (also arguing that beyond the interpretation of
the stabilization clauses in light of the fundamental human rights obligations of corporate
investors, such investor obligations be explicitly included in international investment
agreements); Full text of BTC Human Rights Undertaking (2003), available at
http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/Human%20Rights%2OUndertaking.pdf
156. DESIERTO, supra note 34, at 145-236 ch.5.
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Article XIV,' 57 while others tersely referring only to "essential security
interests" without explicitly providing for the effect of the host State's
invocation of such "necessary" measures on IIA obligations.158 The
Argentine arbitrations have, by and large, generally rejected Argentina's
proposed theory that interpreted various exceptions clauses in Argentine
BITs, (e.g., resulting in the outright inapplicability of such treaties (and
thus, preventing the existence of any treaty breach from arising) the
moment the exception is invoked).159 There has not yet been any arbitral
jurisprudence where a host State has invoked an exceptions clause that
is worded identically with (or clearly traces its drafting genealogy to)
GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV;160 further, it is impossible to
157. 2004 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art.
10.9.3(c); 2005 United States/Uruguay BIT art. 8(3)(c); 1992 North American Free Trade
Agreement art. 1106; 1994 Energy Charter Treaty art. 24(2)(b)(i); 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive
Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009 art. 17 [hereinafter ACIA]; see, e.g., Clause III of the
detailed Annex I (General and Specific Exceptions) to the 1997 Canada/Lebanon BIT art.
XVII(2) & (3) of the 1996 Canada/Panama BIT art. XVII of the 1997 Canada/Thailand BIT art.
XVII of the 1996 Canada/Barbados BIT art. XVII of the 1996 Canada/Ecuador BIT art. XVII of
the 1996 Canada/Egypt BIT, Clause III of the detailed Annex I (General and Specific
Exceptions) to the 1999 Canada/El Salvador BIT, Clause III of the detailed Annex I (General and
Specific Exceptions) to the 1998 Canada/Costa Rica BIT, Clause III of the detailed Annex I
(General and Specific Exceptions Special Provisions) to the 1997 Canada/Croatia BIT art. XVII
of the 1995 Canada/Latvia BIT art. XVII of the 1996 Canada/Romania BIT art. XVII of the 1995
Canada/South Africa BIT art. XVII of the 1995 Canada/Trinidad and Tobago BIT art. XVII of
the 1994 Canada/Ukraine BIT, Clause III in the detailed Annex 1 (General and Specific
Exceptions Special Provisions) to the 1997 Canada/Uruguay BIT, Clause II of detailed Annex to
the 1996 Canada/Venezuela BIT, and Article XVII of the 1997 Canada/Armenia BIT]; see, e.g.,
non-conforming measures under Article 16 of the 2002 Japan/Korea BIT art. 15 of the 2003
Japan/Vietnam BIT, and Article 18 (General and Security Exceptions) of the 2008 Japan/Lao
People's Democratic Republic BIT).
158. For a survey of these types of treaty language, see Katia Yannaca-Small, Essential
Security Interests under International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/4024341 I.pdf
159. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No.
ARB 02/1 (2006), 213-66; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, Decision on Argentina's
Request for Annulment of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (2010), 106-223; CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2005), % 315-92;
Enron Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (2007), 303-39; Cont'1 Cas.
Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (2008), T11 219-85; BG Grp. Plc. v.
Argentina, Final Award, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL) (2007),$ 361-444; Nat'l Grid Plc. v. Argentina,
Award, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL) (2008) 205-62; Suez v. Argentina, Decision on Liability,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (2010), f 249-71; Total S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1 (2010), $T 482-85; El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (2011), 552-670; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentina, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17 (2011), i 336-60; Metalpar S.A. SA v. Argentina, Award on the
Merits, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5 (2008), $T 208-11.
160. Continental Casualty v. Argentina involved a measures not precluded clause (Article
XI of the Argentina-United States BIT) that did not in any way resemble GATT Article XX in
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forecast for now if investment arbitral tribunals would, in the future, be
able to construe their mandates, methodologies, and arbitral
competences as liberally as the WTO Appellate Body and dispute
settlement panels have done insofar as the interpretation of the GATT
Article XX and GATS Article XIV exceptions. Such being the case, the
ultimate usefulness of exceptions clauses as the treaty vehicle for
ensuring States' regulatory freedom to pursue human rights or public
interest concerns still remains very much a question for treaty
draftsmanship.
Turning to the definition of "investment", as well as other provisions
that could carve out treaty applicability, one finds similar dissonance in
investment arbitral jurisprudence on the requisite criteria of
"investment," and whether the same should involve a requirement that
the supposed investment make a "contribution to the economic
development of the host state."l61 I have discussed elsewhere,162 the
majority of arbitral tribunals thus far have preferred to regard this aspect
as a mere feature, and not a definitive criterion or threshold requirement
to establish the existence of an investment.163 In practice, however,
many tribunals have found that "contribution to a host State's
development" is a relatively easy standard for investors to satisfy,164 So
the least, but the tribunal in that one case strangely saw fit to use GATT Article XX and WTO
jurisprudence interpreting GATT Article XX to interpret Article XI of the Argentina-U.S. BIT.
See Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and 'Supplementary Means of Interpretation' for Non-
Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 827 (2010).
161. Salini Costruttori SpA v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4 (2003), 52.
[Dioctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain
duration of the performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of
the transaction . .. In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the
contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as
an additional condition.
Id.
162. Vandevelde, supra note 124.
163. Bureau Veritas v. Paraguay, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/9 (2009), TI 82, 83, 94, 96; Pantechniki SA Contractors & Engineers v. Albania,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, (2009), T 36, 43, 38; Fakes v. Turkey, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/20 (2010), Ill; Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/16 (2010), % 312-13; Consorzio Groupement LESI v. Algeria, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 (2006), 1 72-73; Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech
Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5 (2009), TT 114-15; Malicorp Ltd. v. Egypt, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18 (2011), 113; Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukraine, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/l 1 (2010); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Grenada, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/14 (2009), TT 244, 264; Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18 (2010), 273.
164. For the few awards that denied the existence of a covered investment under an IIA,
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long as some linkage-no matter how attenuated-could be shown
between the investment and a favorable economic outcome in the host
State. 165
IIA practices further show how States differentiate between aspects
of social protection and the public interest for which they design relative
policy flexibility (e.g., non-applicability of IIA standards to certain
measures), as opposed to absolute policy flexibility (e.g., complete
inapplicability of the entire IIA). Many IIAs show that States favor
relative policy flexibility for most public policy areas,' 6 6 and rarely
reserve absolute policy flexibility except for key sovereign functions
such as taxation matters.16 7
see Malaysia Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10
(2007), 123-24; Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/11 (2004), 57; Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7 (2006), 33.
165. Consortium RFCC v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6
(2001), 65; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29 (2005), 137; Toto Costruzioni Generali v. Lebanon, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12 (2009), 86; Kardassopoulos v. Ga., Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 (2007), 116-17; Heinan Int'l Hotels v. Egypt,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19 (2006), 1 77;
Saipem S.P.A v. Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional
Measures, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07 (2007), 101; Jan de Nul v. Egypt, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13 (2006), 92; Noble Energy Inc. v. Ecuador, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12 (2008), 132; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v.
Slovakia, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4
(2011), 378; Societe Generale v. Dominican Republic, Award on Preliminary Objections to
Jurisdiction, LCIA Case No. U.N. 7927 (2008), 16, 30.
166. See 1998 United States/Bolivia BIT, art. II(2)(b) (on intellectual property); 1982
United States/Egypt BIT, Protocol Clause 4 (on ownership of real estate); 1992 North American
Free Trade Agreement art. 1108 (Reservations and Exceptions); 2004 Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.9(3)(b) (making some IIA
provisions inapplicable to intellectual property, competition laws, procurement, among others);
2005 United States/Uruguay BIT art. 8(3) (identical to Article 10.9(3) above); 2006 Canada/Peru
BIT art. 9(5) (removing public procurement, sovereign subsidies/loans/insurance, and public
retirement pension/social security systems from the coverage of national treatment and MFN
obligations in the IIA); 2009 Canada/Czech Republic BIT art. IV(2) (removing sovereign
subsidies, grants, and government-supported loans from national treatment and MFN
obligations); 2010 Canada/Slovakia BIT art. IV(2) (removing obligations as a member of a
customs, economic or monetary union, common market, or free trade area from the coverage of
national treatment and MFN obligations); 2007 Hungary/Azerbaijan BIT art. 3(3) (removing
obligations as a member of a customs, economic or monetary union, common market, or free
trade area from the coverage of national treatment and MFN obligations); 2007 Hungary/Jordan
BIT art. 3(3) (removing obligations as a member of a customs, economic or monetary union,
common market, or free trade area from the coverage of national treatment and MFN
obligations); 1994 United States/Jamaica BIT art. 11(9) (which does not apply MFN obligations
to advantages accorded by either State to third-country investors under free trade or customs
unions agreements or GATT).
167. See 2009 Canada/Jordan BIT art. 10(6) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not
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Interestingly, balance of payments and financial crises provisions in
new IIAs probably represent the clearest instances to date of the direct
incorporation of provisions from WTO law into investment law. Newer
generations of HAs contain language purposely identical to GATT
Article XII and GATS Article XII (provisions in international trade law
that authorize States to impose certain restrictions in order to safeguard
their balance of payments position).168 Recent investment agreements
concluded by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-a
region particularly alert to currency risks and capital flight after its
experience with the 1998 Asian financial crisis- all contain extensive
provisions authorizing States to take temporary "measures to safeguard
balance of payments," such as restrictions on transfers of capital.169
These provisions appear more detailed (and are worded in a more
expansive and self-judging manner) than other HAs that only recognize
States' rights to equitably exercise sovereign powers to temporarily
apply to investments in cultural industries."); 1988 China/New Zealand BIT art. 5(2) ("The
provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either
Contracting Party . . ."); 1999 Argentina/New Zealand BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this
Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party .. .");
1985 China/Singapore BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to
matters of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 2002 Spain/Bosnia and
Herzegovina BIT art. 12(2) ("The treatment granted under this Agreement shall not apply to tax
matters."); 1995 Czech Republic/Singapore BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement
shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 1993
Poland/Singapore BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of
taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 1995 Russian Federation/Hungary BIT
art. 11(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to taxation matters."); 1993 Russian
Federation/Denmark BIT arts. 11(2) & (3) ("This Agreement shall not apply to the Faroe Islands
and Greenland . . . The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to taxation."); 1999
Slovenia/Singapore BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters
of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 2002 Spain/Jamaica BIT art. 12(2)
("The treatment granted under this Agreement shall not apply to tax matters."); 1995
Singapore/Pakistan BIT art. 5(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of
taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 2005 Uganda/Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union BIT art. 4(4) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of
taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . ."); 1995 Sweden/Russian Federation BIT
art. 11(2) ("The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to taxation matters, except as
follows: Article 4, 6, 8, and 9 may apply to taxes imposed by a Contracting Party but only if such
taxes have an effect equivalent to expropriation."); 1997 Hungary/Singapore BIT art. 5(2) ("The
provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either
Contracting Party . . ."); 2004 China/Uganda BIT art. 3(5) ("The provisions of this Agreement
shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party . . .").
168. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the
Balance of Payments); General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XII (Restrictions to
Safeguard the Balance of Payments). See Chantal Thomas, Balance of Payments Crises in the
Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1249, 1255-61 (2000).
169. See supra note 144.
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limit transfers during exceptional balance of payments difficulties.
United Kingdom BITs, for example, often put a cap on the period for
imposing restrictions and the extent of such restrictions, while
stipulating a mandatory minimum amount to be transferred annually.1 70
Hungarian BITs tend to use more general language focusing on
standards of equitableness, non-discrimination, and good faith.17 1 Czech
BITs focus on assessing restrictive measures from international
standards of non-discrimination, equitableness, and good faith rather
than specific contours of restrictions.172 Italian BITs do not specify the
exact terms of what should comprise host States' restrictions to protect
their balance of payments position, other than to prescribe that such
measures should conform to international leqal standards of
equitableness, non-discrimination, and good faith, 7 similar to the
characteristics of Mexico BITs.174  Netherlands BITs stress the
importance of a restriction's consistency with the International
Monetary Fund's rules on transfer restrictions,17 5 while Australian BITs
confine their treaty language to simply recognizing States' inherent
rights "in exceptional balance of payments difficulties, to exercise
equitably and in good faith powers conferred by its law" 76 to restrict
outgoing capital transfers. Canadian BITs favor affording host States
170. 1987 United Kingdom/Jamaica BIT art. 4(2)(b); 1987 United Kingdom/Antigua and
Barbuda BIT art. 6(1); 1990 United Kingdom/Argentina BIT art. 6(4); 1988 United
Kingdom/Benin BIT art. 6; 1988 United Kingdom/Grenada BIT art. 6(1); 1985 United
Kingdom/Haiti BIT art. 6; 1987 United Kingdom/Hungary BIT art. 7(2); 1981 United
Kingdom/Malaysia BIT art. 5; 1986 United Kingdom/Malta BIT art. 6(1); 1986 United
Kingdom/Mauritius BIT art. 6; 1990 United Kingdom/Morocco BIT art. 7; 1987 United
Kingdom/Poland BIT art. 6(1); 1989 United Kingdom/Tunisia BIT art. 6; 1991 United
Kingdom/Turkey BIT, Article 6(1).
171. 2007 Hungary/Azerbaijan BIT arts. 13(2)(a) & (b); 2007 Hungary/Jordan BIT arts.
I 3(2)(a) & (b).
172. 1998 Czech Republic/Costa Rica BIT art. 6(4); 1995 Czech Republic/Philippines BIT,
Clause 3 of the Protocol; 2002 Czech Republic/Mexico BIT. Article 6(5).
173. 1993 Jamaica/Italy BIT art. 6(l)(c); 2004 Italy/Yemen BIT art. VI(4); 2004
Italy/Nicaragua BIT art. VI(4).
174. 2005 Australia/Mexico BIT art. 9(4); 1998 Austria/Mexico BIT art. 7(6); 1998
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union/Mexico BIT art. 6(6); 2000 Denmark/Mexico BIT
art. 6(5); 1999 Finland/Mexico BIT art. 7(4); 2000 Greece/Mexico BIT art. 7(4); 2007
India/Mexico BIT art. 8(4); 2005 Iceland/Mexico BIT art. 6(4); 1999 Italy/Mexico BIT art. 6(4);
2000 Republic of Korea/Mexico BIT, Ad. Article 6 of the Protocol; 1998 Netherlands/Mexico
BIT, Ad. Article 4 of the Protocol; 2000 Sweden/Mexico BIT art. 6(4); 2006 Trinidad &
Tobago/Mexico BIT art. 8(3); 2006 United Kingdom/Mexico BIT art. 8(4).
175. 2002 Netherlands/Yugoslavia BIT art. 5(3); 2003 Netherlands/Korea BIT, Clause I of
the Protocol; 1985 Netherlands/Philippines BIT art. 7(1); 1991 Netherlands/Jamaica BIT art.
5(4); 2002 Netherlands/Namibia BIT Ad. art. 5(a) of the Protocol; 1984 Netherlands/Sri Lanka
BIT art. 7.
176. See 1992 Australia/Indonesia BIT art. VII(1); 1994 Australia/Lao People's
Democratic Republic BIT art. 9(1).
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more flexibility to respond to balance of payments crises.177 German
BITs, by contrast, tend to contain more specific language on
restructuring payment terms after the termination of the balance of
payments crises.' 78 To date, the IIA balance of payments provisions
(e.g., mirroring language from GATT Article XII) have not yet been
interpreted by any investment arbitral tribunal.
The foregoing topographic survey of IIA standards shows that both
treaty language and the interpretation of States' regulatory freedom to
pursue human rights or public interest concerns remain differentiated
and nonlinear. Unlike the core set of WTO agreements (and its
subsidiary legal sources or WTO soft law), interpretation of IIAs has to
be conducted on a piecemeal (and often insular) basis, according to the
terms of the IIA at issue before a tribunal at a given point in time, for a
177. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Slovk., art. IX(3), July 20, 2010, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/
iia/docs/bits/Canada slovakia new.pdf, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-
Lat., art. XVII(4), May 5, 2009, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
canadalatvia.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Romania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Rom., art. XVIH(4), May 5,
2009, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canadaromania.pdf; Agreement
Between Canada and the Czech Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-
Czech, art. IX(3), May 6, 2009, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_
czech%20republic.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Hungary for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Hung., art.
VII(2), Oct. 3, 1991, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada-hungary.
pdf; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of
Poland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Pol., art. VII(3), Apr. 6, 1990,
available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canadapoland.pdf.
178. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
Ghana for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Ger.-Ghana, cl. 4,
Feb. 24, 1995; Treaty Between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Federal Republic of Germany
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Ger.-
Lesotho, cl. 5, Nov. 11, 1982, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany
lesotho.pdf; Treaty Between St. Lucia and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-St. Lucia, art. 5(2), Mar. 16,
1985, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iial docs/bits/germanysaintlucia.pdf; Treaty
Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Swaziland Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Ger.-Swaz., cl. 5(b), Apr. 5,
1990, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germanyswaziland.pdf; Treaty
Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Namibia Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Ger.-Namib., cl. 5(c), Jan.
21, 1994; Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Nepal
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Ger.-Nepal,
cl. 5, Oct. 20, 1986, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germanynepal gr
eng.pdf; Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of
Bangladesh Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol,
Bangl.-Ger., cl. 4(c), May 8, 1981, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
germanybangladesh.pdf.
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particular dispute. Short of the direct incorporation of provisions from
WTO law, it is perilous to assume that IIA treaty drafters and
negotiators indeed intend future arbitral tribunals to use WTO law as
some kind of travaux preparatoires to interpret IIA standards. After all,
interpretation of treaty text according to its terms always antecedes any
attempt at recourse to supplementary means of interpretation.1 79 Where
IIA texts do not lend themselves to ambiguity, or are at least susceptible
of interpretation according to their own terms, it is neither necessary nor
legitimate to contrive at using. WTO law and jurisprudence as proxies
for interpretation.
IIAs remain central to the applicable law in investor-State dispute
settlement.' 8 0 Admittedly, in the absence of parties' choice of law,
international law may also form part of the law applicable to an
investor-State dispute under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.' 8 '
While the potential overlap between IIA norms and other rules of
international law, such as international human rights treaty and
customary norms, has received much scholarly attention,1 82 using
179. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, i155 U.N.T.S.
331; Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Interpreting Treaties
for the Benefit of Third Parties: The 'Salvors' Doctrine' and the Use of Legislative History in
Investment Treaties, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 600 (2010).
The Vienna Convention's rule in Article 31 thus focuses, through several
different lenses, on the text of the instrument and events that follow rather than
precede it, as the critical grist for the interpretive exercise . . . . [T]he language
of Article 32 is facultative and contingent and looks largely to pre-text rather
than post-text events . . . . [T]his recourse may be exercised only where Article
31's application (1) "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure"; or (2) "leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable"; or (3) is undertaken to
"confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 3 ."
180. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 610-11 (2001).
181. 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 42, cl. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereafter ICSID
Convention]; Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of "and" in Article 42(1),
Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID
Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REv. 375, 379-81 (2003); see W. Michael Reisman, The
Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice ofLaw Provision and the Question oflts Threshold, 15
ICSID REV. 362, 380 (2000); see generally Annie Leeks, The Relationship Between Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Wider Corpus ofInternational Law: The ICSID Approach,
65 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 1 (2007).
182. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Monitor No. 1: Latest Developments
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 15, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/7 (2009) (by Luke Eric
Peterson), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20097_en.pdf; Ursula Kriebaum,
Aligning Human Rights and Investment Protection, TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., Jan. 2013, at 1;
see, e.g., Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 5 (Mar. 2010), http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international
investment agreementsandhumanrights.pdf; James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law
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Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'8 to
integrate human rights in IIA interpretationl84 has not yet been applied
in practice in investor-State arbitrations.
B. Authoritative Decision-Makers and Interpretive Communities in
WTO Law Vis-A-vis Investment Law
The preceding section outlined key differences in the bases of
obligation in WTO law and investment law, as well as some nonlinear
interpretations of the public interest and human rights ensuing from
each regime. The following subsections briefly show the contrast
between the authoritative decision-makers and interpretive communities
in WTO law and investment law, and why the former's centralized legal
and political organs are functionally better-situated than the latter to
achieve harmonized and coordinated interpretation of States' regulatory
freedom to pursue public interest and human rights concerns.
1. WTO Law
The mandates and functions of legal and political institutions at the
WTO, I submit, contribute to making the system quite amenable to the
coordination of trade law rules with the human rights and public interest
obligations of the Member States. This is not to say that the system is
in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law's Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L.77 (2007).
183. Roslnvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, SCC Case No. V079/2005, Award on
Jurisdiction, 39 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber Com. 2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.
1093/law:iic/3 15-2007.case. I 1HC3 15(2007)D.pdf, Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, PCA
Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $ 260, 309 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2009), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Yukos-interim-award.pdf;
Veteran Petroleum Ltd v. Russian Fed'n, PCA Case No. AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction
& Admissibility, 260, 309 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_
upload/document/Veteran interim award.pdf; Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, PCA Case
No. AA 226, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 260, 309 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2009), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Hulley interimaward.pdf;
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, $$ 207-08
(Int'l Center Settlement Investment Disp. 2007), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user
upload/document/Kardassopoulos.pdf; Berschader & Berschader v. Russian Fed'n, SCC Case
No. V079/2005, Award, 95 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber Com. 2007), http://italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0079_0.pdf; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, T 90 (Int'l
Ctr. Settlement Inv. Disp. 2009), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC 1171 En&caseld=C5.
184. See generally Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and
International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 678,
691-702 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
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ipso facto ideal for ensuring that Member States simultaneously comply
with their international human rights obligations as well as their trade
obligations, and neither do I take the position that the WTO should be
radically transformed into a human rights organization.18 5 (To recall,
WTO Secretary-General Pascal Lamy had called for "coherence"
between WTO law and human rights law,1 86 not "co-optation" of one by
the other. One can be just as wary of creating a "human rights
imperium,"l87 as with the encroachment or "acquisition" of human
rights by WTO lawi s). Rather, my lens of observation is limited to the
phenomena of the system of governance and adjudication in the WTO,
which, at the very least, appears arguably conducive to democratized,
consultative, centralized, and transparent decision-making on the spaces
of States' regulatory freedoms to pursue human rights and public
interest concerns. The approach largely subscribes to Joel Trachtman's
fairly agnostic and functionalist theory of "constitutional economics" to
analyze the WTO-scrutinizing constitutional functions and processes
within a system to ascertain how they maximize individual
preferences.l 9 In my view, the deepening and regularizing dialogue on
Member States' compliance with human rights obligations alongside
WTO obligations is, in large part, attributable to the capacity of non-
State actors as well as Member States to engage the issue systematically
185. Armin von Bogdandy famously cautioned that if the European Union were to be
"focused on progressive human rights policy" it would "easily endanger the European
constitutional set-up between the Union and the Member States without any real need for
protecting human rights, at least as they are traditionally understood." Armin von Bogdandy, The
European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the European
Union, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1307, 1337 (2000).
186. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., Towards Shared Responsibility and Greater Coherence:
Human Rights, Trade, and Macroeconomic Policy (Jan. 13 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/sppl e/sppl 146 e.htm.
187. Michael Barnett put forward a critical comparison between the evolution of the human
rights movement and humanitarianism, with the historical concept of empire. "Empires are
branded as illegitimate because of their authoritarian qualities, but humanitarian governance is
hardly a paragon of democratic rule . . . . [T]he legitimacy of humanitarian governance does not
depend on a process of deliberation, dialogue, or even consent . . . . Humanitarianism has
become a big business, and increasingly aid agencies are administered by executive offices that
focus on the bottom line and market share. As humanitarian governance has grown, it has
become more centralized, more distant from those it wants to help . . . . In the typical
humanitarian case, the ruling class is made up of well-to-do foreigners, and local populations
largely provide security, support, and menial labor in a way that is reminiscent of earlier
empires." MICHAEL BARNETr, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM 221-22
(2011).
188. See Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade
Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 843 (2002).
189. Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 631-33
(2006).
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through different levers of WTO governance.190 That it has not always
been completely successful in doing so is a subject left to Part IV of this
Article.
The political organs of the WTO collectively contribute to the
WTO's core functions under Article III of the WTO Agreement,
namely:19' (1) the facilitation of the implementation, administration, and
operation of the WTO Agreement, the multilateral and plurilateral trade
agreements; (2) providing the forum for negotiations of new agreements
among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations; (3)
administer the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); (4) administer
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM); and (5) coordinate with
other global economic institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and affiliated agencies. Nothing within this
spectrum of functions, on its face, is itself prohibitive to the
consideration of the public interest or human rights by the Member
States. Implementation of the WTO Agreements and other multilateral
or plurilateral agreements calls for "further legislative or regulatory
action-on the national or international level-which is necessary to
give practical effect to WTO obligations."' 92 Inimitably, States
advocating increased regulatory freedom to pursue public interest or
human rights concerns through measures otherwise deemed restrictive
of trade may articulate the matter within any of the foregoing functions
of the member-driven WTO, either through its participation in the
political processes of the WTO organs and bureaucracy, or through the
legal and adjudicatory processes of the dispute settlement system.
Article IV of the WTO Agreement outlines the institutional structure
of the WTO and its key political organs: the Ministerial Conference
(composed of all Member States meeting at least once every two years);
the General Council, which conducts the day to day functions of the
Ministerial Conference when the latter is not in session, and also acts as
the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) and the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB); the three sectoral councils (Council for Trade in Goods,
Council for Trade in Services, and Council for TRIPS) which oversee
190. See Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade
Organization: Actors, Processes, and Possible Strategies, 24 HUM. RTs. Q. 1, 49-50 (2002).
Susan Ariel Aaronson has estimated that about 75% of the world's governments now participate
in preferential trade agreements (facilitated under the WTO) that contain human rights
provisions. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Human Rights, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 443, 443 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur
eds., 2011).
191. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
192. Armin von Bogdandy & Markus Wagner, Article III WTO Agreement: Functions of
the WTO, in WTO: INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 28, 31 (RUdiger Wolfrum, Peter-
Tobias Stoll & Karen Kaiser eds., 2006).
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the implementation of the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS; and other
specialized councils, committees, and groups as created by the
Ministerial Conference (such as the Trade Negotiations Committee,
Committee on Trade and Development).19 3 The WTO Secretariat
discharges "exclusively international" responsibilities and
administrative duties to implement instructions solely from the WTO.194
Various issues have been mediated and debated within this
framework in regard to States' regulatory freedom to pursue trade-
restrictive measures due to human rights considerations,' 95 spanning
issues such as economic embargoes or sanctions against States
committing egregious human rights violations,196  process and
production mechanisms (PPMs) which seek to restrict or ban trade of
goods that have been manufactured or produced through human rights
violations,197 voluntary and mandatory labeling schemes disclosin
social or environmental processes or inputs used for production,
among others. In 2007, Susan Ariel Aaronson observed that the
contemporary political processes of negotiations, trade policy reviews,
and WTO waiver decisions and Ministerial Conference discussions and
practices already reflect the reality that "WTO members increasingly
seek to reconcile their trade and human rights objectives." 99 Her survey
of years of WTO practices significantly revealed that: (1) accession
applications frequently include questions on rule of law and the
compliance with human rights by the applicant States;20 (2) the WTO
had already issued its first waiver specifically to protect human rights
193. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 191, art. IV.
194. Id. art. VI.
195. See generally CASSIMATIS, supra note 55, at 289.
196. See Buhm-Suk Baek, Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations (Cornell
Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference, Paper No. I1, 2008),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps clacp/11 (arguing that economic sanctions can be an
effective enforcement tool to stop human rights violations in third States); see Daniel Halberstam
& Eric Stein, The United Nations, The European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic
Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order, 46 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 13 (2009)
(arguing that the legality of UNSC economic sanctions-particularly their compatibility with
international human rights-can still be determined by regional courts and international
tribunals); see Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human
Rights, 5 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 153 (2007) (criticizing the general ineffectiveness of
economic sanctions, while at the same time admitting the possibility of their limited or strategic
use, so long as they do not contravene pre-existing WTO obligations).
197. See CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO
LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 20-30 (2011).
198. See generally Jessica M. Karbowski, Grocery Store Activism: A WTO Compliant
Means to Incentivize Social Responsibility, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 727 (2009); see also Carlos Lopez-
Hurtado, Social Labelling and WTO Law, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 719 (2002).
199. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are
Penetrating the WTO, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 413, 415 (2007).
200. Id. at 424-26.
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(e.g., the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to prevent trading in
conflict diamonds);201 (3) human rights concerns were increasingly
being litigated in the dispute settlement system through GATT Article
XX exceptions;202 (4) trade policy reviews conducted by the TPRB
systematically engage questions of social and environmental impacts of
and human rights considerations in, Member States' trade policies;203
and (5) trade negotiations under the Doha Round increasingly reflect the
prioritization of human rights obligations as the premise of the global
development agenda. 204 Other scholars confirm various aspects of this
evolving phenomenon of accommodation and coordination of human
rights in the political organs and processes of the WTO system.205
Perhaps the best indication of some institutional coordination of
human rights and WTO law might stem from the General Council,
which doubly acts as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in adopting
reports of dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body.206 One can
plausibly expect that the increased DSU litigation of human rights and
public interest concerns over the past decade has not only brought these
issues to the forefront of awareness of the same representatives of the
Member States in the General Council (who, in turn, act as the DSB as
required under the DSU), but more to the point, that such cyclical
referrals of Appellate Body interpretations of the GATT Article XX
exceptions and other WTO law provisions that involve the issue of
States' regulatory freedom to implement (ordinarily) trade-restrictive
measures to protect human rights and public interest priorities, would
also conceivably inform the Council's political decision-making in light
of the ongoing jurisprudential precedents crystallizing from the dispute
settlement system. 20 The DSB does not only adopt panel and Appellate
201. Id. at 428. Note that another well-known WTO waiver was issued to enable access to
essential medicines by suspending patent protections under TRIPS. Decision of the General
Council, supra note 61.
202. Aaronson, supra note 199, at 430-31.
203. Id. at 434-38.
204. Id. at 442-44.
205. Christopher Butler, Comment, Human Rights and the World Trade Organization: The
Right to Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement, U. PA. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 2007, at 1,
1-2; Abadir M. Ibrahim, International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished Debate, 14 GER.
L.J. 321, 334-36 (2013); see Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Effective Implementation of
Intersecting Public International Law Regimes: Environment, Development, and Trade Law, in
PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 213,
231-47 (Teruo Komori & Karel Wellens eds., 2009).
206. On the multi-functional nature of the General Council, see VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra
note 73, at 235-38.
207. See Barbara Marchetti, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Administration, Court,
or Tertium Genus?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 567, 572-73 (2009) ("The Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) plays a crucial role in the decision-making process of both the panel and
the Appellate Body. This body is nothing more than the General Council in a different guise.
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Body reports, but is also tasked to maintain surveillance of the
implementation of rulings and recommendations, authorize suspension
of concessions and other obligations under the WTO covered
agreements, and inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of
related developments arising from disputes under the WTO-covered
agreements.208 It is precisely due to these broad powers that the DSB is
widely known to be "a political institution" 209 that has demonstrated a
generally positive and successful ability to ensure Member States'
compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings. 2 1 0
Moreover, it must also be emphasized that the WTO Appellate Body
apprehends a deep, but also careful sense of its unique judicial function
and influential constitutive role within the WTO system.211 In practice,
the Appellate Body has been able to look to the practice of other courts
and tribunals in the course of its own interpretation of trade standards
only because its mandate and the relative porousness of the applicable
procedural law in particular cases enabled it to do so.212 The distinction
Beyond its panel establishing power, it has the authority to adopt and supervise the panel's
decisions and recommendations, and to authorize the suspension of concessions and other
obligations of the WTO. In this way, the dispute resolution taken by the adjudicatory bodies,
temporarily excluded from the Members negotiation circuit and given to third and neutral
judicial bodies, comes back to the decision-making power of the contracting parties."). Holger
Hestermeyer has analyzed the possibilities for deploying the legal argument on the right to health
and the right of access to medicines through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, along with
the political developments that culminated with the decision to amend the TRIPS agreement to
enable access to essential medicines through compulsory licensing. See generally HOLGER
HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES (2007).
208. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlment of Disputes art. 2(1)
-2(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
209. Karen Kaiser, Article 2 DSU: Administration, in WTO: INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 277, 279 (Rildiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Karen Kaiser eds., 2006).
210. See generally Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO
Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 397 (2007).
211. See Peter van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO Appellate
Body and its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System 37 (Maastricht Fac. L., Working
Paper No. 2005/1, 2005), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/vandenbosscheab.pdf; Mitsuo
Matsushita, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism at the WTO: The Appellate Body - Assessment
and Problems, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 507, 530 (Amrita
Narlikar et al. eds., 2012).
212. VAN DAMME, supra note 16, at 163, 209-10.
Understanding the judicial function of Appellate Body Members means
appreciating that the DSU and other procedural rules developed in the WTO
may not be the only sources of their powers. International procedural law may
provide other powers or restrict the exercise of existing ones . . . . The
Appellate Body is amenable to such principles in the absence of any (contrary)
rules in the DSU and its Working Procedures, and any contrary will of the
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of its role within the WTO system is such that the Appellate Body's
interpretations are deemed to
effectively allocate decision-making authority to market
mechanisms, to political or administrative processes at the
national or international levels, or to itself . . . [when it] must
determine the amount of deference to show to national and local
regulations that affect foreigners ... it shapes the operation of []
second-order governance mechanisms. 2 13
It is thus impossible to discount the normative pull that Appellate
Body decisions on GATT Article XX have had on the WTO political
organs' understanding and engagement of human rights in WTO law
and governance. 2 14 WTO legalism, at least in this sense, inevitably
influences the future course of WTO politics and policy-making.
Finally, one cannot overlook a key democratizing feature of the
WTO, which is the consultative facility made for intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage with the WTO
under Article V of the WTO Agreement. 2 Despite recurring criticisms
disputants. General principles of procedural law, if proven to exist, apply if
there are no more specific WTO rules. When deciding that such principles exist
and apply, the Appellate Body often does not justify their application on the
basis of principles of treaty interpretation. It becomes a matter of the applicable
law, not of treaty interpretation. The creative function of the Appellate Body
then lies in the expansion of the mandate to apply only WTO law, whether
procedural or substantive, and less in the norm-creating function as such ....
The assertion and exercise of inherent powers is illustrative of this maturing but
equally self-enforces the Appellate Body's early decision to function as a court
or tribunal. That decision was not inevitable, but perhaps its consequences
were. In part, the evolution of procedural law in the WTO is the result of a
dialectic relationship between consent-based powers and inherent powers.
Increasingly, the consent of parties forces the Appellate Body to source
procedural powers from outside the DSU and on an ad hoc basis, and to look at
the practice of other courts and tribunals.
Id
213. Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional
Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130, 140 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duval
eds., 2004); see also Sol Picciotto, The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a
Legitimation of Global Governance (U.C. London Sch. Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 14,
2005), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/downloads/spp-wp-14.pdf.
214. See Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing
Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, in INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
LAWMAKING, supra note 27, at 179, 213-14; see generally Adrian T.L. Chua, Precedent and
Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 171 (1998); see generally John
H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply
or Option to 'Buy Out'?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004).
215. Article V of the Agreement states: "1. The General Council shall make appropriate
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of the width of (and the perceived democratic deficit in) NGO
participation in WTO processes and policy-making,216 it remains an
undeniable fact that NGOs have been able to strategically engage the
WTO throughout various areas of trade policy-making and agenda-
setting.217 NGOs are able to observe plenary sessions and ministerial
conferences, obtain information (albeit under certain limits) on trade
issues under consideration at the WTO, and have been able to
influentially debate and strategically push their particular advocacies on
WTO Member States, such as those on enforcing labor rights,
protecting the right to health and enabling access to essential medicines
through compulsory licensing as an exception to TRIPS obligations.218
It is through this complex dynamic of formal institutions vested with
broad global governance powers, generally centralized adjudication
under a unique judicial function with constitutive and systemic impacts,
and regular State and non-State actor involvement in trade policy and
interpretation that one can appreciate the coordination of the trade-
human rights dialectic within the WTO system. While one can easily
critique the quality or success of this dialogue depending on one's
perspective on WTO history, there are at least entrenched and
embedded formal and informal mechanisms for ensuring interpretive
continuity and the repeated public auditing of the issue of States'
regulatory freedom to pursue trade-restrictive measures to fulfill human
rights obligations or public interest concerns. As will be shown in the
next section, the authoritative decision-making processes and actors in
the international investment system nowhere approximate this dynamic.
arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations that have
responsibilities related to those of the WTO. 2. The General Council may make appropriate
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned
with matters related to those of the WTO." Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 191, art. 5.
216. See Mark Mattner, Understanding NGO Participation in the WTO: History, Nature,
and Implications for Developing Countries, 2003 TRANSNAT'L Ass'N 132, 138-40.
217. Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO Debate and the
Appropriate Role for Non-State Actors, II OR. REV. INT'L L. 71, 105 (2009) ("NGOs already
play an important role informally and have a significant agenda-setting impact .. . . Now that
NGOs are already actively involved in trade negotiations, the more important question might no
longer be whether NGOs should participate, but what influence do NGOs have and how is it
being exercised."); Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate and Participation by NGOs in
the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT'L EcON. L. 683, 685 (2004); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The
Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, I J. INT'L EcON. L. 433,451-52 (1998);
see generally Steve Chamovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); see generally Daniel C. Esty, Non-
Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or
Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 123, 128-43 (1998).
218. See Shamima Ahmed, The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations:
Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 817, 827-28 (2010).
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2. Investment Law
Investment treaty negotiations, compliance monitoring, and
interpretation of IIA standards are not, by any means, institutionally or
formally centralized. To reiterate, States have, for the most part,
historically concluded their own investment treaty programs
independently and usuall' without having to follow the route of
multilateral negotiations.21 As discussed in Part II.A.2, IIA standards
reflect considerable textual diversity, albeit tending to contain common
legal standards of protection and dispute settlement provisions that
enable investors to directly sue host States for IIA breaches.220 Because
each IIA must be taken according to its own terms, it is difficult to
generalize that HAs all possess identical institutional or structural
features for monitoring IIA compliance, establishing recourse to dispute
settlement procedures, or standardizing IIA interpretations of States'
spaces of regulatory freedom221 between arbitral tribunals in investor-
State arbitration and the actual States Parties to the IIAs.
Unlike the coordinative processes between political and legal organs
of the WTO, there are no formal institutions in international investment
law that could centralize and coordinate foreign investment policy-
making undertaken by all States, with the IIA interpretations emerging
from a constantly growing corpus of investor-State arbitral
jurisprudence. While investment arbitral tribunals usually observe a
sense of precedent,222 this is not formally required of them within the
219. See, e.g., Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, May
23, 2007, 33 I.L.M. 1067; North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
L.L.M. 289; The Dominican Republic - United States - Central America Free Trade Agreement,
ch. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462; ACIA, supra note 157; see generally Alireza Falsafi,
Regional Trade and Investment Agreements: Liberalizing Investment in a Preferential Climate,
36 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COMM. 43 (2008).
220. Stephan Schill has long demonstrated the emergence of a "multilateralized" system
from the universe of bilateral treaties. Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International
Investment Law: Emergence of a Multilateral System of Investment Protection on Bilateral
Grounds, 2 TRADE L. & DEv. 59, 61 (2010).
221. On vast literature involving the question of investment arbitral tribunals' degree of
deference to domestic judicial review findings, see generally Caroline Henckels, Indirect
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of
Review in Investor State Arbitration, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 223 (2012); Stephan W. Schill,
Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological
Foundations of New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (2011); William Burke-White
& Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in
Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283 (2010); Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto,
Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards: Public Interest Regulation in International
Investment Law, Y.B. INT'L INv. L. & POL'Y 2011-2012 ch.13 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., forthcoming
2014).
222. Schill, supra note 221, at 79-83; see also August Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in
ICSID Arbitration, 2008 Austrian Arbitration Y.B. 495, 497-98; W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
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terms of their arbitral function or mandate. The consent of the disputing
parties-a foreign investor and the host State-determines and shapes
the jurisdiction of the investment arbitral tribunal.223 In the particular
case of arbitration administered through the 1965 Convention on the
Settlement of Investments Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (otherwise known as the ICSID Convention),224 the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal depends upon the fulfillment of the
requirements in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention-written consent,
either through direct agreement of the parties, national legislation of the
host State that enables investor recourse to ICSID arbitration, or an IIA
between the host State and the investor's State of nationality that
provides for consent to ICSID jurisdiction.225
Unlike the extended litigation procedures in the WTO, there is no
counterpart standing body (like the Dispute Settlement Body) that
ensures the enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards. While the ICSID
Convention makes it obligatory for all States Parties to the ICSID
226Convention recognize and enforce ICSID awards, there is no
international body or organ that oversees the practical procedures for
enforcement of ICSID awards-rather, as with the 1958 New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 227 it is
the party seeking enforcement that must submit the ICSID award to the
local court or authorit' charged with enforcement of ICSID awards in
the State concerned. Excluding Argentina's particular circumstances
and its current policy of non-payment in around forty pending or
concluded arbitrations, 229 enforcement of ICSID awards has been
reported to be fairly successful.230
Toward A Theory ofPrecedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1895, 1914-16 (2010).
223. On the primary principle of consent in international arbitration, see Weidemaier, supra
note 222, at 1907.
224. See generally CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
(2009) [hereinafter ICSID COMMENTARY].
225. ICSID Convention, supra note 181, art. 25. See also Christoph Schreuer, ICSID:
Consent to Arbitration, PROJECT ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Mar. I1, 2003), http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/
DisputeSettlement/Project-on-Dispute-Settlement-in-International-Trade,-Investment-and-IntelI
ectual-Property.aspx?Pu=21,5.
226. ICSID Convention, supra note 181, art. 54.
227. U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958.
228. Note that initiating the investment arbitration through ICSID (as opposed to ad hoc
arbitration under UNCITRAL arbitration rules), has been observed by some as not necessarily a
predictive indicator of future enforcement success. See Freya Baetens, Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards: 'To ICSID or not to ICSID' is NOT the Question, in THE FUTURE OF ICSID, JURIS
ARBITRATION SERIES, 211, 212 (Todd Weiler & Ian Laird eds., 2013).
229. Id. at 214-15.
230. Antonio R. Parra, The Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards, in ENFORCEMENT OF
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Ongoing developments, nevertheless, do show that States are
increasingly trying to address the issue of their regulatory freedom to
pursue public interest or human rights concerns through a variety of
structural approaches in their IIAs, such as: (1) ad hoc joint decision
mechanisms; (2) treaty-based institutional commissions; (3) inter-State
consultative mechanisms; (4) incorporation of other subject matter-
specific treaties (e.g., environmental, labor, human rights); and (5) inter-
State bilateral appellate mechanisms to review arbitral awards under the
IIA's investor-State dispute settlement mechanism, or the outright
omission of investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms under the
IIA. 23 1 The ad hoc joint decision mechanism is a relatively recent device
in the newer generations of IIAs, and it may be utilized in the future to
enable States to control the interpretation of an IIA so that States
continue to retain sufficient policy flexibility to respond to domestic
public interest and regulatory objectives.232 As seen from Article 30(3)
of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT),233 States Parties to
an IIA reserve the right to issue a "joint decision" declaring their
interpretation of any provision of the IIA, which would be binding on
any present or future arbitral tribunal constituted under the IIA's dispute
settlement mechanism. The States Parties may issue the joint decision
interpreting an IIA standard (such as, for example, the fair and equitable
treatment standard) at any stage, with or without reference to pending
investor-State disputes, and with or without reference to
contemporaneous interpretations by other international tribunals of the
same IIA standard contained in other IIAs. Other joint decision
mechanisms are present in Article 30(3) of the 2005 United States-
Uruguay BIT,234 Article 30(3) of the 2008 United States-Rwanda
ARBITRAL AWARDS AGAINST SOVEREIGNs, 131, 136 (R. Doak Bishop ed., 2009).
231. For a recent general survey on approaches for States to control the interpretation of
their IlAs, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Interpretation of lAs: What States Can Do, HA Issues Note No. 3, 1, 5-8 (Dec. 2011), available
at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia201 Idl0_en.pdf.
232. See Diane A. Desierto, Joint Decisions by States Parties: Fair Control of Tribunal
Interpretations?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 8, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2012/06/08/joint-decisions-by-state-parties-fair-control-of-tribunal-interpretations/.
233. Article 30(3) of the U.S. Model BIT states: "A joint decision of the Parties, each
acting through its representative designated for the purpose of this Article, declaring their
interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or
award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that decision." United States Model BIT,
U.S.-(X), art. 30(3), 2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20
for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
234. Article 30(3): "A joint decision of the Parties, each acting through its representative
designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty
shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent
with that joint decision." Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic
of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru.,
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BIT,23 Article 29(2) in relation to Article 18(2) of the 2007 India-
Mexico BIT,236 Article X(6) of the 2009 Canada-Czech Republic
BIT, 27 Article 27(3) of Chapter 11 (Investment) of the 2010 ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement.23
While these mechanisms openly permit States Parties to the IIA to
agree on any interpretation of IIA provisions that would prevail over
any arbitral tribunal, they problematically do not refer to international
law as the Parties' guiding principles when deciding on any future
agreed interpretation of the IIA. Neither do the joint decision
mechanisms provide for any internal control or guidance for the States
Parties when their interpretation frontally collides with an arbitral
tribunal's legal interpretation of an IIA standard, issued by arbitrators in
observance of their fundamental duties to maintain independence and
impartiality. There has not yet been an occasion to resolve the potential
jurisdictional tension between arbitral tribunals' exercise of their
competences to interpret and apply the IIA to concrete investor-State
disputes, and how States Parties to the IIA might strategically wield the
joint decision mechanism to minimize or avoid liability under the IIA
art. 30(3), Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-9 [hereinafter United States/Uruguay BIT].
235. Article 30(3): "A joint decision of the Parties, each acting through its representative
designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty
shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent
with that joint decision." Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, art. 30(3), Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY Doc. No. 110-23.
236. Article 29(2):
The Contracting Parties agree to consult each other on having a joint
interpretation on Article 7 [Expropriation] in accordance with paragraph 2 of
Article 18 ["An interpretation jointly formulated and agreed upon by the
Contracting Parties with regard to any provision of this Agreement shall be
binding on any tribunal established under this Section."] of this Agreement at
any time after the entry into force of this Agreement.
Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the
Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mex.-India, art. 29(2), May
21, 2007, available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779.
237. Article X(6): "An interpretation of this Agreement agreed between the Contracting
Parties shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Article." Agreement between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Czech, art. X(6), Nov. 15, 1990, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BtTs/CAN CzechAd e.asp.
238. Article 27(3) of Chapter 11: "A joint decision of the Parties, declaring their
interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or
award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision." Agreement Establishing
the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, art. 27(3), Feb. 29, 2009, available at
http://www.asean.fta.govt.nz/assets/Agreement-Establishing-the-ASEAN-Australia-New-Zealan
d-Free-Trade-Area.pdf.
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by controlling the latter's ultimate interpretation at any stage of a given
investor-State dispute.
Treaty-based institutional commissions or inter-State consultative
bodies, on the other hand, pose less of a danger of undue interference
with arbitral tribunals' competences in specific pending investor-State
disputes. While the IIA interpretations of treaty-based commissions are
generally binding on arbitral tribunals, they are nevertheless issued
presumably with a more institutional view of the interpretation's
consequences for the future implementation, oversight, and supervision
of the IIA. A treaty-based institutional commission also has the
advantage of entrenching regular consultations and dialogue between
the States Parties to the IIA, and thus may be said to have a more long-
term view of the IIA's implementation when it issues an interpretation,
as opposed to an ad hoc joint decision mechanism which may be
triggered purposely only to affect the outcome of specific pending
investor-State disputes. One example of such a treaty-based institutional
commission is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Free Trade Commission,239 which was set up as an institution composed
of cabinet-level representatives from the three contracting States, with
the specific powers to "supervise the implementation" of the treaty,240
"oversee its further elaboration," 24 1 and "resolve disputes that may arise
regarding its interpretation or application."242 The Free Trade
Commission issued Notes of Interpretation in 2001,243 although
admittedly it has since been criticized for the seeming de facto
amendment of NAFTA treaty provisions as a result of the Notes.244
Other IIAs that establish institutional commissions authorized to
undertake IIA interpretation binding upon future arbitral tribunals
include: Article 10.22(3) of the 2004 Dominican-Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), 24 Article
24640(3) of the 2006 Canada/Peru BIT, Article 40(2) of the 2009
239. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), art. 2001 (The Free Trade
Commission), Dec. 17, 1992, IC-MT 002; see also Jeswald Salacuse, The Emerging Global
Regime for Investment, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 427, 456 (2010).
240. NAFTA, supra note 238, art. 2001(2)(a).
24 1. Id. art. 2001(2)(b).
242. Id. art. 2001(2)(c).
243. See NAFTA: Notes ofInterpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA FREE
TRADE COMMISSION, July 31, 2001, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CHI1
understanding e.asp.
244. See Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory, Failed
Experiments, and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 251, 255-57 (2003).
245. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA 2004), art. 10.22, Aug. 5, 2004, IC-MT 012.
246. Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru., art. 40(3), Nov. 14, 2006, IC-BT 014.
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247Canada/Jordan BIT, and Article X(6) of the 2010 Canada/Slovakia
BIT.248
In contrast to ad hoc joint decision mechanisms and treaty-based
institutional commissions, inter-State consultation mechanisms in an
IIA have the least potential for disrupting arbitral independence and
impartiality in handling investor-State disputes. They are not likely to
affect the substantive content of an IIA, but rather, could serve as a
structural device to facilitate continuing communications between States
Parties to the IIA. This structural device could be particularly useful for
States Parties to transparently articulate and make of record any
ongoing regulatory and public interest concerns that could affect the
future implementation of the IIA. Examples of these include Article 12
of the 1996 Greece/Chile BIT,2 49  Article 12 of the 1989
Netherlands/Ghana BIT,2 50 Article VIII of the 1993 Spain/Philippines
B 211252BIT,251 Article XI of the 1997 Denmark/Philippines BIT, Article 43
of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement,253 Article
VIII of the 1995 Czech Republic/Philippines BIT, Article 8 of the
1985 Netherlands/Philippines BIT,25 Article VIII of the 1999
Philip ines/Pakistan BIT, 56 Article 7 of the 1997 Germany/Philippines
BIT, and Article 29(1) of the 2007 India/Mexico BIT.258
247. Agreement Between Canada and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Can.-Jordan, art. 40(2), June 28, 2009, IC-BT 1154.
248. Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Slovk., art. X(6), July 20, 2010, IC-BT 1533.
249. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of
the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Chile-Greece,
art. 12, July 10, 1996, IC-BT 1475.
250. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Ghana, Neth.-Ghana, art. 12, Mar. 31, 1989,
IC-BT 938.
251. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Kingdom of Spain, Phil.-Spain, art. VIII, Oct. 19, 1993, 1842
U.N.T.S. 91, IC-BT 1369.
252. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Phil.-Den., art. XI, Sep. 26, 1997, IC-BT 893.
253. ACIA, supra note 157, art. 43.
254. Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the Czech Republic for the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Phil.-Czech, art. VII, Apr. 5, 1995, IC-BT
592.
255. Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the
Philippines for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Neth.-Phil., art. 8, Feb. 27, 1985.
256. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Phil.-Pak., art. VIII, Apr. 23, 1999, IC-BT 668.
257. Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the Federal Republic of
Germany for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Phil.-Ger., art. 7, Apr. 18,
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Alternatively, some IIAs include language that purposely cross-
references other treaty obligations involving social protection, human
rights, or public interest objectives. Article 18(2) of the 2002
Austria/Malta BIT, for example, specifically provides that the
application of the European Convention on Human Rights "shall not be
excluded."259 Clause 1 of the Protocol to the 1998 Japan/Pakistan BIT
prohibits the interpretation of the treaty in a way that would derogate
from intellectual property rights agreements, such as the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, "and other
treaties concluded under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organization."2 60 Article 5(3) of the 2004 Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union/Serbia and Montenegro BIT reaffirms the States'
Parties "commitments under international environmental
agreements." 26 1 While Article 12 of the 2005 United States/Uruguay
1997, IC-BT 123.
258. Mexico/India BIT 2007, supra note 236, art. 29(1).
259. Article 18 (2): "The application of the European Convention on Human Rights shall
not be excluded." Agreement between the Republic of Austria and Malta on the Promotion and
Mutual Protection of Investments (Austria/Malta BIT 2002), Austria-Malta, art. 18(2), May 29,
2002, IC-BT 1425.
260. Protocol, Clause 1:
Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed so as to derogate from the rights
and obligations under international agreements in respect of protection of
intellectual property rights to which they are parties, including Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC of Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and other treaties
concluded under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Agreement between Japan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the Promotion and
Protection of Investment, Japan-Pak., Protocol Clause 1, Mar. 10, 1998, IC-BT 655. See also
Agreement between Japan and the People's Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Promotion
and Protection of Investment (Japan/Bangladesh BIT 1998), Japan-Bangl., Protocol Clause 1,
Nov. 10, 1998; Agreement between Japan and Mongolia Concerning the Promotion and
Protection of Investment (Japan/Mongolia BIT 2001), Japan-Mong., Protocol Clause 1, Feb. 15,
2001; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of
Japan for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, S. Kor.-Japan, Protocol
Clause 1, Mar. 22, 2002.
261. Article 5(3): "The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments under the
international environmental agreements, which they have accepted. They shall strive to ensure
that such commitments are fully recognized and implemented by their national legislation."
Agreement between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand, and Serbia and
Montenegro, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Bel.-Lux.-Serb. & Mont., art. 5(3), Mar. 6, 2004. See also Agreement between the Belgian-
Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand, and the Republic of the Sudan, on the other
hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection; of Investments, Bel.-Lux.-Sudan, art. 5(3),
Nov. 7, 2005; Agreement between the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand,
and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal
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BIT holds that "it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic
environmental laws,"262 Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the same treaty
make references to "internationally recognized labor rights." 263 Other
IIAs tend to provide rules governing the application of other
international agreements along with the IIA, usually calling for the
application of the "more favorable" provision to the States Parties
without indicating the criteria for determining the "favorability" of the
applicable agreement. Examples of these types of references to the
application of other treaties include: Article 11 of the 1993
Slovenia/Slovakia BIT,264 Article 10 of the 1994 Hungary/Bulgaria
BIT,265 and Article 13(1) of the 1994 Czech Republic/United Arab
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bel.-Lux.-Eth. art. 5(3), Oct. 26, 2006; Agreement
between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Government of the Republic of
Guatemala on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bel.-Lux.- Guat., art.
13(3), Apr. 14, 2005; Agreement between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one
hand, and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the other hand, on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments , Bel.-Lux.- Libya, art. 5(3), Feb. 15, 2004;
Agreement between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Mauritius on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bel.-Lux.-Mauritius, art. 5(3), Nov. 30,
2005; Agreement between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one hand, and the
Government of the Republic of Peru, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments Bel.-Lux.-Peru, art. 5(3), Oct. 12, 2005.
262. United States/Uruguay BIT, supra note 234, art. 12(1).
263. Id. arts. 13(1), 13(2).
264. Agreement on Reciprocal Investment Protection and Promotion between the Republic
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic (Slovenia/Slovakia BIT 1993), IC-BT 1522 (1993), art.
13(1):
When any matter is treated simultaneously by this agreement and some other
international agreements of which the two parties hereof are signatories, or the
matter is governed by the general international law, then the most favourable
provisions shall apply to both parties hereof and their respective investors, on a
case-by-case basis.
Id.
265. Article 10:
Should national legislation of the Contracting Parties or present or future
international agreements applicable between the Contracting Parties or other
international agreements entered into by both Contracting Parties contain
regulations, whether general or specific, entitling investments by investors of
the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than is provided for
by this Agreement, such regulation shall to the extent that it is more favourable
prevail over the present Agreement.
Agreement Between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Hungary on Mutual
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Hungary/Bulgaria BIT 1994), Bulg.-Hung., art. 10,
June 8, 1994. See also Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Bulgaria for
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266Emirates BIT. Apart from these modes of referring to other
applicable treaties, current HAs seldom contain language that explicitly
integrates international human rights treaties, environmental, or labor
agreements as part of subsisting obligations to be observed alongside
IIA obligations.
Finally, it should be stressed that the ICSID arbitration system does
not contain any full-blown appeals procedure to review arbitral awards'
factual and legal findings, instead providing for limited annulment
procedures in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.267 States Parties tend
to rely on the "self-contained" 268 dispute settlement system under the
ICSID Convention, and thus rarely contemplate building any bilateral
appellate mechanism into their IIAs. The 2005 United States/Uruguay
BIT provided for the possibility of creating such a bilateral appellate
mechanism, 269 but none of the other HAs concluded by the United
States contain such a provision. Unlike this unusual practice, IIAs
would usually state that an arbitral award "shall not be subject to any
appeal or remedy other than those provided for in [the ICSID]
Convention."270 In this sense, carving out a bilateral appellate
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Czech Republic/Bulgaria BIT 1999),
Czech-Bulg., art. 11, Mar. 17, 1999.
266. Afticle 13(1):
Where a matter is governed simultaneously both by this Agreement and by
other international agreements to which both the Contracting States are parties
or general principles of law commonly recognized by both Contracting States
or domestic law of the host State, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either
Contracting State or any of its investors who own investments in the territory of
the other contracting State from taking advantage of whichever rules are the
more favourable to their case.
Agreement between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Government of the
Czech Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Czech Republic/United Arab
Emirates BIT 1994), U.A.E.-Czech, art. 13(1), Nov. 23, 1994.
267. See generally ICSID COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 890-1095.
268. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Improving
the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview, 183, at 185 in OECD,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES (2006 ed.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
internationalinvestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40079647.pdf.
269. United States/Uruguay BIT, supra note 234, Annex E (Possibility of a Bilateral
Appellate Mechanism): "Within three years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the
Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to
review awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they establish the
appellate body or similar mechanism." Id.
270. See, e.g., Agreement between Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
Indonesia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Indon.,
art. 10(3), May 14, 2003; Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Saudi Arabia-Belg.-Lux., art. 10(3)(b), Apr. 4, 2001; Agreement between the
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mechanism from the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism under
the IIA, well outside of the self-contained dispute settlement procedures
in the ICSID system, problematically introduces more uncertainty over
the future enforceability of arbitral awards issued under the IIA.27 1
Nonetheless, a State may also choose to ensure that it has full policy
flexibility by altogether omitting any provision that establishes an
investor-State dispute settlement mechanism in the IIA. This structural
omission insulates the host State from investors' direct recourse to
investor-State arbitration, thereby diminishing the possibility that the
host State could be held liable to pay compensation for IIA breaches
against investors. Moreover, investors would be forced to seek legal
remedies from local courts of the host State, or apply with their
respective home States to exercise diplomatic protection over their
claims. While removing the investor-State dispute settlement
mechanism from an IIA would thus make it much easier for a host State
to implement policy changes at its own wherewithal in the future, it
would also correspondingly increase regulatory risks for foreign
investors. This is best illustrated in the Australian Government's April
2011 announcement that it would reject any investor-State dispute
settlement mechanism from its IIAs. 272
As seen in the foregoing, the institutional limitations and diversity of
IIA texts within the investment law system impedes coordinated law-
making towards uniform interpretations of States' regulatory freedom to
pursue human rights and public interest concerns, unlike in WTO law.
Apart from being a matter of text and structure, I further submit that this
is also an ontological issue involving competing ideologies unique to
each treaty regime. In the following Part III, I present the ideological
and thematic differences that have respectively arisen in WTO law and
investment law on States' regulatory freedoms to pursue (ordinarily)
Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe
concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-Zim., art. 9(3)(b), Oct.
25, 1996.
271. Other scholars have referred to the need for an authoritative centralized appellate
mechanism that would generate consistent jurisprudence and avoid normative fragmentation. See
Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International
Authority: The WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6
Loy. U. CHI. INT'L REv. 173, 180-81 (2008); Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The
Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, 57 ESSAYS IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONoMIC LAw 38-
40 (2006), available at http://www.telc.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft57.pdf (last
accessed Jan. 10, 2013).
272. Kyla Tienhaara & Patricia Ranald, Australia's Rejection of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Four Potential Contributing Factors, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS- INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.iisd.
org/itn/2011/07/12/australias-rejection-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-four-potential-cont
ributing-factors/.
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non-conforming or non-compliant measures within each regime to
comply with human rights and public interest concerns. Using the
"necessity" cases in GATT Article XX jurisprudence as an example, I
show why the deeper ideological considerations of market access and
trade policy adjustment in these particular cases additionally militate
against simply transferring the "weighing and balancing" tests
developed by the WTO panels and Appellate Body into the
interpretation of "necessity" exceptions in investment treaties that have
no traceable drafting history or linkage with GATT Article XX.
III. Two VISIONS OF REGULATORY FREEDOM TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC
POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES
When a State asserts its regulatory freedom against international
regulation or oversight, it is actually re-articulating Hans Kelsen's
classic problem on the sovereignty of the state: "the problem of the
sovereignty of the national legal order in its relation to the international
legal order."273 The seeming Gordian knot between national law and
international law cannot be disentangled simply by arguing that one is
superior to the other. What was more critical, in Kelsen's view, was to
appreciate the "difference of two systems of reference. One of them is
firmly connected with the legal order of one's own state or national
legal order; the other is firmly connected with the international legal
order. Both systems are equally correct and equally legitimate,"274 and
ultimately, it would be a matter of policy or "political considerations" 275
rather than hard positivist legal science to assign priorities between one
and the other. The same reasoning may be analogized in characterizing
the issue of States' regulatory freedom asserted in WTO law vis-c't-vis
international investment law. While States commonly seek to assert
policy space and regulatory freedom in both treaty regimes, the
assertions are addressed to different questions and frames of reference.
The contours of States' regulatory freedom and policy spaces that are
accepted and understood in WTO law would thus very likely prove
quite different from those sought in international investment law.
A. Clarifying Frames ofReference: WTO Law
Regulatory freedom in WTO law is addressed to issues of market
access, non-discrimination, and the restoration of the economic
equilibrium expected from trade liberalization commitments under the
273. Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, 48 GEO. L.J. 627, 628 (1960).
274. Id. at 639.
275. Id. at 640.
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WTO agreements.276 WTO law purposely delineates between a State's
justifiable exercise of regulatory freedom, from protectionist measures
designed to circumvent commitments under the WTO Agreements.
These trade agreements purposely accept that a margin of domestic
regulatory freedom must continue to be maintained both as a matter of
economic efficiency (assuming asymmetric information on world
markets, technologies, consumer preferences, and all other exogenous
factors that cannot be anticipated in designing the trade agreement), as
well as to build in a "safety-valve" precaution against unforeseeable
contin encies that could disrupt the anticipated or forecasted terms of
trade. 7 The criteria for determining the lawfulness of the State's
assertion of regulatory freedom, however, differs across the various
provisions of the WTO covered agreements. The State's justifiable
exercise of regulatory freedom could be manifested in different ways. It
may be asserted to permit the State to implement an ordinarily trade-
distorting or trade-restrictive non-conforming measure, in order to
promote and advance specific public or non-trade aims accepted within
the sphere of the agreements-such as the exceptions enumerated in
GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV.278 Not every domestic
regulatory measure of a State that might pose some obstacle to trade,
however, will require legal justification: "Articles II, III, and XI ... [of]
the GATT restricts itself to establishing a non-discrimination regime for
internal regulation and internal taxation, under which only de jure and
de facto discriminatory measures need to be justified under pertinent
GATT exceptions." 279
Regulatory freedom may also be justifiably invoked to permit a State
276. Vranes, supra note 52, at 956-57,
Determining the GATT's impact on national regulatory autonomy, in
particular, requires a legal analysis of two "triangular" relations' in the GATT
agreement: regarding regulatory measures in general, the principal confines of
national regulatory autonomy are demarcated by the triangle which consists of
Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions), Article III
(National Treatment), and Article XX (General Exceptions). As respects
taxation, these borderlines are drawn by the triangular relationship between
Articles II (concerned with further border measures, namely customs duties,
and all other duties and charges "imposed on or in connection with
importation"), Article III (National Treatment) and Article XX (General
Exceptions).
Id.
277. See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., THE LAW AND EcONOMICS OF CONTINGENT
PROTECTION IN THE WTO 466-71 (2008).
278. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for
an'Aim and Effects' Test, 32 INT'L LAW 619, 621 (1998).
279. Vranes, supra note 52, at 962.
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to recalibrate or reschedule performance of its trade liberalization
commitments, when certain domestic constituencies or sectors cannot
yet meet the terms of competition brought by opening up to foreign
market access, or when the State's level of economic development itself
requires a longer timeframe to comply with trade liberalization
commitments. Examples of this may be gleaned from the emergency
safeguards measures in GATT Article XIX, the Agreement on
Safeguards, Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and Article 6 of
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,280 as well as various
provisions on special and differentiated treatment for developing
countries.28 1 Finally, a State's regulatory freedom may justify it to
monopolize regulatory oversight (or in some cases, directly supply)
certain public goods according to its own legislative or political agenda,
and in keeping with its own economic programming and social
protection objectives,282 such as GATS Article I:3(b) (which recognizes
280. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products); see
Agreement on Safeguards art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
[A] Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member
has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is
being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or
relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or
directly competitive products.
Id.; Agreement on Agriculture art. 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]
(Special Safeguard Provisions); Agreement on Textiles and Clothing art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter Agreement on Textiles and Clothing] [see "transitional safeguards" in Article 6(1)].
281. On special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions, see Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter SCM];
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 65.2 & 65.4, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade arts. 12.4, 12.6 &
12.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TBT]; The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures arts. 10.1, 10.2, 10.4 & 14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter SPS]. See
also Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond
Special and Diferential Treatment, World Bank, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.ycsg.yale.
edulfocus/gtaloperationalizing.pdf (proposals for transparency and specificity of SDT provisions
and monitoring mechanisms for SDT provisions).
282. Joel Trachtman & Gabrielle Marceau, TBT, SPS, and GATT: A Map ofthe WTO Law
on Domestic Regulation, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2002).
2014] 1 19
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
"services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" 283) and
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement (which acknowledges that technical
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill
certain "legitimate objectives," such as national security requirements,
prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment).
The inherent flexibility and accommodation built into the WTO
agreements makes it clear that States already contemplate inevitable and
continuing tensions between domestic regulations and legislation with
their duties to fulfill all trade obligations under the WTO. This is
evidenced by the particular text of the WTO agreements that purposely
preserve State regulatory freedom for certain identified public policy or
public interest areas and human rights concerns, as well as in the
organic structure and competences of its interpretive institutions (e.g.,
the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement panels under the DSU).
Ensuring the continued flexibility of the WTO Agreements toward
delineating lawful exercises of State regulatory freedom, from covert or
openly protectionist measures, is an interpretive function deliberately
entrusted to the panels and the Appellate Body under the DSU. The
breadth of their interpretive authority well explains how GATT
jurisprudence has correspondingly "evolved" to "encompass protective
discrimination" or "hidden discrimination" that would "represent an
innocuous disparate impact on trade, unrelated to protection. ,84
The "weighing and balancing" methodology of the Appellate Body
and the dispute settlement panels axiomatically reflects both the
functional mandates of these tribunals, as well as the fundamental
flexibility explicitly maintained in the Agreements to uphold State
regulatory freedoms exercised for public policy, public interest, or
human rights objectives. Because not every internal regulation or
domestic measure of a State that could have some possible or forecasted
impact on trade automatically rises to the level of an unjustified trade
distortion or trade restriction, it is understandable that the Appellate
Body and the dispute settlement panels devised certain legal tests to
differentiate purely protectionist discriminatory measures, from those
that had the cloak of WTO protection for State regulatory freedom. It is
further comprehensible that these legal tests would leave considerable
margin of appreciation285 for the design of a measure vis-c'-vis proposed
283. On the lack of clarity or definition in regard to this standard, see Robert Howse &
Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Negotiations on Services: The Regulatory State up for Grabs, 9
CANADA WATCH 1-2 (Sept. 2002).
284. Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations - A Case
Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY 77-117
(George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2006).
285. MATrHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 14 (2003)
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reasonable alternative measures. This uniquely-textured standard of
review of the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement panels is a
particular "procedural instrument and, in addition to substantive treaty
rules and other procedural techniques developed by panels and the
Appellate Body, shapes the jurisdictional competence of the WTO
adjudicating bodies vis-i-vis WTO members." 286
The fact-intensive and context-specific "weighing and balancing"
methodology of the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement panels
also enables the management and allocation of the burden of proof,
when either tribunal has to compare a challenged State measure with
other possible (or less trade-distorting) alternatives.287 More to the
point, this method is entirely appropriate to the internal design logic
underlying the remedies system of the DSU, where directing the
violating Member State to bring its measure "in conformity" with the
Agreements is the "ultimate remedy." 288 The remedy prescribed under
the DSU for a State's domestic measures that distort the achievement of
the ideal general economic equilibrium 289  in fully liberalized
international trade290 is to adjust that State's policies in a manner that
would correct the trade distortion. To this end, the panel or the
Appellate Body issues a recommendation "that the Member concerned
bring the measure into conformity with that agreement," and may
additionally "suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations." 29 1 As stressed by the Panel in United
States - Section 301 Trade Act,292 however, there could be any number
of ways, short of or apart from changing an offending domestic statute,
to remove the trade-distorting effect of the inconsistency between the
challenged State measure and the State's WTO obligations.293 After
adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, the DSB then oversees
("the notion of standard of review defines the margin of appreciation which panels and the
Appellate Body grant national authorities in enacting and enforcing their obligations under the
WTO agreements. Panels respect this margin before they are prepared to declare a national
measure inconsistent with WTO law. .
286. Id
287. See MICHELLE T. GRANDO, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACT-FINDING IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 212-15(2009).
288. R. RAJESH BABU, REMEDIES UNDER THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 136 (2012).
289. JACOB L. MOSAK, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 180
(1944).
290. See Donald R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, International Trade as an 'Integrated
Equilibrium': New Perspectives, 90 EMPIRICAL TESTING OF TRADE THEORIES: AEA PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS 2, 150-54. (2000).
291. DSUart.19.1.
292. Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
293. Id f 7.101-7.104.
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compliance (or keeps "surveillance"294 ) by the Member State concerned
with its recommendation and ruling, either through withdrawal or
modification of the challenged measure. 295 It is only when a Member
State fails to comply with the recommendation or ruling that the
complaining State could either initiate negotiations to obtain
compensation from the non-complying State, 296  or impose
countermeasures through discriminatory suspension of WTO
concessions.297
This is precisely why Appellate Body and dispute settlement panels
could afford to interpret the GATT Article XX "necessity" provisions
using a "least restrictive means" test.298 By the time the tribunal
undertakes a detailed analysis of the asserted GATT Article XX
justification, it has already reached a preliminary conclusion that the
State's challenged measure is already inconsistent or non-conforming
with GATT obligations, and the respondent State's challenged measure
must thus be adjusted or reformed to bring it into GATT compliance. At
that point, then, the respondent State assumes the burden of proving-
after the complaining Member State shows that a "reasonably available"
alternative exists-that the challenged measure was the "least restrictive
means" employed to accomplish the public interest objective specified
in the GATT Article XX justification.
Andrew Mitchell and Caroline Henckels have argued that the above
method of reasoning "might well improve the decision making process
of investment tribunals." 9 However, they also (rightly) concede that
the WTO jurisprudence on "necessity" tests are laden with numerous
ambiguities: (1) "the role of the assessment of the importance of the
measure's objective in WTO necessity analysis is still not entirely
clear;" 300 (2) "the 'aptness' standard in WTO law is still somewhat
embryonic and is yet to be fully clarified;"30' (3) "[WTO analysis]
requires detailed consideration of whether the respondent could actually
adopt the proposed alternative, taking into account its resources and
technical capacities;"302 and (4) "[the] significant general difficulty with
the WTO weighing and balancing test is its opacity. The test has been
expressed in a number of different ways and indeed seems to change
294. DSU art. 21.6.
295. MOSAK, supra note 289, at 159 (citing Argentina - Hides and Leather (Article 21.3)).
296. DSU art. 22.2; see MOSAK, supra note 289, at 198-200 (on the rare resort to
compensation due to problems of its voluntariness, prospective application, form through trade
concessions and not money).
297. MOSAK, supra note 289, at 193.
298. Supra text accompanying notes 80 & 83.
299. Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 3, at 47.
300. Id. at 46.
301. Id. at 49.
302. Id. at 51.
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each time it is articulated . . . ." If this level of ambiguity and
methodological inconsistency already subsists in the context of
centralized, cyclical, and repeat adjudication by the WTO Appellate
Body, one is left to wonder how the demonstrated dangers of this
"weighing and balancing" proposal could somehow be avoided by
dispersed and diversely-constituted investment arbitral tribunals with
limited mandates to resolve particular one-off investment disputes.
Andrew Mitchell and Caroline Henckels celebrate the "sophistication"
of WTO jurisprudence, but omit to discuss how exactly an investment
arbitral tribunal gets from point A (e.g., finding the GATT Article XX
necessity test applicable despite vastly different treaty texts, as well as
GATT Article XX's evident differences with the customary norm of
necessity under Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility), to
point B (e.g., reaching a decision on the host State's right to regulate
well in accord with treaty interpretation rules and within the confines of
the arbitral function). Opening the door to investment arbitral tribunals
to this process of reasoning in its adjudication-in the absence of a
comparable centralized adjudication system and a Member State-driven
Dispute Settlement Body that ultimately determines, monitors, and
oversees the adjustment of a respondent State's challenged measure to
bring it to GATT compliance-is inviting license for arbitral overreach.
It will not necessarily yield just legal outcomes, as tribunals would have
to engage in extensive ex post scientific and technical assessments of
the legislative/administrative design and public policy objectives of the
host State's challenged measure, and then ascertain whether it was
indeed "least restrictive" given other "reasonably available"
alternatives. This is a ponderous slippery slope that only depends on the
arbitrator's self-restraint as a precarious limit.
B. Checking Criteria for Comparator Applicability: Investment Law
Within the investment treaty regime, the State can assert its
regulatory freedom to vindicate public interest or human rights concerns
within the interpretation of the primary norm asserted to constitute the
treaty breach (e.g., interpretation of the IIA standard of treatment
alleged to have been violated such as fair and equitable treatment or
indirect expropriation).304 It may also attempt to assert the issue to
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. See Marcela Klein Bronfman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving Standard
in, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609-80, (Armin von Bogdandy & Rildiger Wolfrum eds.,
2006); RONALD KLAGER, 'FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT' IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 158-59 (2011); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
'INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION' AND THE 'RIGHT TO REGULATE' IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/
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establish an independent first-order defense (e.g., "necessity" as a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness under Article 25 of the Articles
of State Responsibility, "non-precluded measures" under an IIA
provision, or the notion of regulator freedom as an independent
customary norm of international law). It may also assert the issue
contextually, as an alternative defense to equitably mitigate or
substantially reduce the ultimate value of compensation that it must pay
for incurring liability through the IIA breach.3 6 Regulatory freedom can
be deployed as an argument for host States in various ratione materiae
within an investment dispute precisely because of the nature of
investment treaty texts and the formulation of substantive standards
therein, the remedy designed under the investor-State dispute settlement
mechanism, and the mandate of an investment arbitral tribunal
convened only upon the consent of the parties.
Unlike WTO law which looks to provide a system of legality and
adjudication to restore the economic equilibrium and terms of trade
anticipated from trade liberalization commitments by eliminating or
reforming trade-distorting State measures, the investment treaty regime
operates to provide a predictable legal environment that guarantees
anticipated investment returns to the investor alongside the
macroeconomic gains received by the host State, considering risks
identified at the establishment of the investment, as well as building in
other risk premia to capture other risks that could materialize beyond
the contemplation of the host State and the investor. The mechanism for
restoring disruptions to the economic equilibrium of foreign market
access in WTO law is primarily adjustment or elimination of a State's
challenged measure; while the mechanism for restoring disruptions to
the anticipated flow of investment returns given assumed risks is a
33776546.pdf.
305. Davies, supra note 4. See also Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of
Customary International Law: A Plea for Change ofParadigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47-
98, 33 (1996).
[T]he only logically satisfying and empirically validating position to take on
the source of human rights norms is that they derive from provisions in treaties.
But people who are prisoners of the Contract Paradigm are disabled from
taking such a position. I can only hope that with the passage of time this
Paradigm, like the Sovereignty Paradigm, will gently erode ...
Id.
306. Siemens AG v. Argentina, Award & Separate Opinon, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
Feb. 6, 2008; Diane A. Desierto, ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting
the Non-Expropriation Compensation Model During Financial Crises, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 473 (2012); SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 330-38 (2009).
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"price" mechanism 307 to remediate the loss of expected or agreed
returns (e.g., compensation (either treaty-stipulated, as in the case of
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" for expropriations), 308
or as a form of reparations under customary norms of international
responsibility for breach of treaty provisions other than
expropriation 309 ).310
Moreover, the dispute between States in a WTO proceeding arises
from mutually and multilaterally agreed trade liberalization
commitments that are jeopardized by unjustified State measures that
alter the terms of competition and result in inefficient trade; while the
dispute between an investor and a host State arises from a pre-existing
contractual setting, the non-performance of certain obligations by the
host State or the investor in their established relationship within the
jurisdiction of the host State, and the ensuing unjustified change in the
forecasted returns from investment. While not every breach of a foreign
investment contract will amount to an actionable breach of an IIA
standard of protection,311 acts of the host State toward the investment
307. Note recent literature critiquing the quantum reached by investment tribunals through
the "price" mechanism, and arguing conceptual and methodological reconsideration. See
Desierto, supra note 306; Mavluda Sattorova, Investment Treaty Breach as Internationally
Proscribed Conduct: Shifting Scope, Evolving Objectives, Recalibrated Remedies? (Jan. 2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1000&context-mavludasattorova&sei-redir-l&referer (last accessed Feb. 1, 2013).
308. For early doubts expressed concerning the supposed universality of the Hull formula,
see Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation (Editorial Comment), 78 Am. J. INT'L L. I
(1984); Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, 'Prompt, Adequate, and Effective': A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727, 757 (1962).
Far from being a 'rule' of international law in the extensive deprivation
context, the demand for 'full' or 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation
would appear to be little more than a preference assumed for bargaining
purposes - an element of legal mythology to which spokesmen pay ritualistic
tribute and which has little meaning in effective policy.
Id
309. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 306, at 88-110.
310. Alan Sykes authoritatively proved that the private right of action for money damages
in investment law is the appropriate efficient enforcement mechanism to signal that the
State/capital importer will not engage in injurious practices against the capital exporter, while
trade policy adjustment and the threat of withdrawal of trade concessions (authorized
countermeasures) is the most efficient way to ensure compliance with government to government
commitments in WTO law. See Alan 0. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of
International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. (2005), reprinted in
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-81 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2010).
311. See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, Award of Aug. 12, 2008, $ 345.
Establishing a treaty breach is a different exercise from showing a contract
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that extend beyond the zones of permissible treatment defined under an
IIA are what give rise to the host State's international responsibility to a
third-party beneficiary of the IIA, (e.g., the investor). The ultimate
question for a State asserting its regulatory freedom to vindicate public
interest or human rights concerns is thus whether its measures taken
under the aegis of regulatory freedom exceed the risk parameters and
anticipated returns as understood by both the host State and the investor
at the time of the establishment of the contract.
Most importantly, there is a markedly different temporal dimension
to an investment tribunal's analysis of legally-actionable State
disruptions to the economic equilibrium protected by investment treaties
that contrasts with that undertaken by the DSU, the Appellate Body and
dispute settlement panels in WTO law, and this difference shapes the
nature of remedial measures taken by adjudicatory bodies. WTO
analysis of regulatory measures will tend to focus on its prospective
effects or impacts on market access, and remedies will be prescribed on
the basis of that prospective assessment. In WTO tribunals' analysis of
GATT Article XX exceptions, the relevant issue for determination is
whether, at Time 1, a State's challenged regulatory measure is
inconsistent with a Member State's GATT obligations (e.g., causes or
results in an actionable trade-distortion or foreign market access
restriction). If so, then, at Time 1 + n, the issue is whether the regulatory
measure can be redesigned or calibrated toward achieving GATT
consistency. At Time 1 + n, what matters for the DSU is to monitor the
respondent State's implementation of the challenged measure to ensure
that the latter is brought to conform with GATT and thereby
immediately stop the injurious effects of the trade-distortion. If the
redesign or withdrawal of the trade-distorting measure cannot be
accomplished, then compensation by way of trade concessions (as a
"second-best" alternative to avoid future damage from the continued
existence of the measure) is a temporary option. 3 12 In the event of a
respondent State's further recalcitrance or non-compliance, counter-
measures may be authorized by the DSB in the form of authorizing
WTO Members to suspend concessions or observance of other
obligations toward the recalcitrant State. 3 13
In investment treaty arbitration, however, once the primary liability
breach. Subject to the particular question of the umbrella clause, in order to
prove a treaty breach, the Claimants must establish a violation different in
nature from a contract breach, in other words a violation which the State
commits in the exercise of its sovereign power.
Id
312. BABU, supra note 288, at 193-202.
313. See DSU, art. 22.1.
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of a host State is established for breach of an IIA standard of protection,
the only issues left for the tribunal to resolve are whether a customary
norm of necessity lawfully suspended the duty to perform the
contemplated IIA standard of protection, or whether there is a specific
provision in the IIA itself that would operate to excuse the host State
from the second-order consequences (e.g., the duty to compensate as a
form of reparations) flowing from having incurred primary liability due
to breach of the IIA. There is no room for an investment tribunal to
calibrate a State's regulatory measure ex post to restore a loss of market
access or prevent further injury from loss of market access-the host
State's regulatory measure is simply taken as a given operative fact that
must be assessed either in determining the existence of primary liability
or the scope of second-order consequences arising after such primary
liability is established. The analysis of a State's regulatory measure is
therefore retrospective, and remedies are likewise prescribed with a
view to ameliorating a past injury (not anticipating future losses to the
investment). At Time 1, an investment tribunal determines whether an
investment treaty breach has occurred and a State then puts forward its
defense of regulatory freedom. The tribunal then has to work
backwards, and determine whether the risk parameters and anticipated
returns at Time 1-n were justifiably or unlawfully distorted by the
State's challenged regulatory measure (e.g., an actionable injury that
engages international responsibility exists). If it finds that there is
indeed actionable injury triggering international responsibility, the
investment tribunal would have to prescribe compensation that
approximately remedies the loss incurred in Time 1-n. 3 14
314. Although there are cases involving other states such as Unglaube and Unglaube v.
Costa Rica, Award, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, May 16, 2012 (which involved
an expropriation finding arising from regulatory actions taken by Costa Rica to create an
ecological zone protecting the endangered leatherback sea turtles and their nesting sites), as well
as Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2,
May 29, 2003 (also involving an expropriation finding in relation to a Mexican government
agency's Resolution ordering closure of a landfill for environmental reasons), the cases
involving the Argentina financial crises of 2000-2002 are probably the most famous examples of
failed attempts to justify social protection measures on the basis of human rights, public policy,
or public interest reasons: LG & E Energy Corp v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1/3, Oct. 2006, paras. 213-66; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Decision
on Argentina's Application for Annulment of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, June 29,
2010, paras. 106-223; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/0108, Apr. 25, 2005, paras. 315-92; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v.
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, May 22, 2007, paras. 303-39; Cont'l Cas. Co. y
v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Sept. 5, 2008, paras. 219-85; BG Group PLC
v. Argentina, Final Award, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL), Dec. 24, 2007, paras. 361-444; National Grid
PLC v. Argentina, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL), Nov. 3, 2008, paras. 205-62; Suez v. Argentina,
Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, July 30, 2010, paras. 249-71; Total SA v.
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Dec. 21, 2010, paras. 482-85; El
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This is where the proposed application of the "least restrictive
means" test in GATT Article XX "necessity" jurisprudence into
investment arbitration turns on its head. Andrew Mitchell and Caroline
Henckels extolled the "sophisticated" analytical value of setting up a
comparison of a host State's regulatory measures (as the supposed
"least restrictive means") with proposed "reasonable alternatives,"
similar to what the Appellate Body and dispute settlement panels have
done in "necessity tests" for GATT Article XX. 3 15 But they did not
show how this method of reasoning could be replicated by an
investment tribunal that mainly has to decide the existence of an IIA or
treaty breach, and the quantum of compensation to remedy loss from the
breach. Comparing a State's regulatory measure with other "reasonably
available alternatives" makes sense for a WTO tribunal that has to
decide on altering the contours of that measure to bring it to full
conformity with GATT commitments and the Member States'
multilateral expectations of market access. But comparing a host State's
regulatory measure with a plethora of other macroeconomic acts that it
could or should have taken at Time 1-n does nothing for the assessment
of primary liability, except to introduce a heightened level of
subjectivity in, and arbitrary scrutiny of, the host State's "treatment" of
an investment and whether the same falls within the bounds of
permissible treatment defined under the IIA. Given the universe of
possible policy options and the propensity for hindsight or "black swan"
reasoning often employed by economists,316 more than likely an arbitral
tribunal would be swamped by the parties with competing analyses by
their respective expert economists, leading to at least some
preponderance that "reasonably available alternatives" exist. Rather
than afford a feasible defense to a State (presumably the purpose behind
the Mitchell and Henckels' proposal), the likely outcome would be quite
similar to how investment tribunals have dealt with the virtually
impossible requirement in the customary norm of necessity in Article 25
Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Oct. 27,
2011, paras. 552-670; Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, Final Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, June 21, 2011, paras. 336-60; Metalpar SA and Buen Aire SA v. Argentina, Award
on the Merits, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, June 6, 2008, paras. 208-11; Siemens AG v.
Argentina, Award and Separate Opinion, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Feb. 6, 2007, paras. 79 &
354.
315. Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 3, at 56-57.
316. Metaphor originated by Nassim Nicholas Taleb to describe a surprising (and
unexpected) event found to have had massive effects, which is subsequently rationalized (often
wrongly or inappropriately) with the benefit of hindsight. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE FRAGILITY (2d ed. 2010). Paul Krugman
has also acknowledged the difficulty of formally modeling international economic crises. See
Paul Krugman, The International Aspects of Financial Crises, in THE RISK OF ECONOMIC CRIsIs
85-134 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1991).
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of the Articles of State Responsibility that the measure taken was the
"only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril."317 Under the Mitchell and Henckels proposal
where investment arbitral tribunals would have full sway to "weigh and
balance" the host State's regulatory measure and proposed alternatives
at hindsight (and even with the fiction of "margin of appreciation"), it
would be more likely that a host State would be unable to bear the
additional evidentiary burden of showing that other alternatives to the
challenged regulatory measures were not realistically available at Time
1-n. Neither is the evidentiary burden clearly explicated for the claimant
investor that posits "other reasonable alternatives" (whether regulatory
measures or macroeconomic policies) that the host State could or should
have taken to avoid injury to the investment. Much of this line of
analysis sweepingly induces an arbitral tribunal to engage in more
speculative and hindsight armchair reasoning on host States'
macroeconomic policies and the design of government regulations that
could have avoided or diminished injury or loss to the value of the
investment, in order to resolve the questions of the existence of an IIA
breach, and the level of compensation required to redress such breach.
This analysis is suited to WTO tribunals that have to issue
recommendations to calibrate, withdraw, or adjust a respondent State's
regulatory measure to prevent further trade distortions or unjustifiable
market access restrictions against other WTO Member States, but it
makes no sense whatsoever for investment tribunals tasked with
providing compensatory redress for IIA breaches.
Interestingly, the recent UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for
Sustainable Development (IPFSD) acknowledges the complexities of
designing language for public policy exceptions in IIAs, 3 18 and one of
its suggested options is patterned after GATT Article XX language in
IIA treaties. This has already been concretely followed in recent treaty
practice, specifically the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (ACIA), Article 17 (General Exceptions) which is a replica
of GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV exceptions. Although this
provision has not yet been tested by an arbitral tribunal, several
interpretive difficulties could already be anticipated for an investment
arbitral tribunal tasked to apply this provision. Would the tribunal defer
to a host State's (self-judged) invocation of the public policy objective
specified in the enumerated exceptions, and if so, to what extent will
317. On the evidentiary hurdles to meet the "only way" requirement in Article 25 of the
Articles of State Responsibility, see Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Application for Annulment, 368-77 (July 30, 2010);
EDF Int'l SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 1171-72 (June 11, 2012).
318. See IPFSD text on suggested options for designing such exceptions in
http://www.Investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Views/Public/content.aspx?sid=3.
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this deference affect its standard of review for the exception-based
defense? If the tribunal will not defer to the self-judged assessment of a
host State, what onus probandi would it assign to a host State invoking,
for example a "public morals" exception? If the investment tribunal
were to apply the "least restrictive means" test to establish the necessity
of a host State measure, would it mean that it would first make a
preliminary finding that the host State measure breaches the IIA, and
afterwards require the host State to prove its exception as opposed to
some kind of "reasonably available alternative" under the "weighing
and balancing approach"? (As already discussed, this method of
reasoning contains its own set of evidentiary complications). Finally
and most importantly, what effect on a State's international
responsibility is intended by the phrase "nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member
State of measures"3 19-does it result in the inexistence of any primary
breach due to the wholesale inapplicability of a treaty (e.g., an effect of
treaty inapplicability that is not borne out by WTO jurisprudence on
GATT Article XX, but which is unique to the Continental Casualty
interpretation 320), or does it affect the second-order consequences of
primary breach (e.g., mitigation or reduced damages)? While one can
understand the function of GATT Article XX as a State's residual
defense seeking to permit the continuity of the measure notwithstanding
its possibly trade-distorting or market access-restricting impact (and
notably after the WTO tribunal already finds that measure to be non-
compliant or inconsistent with GATT), one is not too sure about what
treaty effects will be generated from a GATT Article XX-type provision
in an IIA that says utterly nothing about preventing a treaty breach from
arising, preventing a treaty from being applicable, or preventing
international responsibility from attaching. The only effect that could be
literally read from the phrase "nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member State
of measures" is that the Agreement will literally NOT be construed or
interpreted to prevent a Member State from adopting or enforcing such
measures. But at Time 1, when an arbitral tribunal has to deal with a
host State that has already enforced the regulatory measure that causes
economic injury to an investment or a breach of an IIA standard of
protection in Time 1-n, what is still there to prevent? How would a
"weighing and balancing" approach then serve any realistic purpose to
afford host States a genuine defense against a primary breach when the
evidentiary burden is increased? Clearly, there is a need to scrutinize the
actual functional criteria for making investment tribunals use WTO law
319. ACIA, supra note 157, art. 17(1).
320. Desierto, supra note 15, at 882-93.
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as a relevant comparator in investment law.
The literature on the WTO law qua investment law proposition has
not yet reached a point where the premises, policies, and methods of
comparisons between both regimes have been fully and transparently
disclosed. 32 1 Rather, the proposition has often been argued from the
standpoint of either supposedly shared normative or genealogies or
teleologies between treaty texts (e.g., "necessity," "most favoured
nation treatment," "national treatment"),322 glowing descriptions of the
settled interpretive processes within WTO adjudication, 323 or by arguing
the negative consequences of keeping both WTO law and investment
treaty regimes "separate." 32 4 But each of these approaches have been
inadequate to justify the function of the comparison or transposition of
WTO law into investment law interpretation. First, while shared
normative genealogies, teleologies, or common travaux might prove
true in some IIAs (especially for those negotiated within or alongside
free trade agreements 5), there has not been any empirical validation of
the latter for the entire constellation of IIAs-at least enough to say that
the WTO law qua investment law proposition can indeed be generalized
to all IIAs. Second, celebrating WTO interpretive methods, as
previously shown, does not address the crucial question of how to
validly apply or transplant them into investment treaty interpretation-
whether it would be through a "broad" (albeit questionable)
construction of the investment arbitral mandate or a demonstrable
textual or contextual nexus with the IIA standard within the system of
unitary interpretation in VCLT Article 31. Finally, listing some negative
consequences that could arise from keeping both treaty regimes
separate, without discussing how these consequences overpower any
perceived or actual gains from distinct treaty regime design and
institutions, unfortunately misses out on the rest of the analysis
necessary in an actual cost-benefit equation. 32 6 If the WTO law qua
investment law proposition is to be accepted as the public policy tool
for resolving contended "legitimacy" issues on the right to regulate in
international investment law, clearly we need more well-developed
criteria before we seek to turn our investment arbitrators into full-scale
321. Supranote3.
322. Supra note 3; see also Robert Howse, The Relevance of WTO Law and Jurisprudence
to Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Notes for Panel Discussion), INVESTMENT TREATY FORUM-
BRITISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Sept. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.biicl.org/files/5638_robert-howse.pdf).
323. Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 3.
324. Broude, supra note 25.
325. See Diane A. Desierto, 'For Greater Certainty': Balancing Economic Integration and
Investor Protection in the New ASEAN Investment Agreements, 8 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 5
(2011).
326. See ROBERT J. BRENT, APPLIED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6-9 (2d ed. 2006).
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comparativists.
A basic method in comparative law that might prove to be of some
use in making this determination, although not without its detractors, 327
is the "functional method" in comparative law. 328 The basic principle of
all comparative law, according to this method, is "functionality"-all
other rules which determine from the choice of laws to be compared, the
scope of the undertaking, and the creation of the system of comparison
are to be determined according to functional terms-"[functionality]
rests on what every comparatist learns . . . that the legal system of every
society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems
by quite different means, though very often with similar results." 329
Some of the basic premises of the functional method are the following:
(1) there is a relationship between concept and function, such that
"[r]ules, which have functions or purposes, are framed in terms of
concepts . . . unless concepts are themselves defined in terms of the
purposes that the rules serve, they become 'doctrinal abstractions' that
are obstacles to understanding the rules;" 330 (2) the meaning of
"function" or "purpose" is "the end served by a rule . . . an end which
accounts for its structure and its contribution to the behavior of a larger
structure of which it is a part: the legal system . . .;"331 and (3) even
when there are
deeper universal values that all societies share . . . these values
are expressed in different ways. It does not follow that the legal
systems of all societies . . . face the same problems. Problems that
have been solved by jurists in some societies . . . have been
solved elsewhere in other ways . . . .332
Applying this method of functionality, especially in this Part III, it
should be evident that the spaces for commonality of treaty functions,
adjudicatory functions, remedial functions, and institutional functions,
for WTO law and investment law, respectively, appear much more
diminished than others might intuitively assume. There are historical as
well as policy reasons for the emergence of these distinct treaty
systems, and in particular, the remedial measures within these systems.
327. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 339-82 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2007). It has also been described as a "chimera, in both the theory and practice of comparative
law." See PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 339 (1999).
328. See CRUZ, supra note 327, at 230; James Gordley, The Functional Method, in
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 107-19 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012).
329. CRUZ, supra note 327, at 230-31.
330. Gordley, supra note 328, at I10.
331. Id. at 114.
332. Id. at 118.
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Thus far, we have examined the WTO law qua investment law
provision from a somewhat microscopic lens of treaties, constitutive
decision-making processes, institutional structures and interpretive
communities, and the subject-matter addressees of a State's regulatory
freedom in each regime. The following Part IV attempts a brief critical
historical analysis to explore the state of human rights compliance
facilitated by, or accomplished under the auspices of, the WTO system
(including reform areas that remain in progress), to further examine the
plausibility of using WTO law as the "public policy toolbox" for the
international investment treaty regime.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AS A WORK IN PROGRESS: THE UNCERTAIN
SUCCESS OF WTO LAW'S POST-NEOLIBERAL PUBLIC
POLICY PARADIGM
A. Viewing Human Rights in the WTO as a Sociological Project
It would be well-nigh impossible for this Part to capture the
complete record of human rights compliance facilitated by the WTO (or
otherwise) in nearly thirty years of its institutional existence. Indeed, the
narratives of engagement of human rights in trade (and vice-versa) have
been anything but linear, to the point that one can only characterize the
WTO as having achieved an uncertain success in the area of facilitating
human rights compliance, and ensuring that trade policies and actions of
Member States do not inhibit, prevent, or impede fulfillment of their
human rights obligations. 333 Andrew Lang has observed that
[d]uring any particular historical period, both the trade and
human rights regimes represent a contingent compromise
between the partisans of each perspective - a compromise which
evolves over time as their relative influence changes .. . each
regime is composed of complex and layered social phenomena
... classical liberalism represents only one strand in the complex
and contested ideological foundations of the trade regime. 334
He finds that the "normative orientation" of the WTO system is
significantly influenced by "collective purposes" and "shared ideologies
333. Jeff Waincymer valuably discusses the significance of interdisciplinary approaches
from law, economics, political science, and philosophy to fully assess the status and prospects of
the trade and human rights debate in the WTO. See Jeff Waincymer, The Trade and Human
Rights Debate: Introduction to an Interdisciplinary Analysis, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1-38 (Sarah Joseph et al., eds. 2009).
334. LANG, supra note 49, at 57-58.
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which animate that regime at any particular point in time," so much so
that "major re-orientations of the trade regime may not be possible
without sustained contestation and destabilization of dominant ideas
relating to the objectives of the regime, the purposes it serves, and the
causal pathways by which it contributes to the achievement of those
purposes." 335 The rise of, and resistance to, neoliberal thought in each
respective regime accompanied the legal relationship between trade and
human rights-in ways that reflect the legal tensions as "interventions
into the political struggles internal to each regime."336
There is much that persuades in the above sociological lens for
viewing the (at times institutionally-conflicting 337) dialectic between
WTO law and human rights. Certainly the body of analytical studies
and experts' reports from the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that explores the trade-
human rights linkage and implications over the past decade often
articulated many concrete political and social protection concerns,
concordantly with its call for WTO Member States to design
comprehensive compliance of their international human obligations
alongside trade liberalization commitments. 3 38 The bulk of these reports
and studies define the key pillars of the "human rights-based approach
to trade," summarized by the OHCHR as: (1) "respecting the principle
of non-discrimination" by ensuring that individuals and groups are
335. Id. at 58.
336. Id. at 59.
337. One need only recall the WTO's public complaint in 2000 to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson regarding an expert study issued by the
OHCHR on the human rights implications for globalization, and the exchanges that ensued
between both institutions thereafter. See Someshwar Singh, UN Human Rights Commissioner
Responds to the WTO, TmIRD WORLD NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2000) http://twnside.org.sg/title/
responds.htm. Institutional frictions, however, have smoothened over a decade since then. See
Statement of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanathem Pillay to the WTO Public
Policy Forum, "Doing it Differently: Reshaping the Global Economy" (Geneva, Sept. 16, 2010)
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News ID=10346&
LanglD=E.
338. See Analytical study of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the fundamental
principle of participation and its application in the context of globalization, E/CN.4/2005/41, 23
Dec. 2004; Mainstreaming the right to development into international trade law and policy at the
World Trade Organization, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17, June 9, 2004; The right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health-Mission to the
World Trade Organization, E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, Mar. 1, 2004; Analytical study of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the
context of globalization, E/CN.4/2004/40, Jan. 15, 2004; Human rights and trade, Submission to
the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, Mexico, Sept. 10-14, 2003; Human rights, trade
and investment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, June 25, 2002; Globalization and its impact on the full
enjoyment of human rights, E/CN.4/2002/54, Jan. 15, 2002; The impact of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13,
June 27, 2001.
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protected against overt discrimination in multilateral trade processes, as
well as by ensuring that they are not excluded from deliberations or
policy-making in trade; (2) "promoting popular participation" in the
development of trade rules and policies through democratic consultative
processes not just reserved for States but also for individual and group
constituencies impacted by trade; (3) using "human rights impact
assessments" to monitor the potential and real impacts of trade rules and
policies on the enjoyment of human rights by individuals and groups;
(4) "promoting accountability" in trade liberalization processes for
individuals to have recourse, particularly on the justiciability of
economic, social, and cultural rights; (5) "ensuring the promotion of
corporate social responsibility initiatives" for standard practices of
traders and investors; and (6) "encouraging international cooperation
and assistance" that enables poorer countries to adjust to the trade
process and benefit from its reform. 339
Depending on perspective, one can either view WTO as having the
ability to facilitate compliance with international human rights
treaties, 340 and conversely, as ineffective in curtailing human rights
violations of WTO Member States. 34 1 As previously discussed, Susan
Ariel Aaronson noted in 2007 that there was already significant
progress in the political and policy "seepage" of human rights (and a
human rights consciousness) into the WTO decisions of the political
organs as well as the legal/adjudicatory system under the DSU. 342 The
current deadlock on substantive human rights, development, and public
policy issues in the Doha Round might be enough for some to indict the
WTO system for its paralysis or vulnerabilities to multilateral stalemate
when it comes to addressing deeper issues of income inequalities,
deficits in meaningful social participation and opportunities for enabling
human rights capabilities. 343 At best, this lends a picture of the WTO
339. See Globalization-Trade and Investment, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/Globaliz
ation/Pages/Globalizationindex.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
340. See generally Marceau, supra note 14; Stephen Joseph Powell, The Place of Human
Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 2, 219-31 (2004); Pascal
Lamy, Trade and Human Rights Go Hand in Hand, Speech of the WTO Director-General (Sept.
26, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spple/sppil72_e.htm; Robert
Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Beyond the Divide: the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Political Rights and the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 39-68(Sarah Joseph et al. eds., 2009).
341. See Dean Dalke, Enforcing Human Rights through the WTO: A Critical Appraisal,
Occasional Papers in International Trade Law and Policy, 58 CARLETON UNIv. (2004); Virginia
A. Leary, The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 118 (1997).
342. Aaronson, supra note 199.
343. See Andreas Bli0thner, Trade and Human Rights at Work: Next Round Please . ?, in
AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 335-73 (Harald Hohmann ed.,
2008); Ruth Bergan, WTO Fails the Poorest - Again, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011 /jul/29/wto-doha-fails-poo
2014] 135
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
system as a work in progress on the trade and human rights debate,
where its policies and governance framework assuredly remains subject
to reform. 344 What these also ultimately convey, for purposes of
scrutinizing the WTO law qua investment law proposition, is that the
WTO gridlock on these issues, borne out of its own institutional,
ideological, and political experiences, neither inspires its emulation or
replication in the dispersed, decentralized, and diffuse investment treaty
regime.
B. Human Rights Impact Assessments and Interdisciplinarity
What is of more interest (and in my view also a more realistically
feasible common gateway between WTO law and investment law to
effectuate human rights compliance in international investment law),345
for purposes of getting a more substantial and empirically-based
perspective of WTO impacts on human rights compliance for future
operational design of State policies and regulations, is the visible trend
towards mainstreaming the use of human rights impact assessments
(HRIAs) of trade-related policies. 346 While there is a growing body of
scholarly literature that accepts the use of HRIAs, elaborates on their
possible design, and explains methods for conducting them in relation to
trade and development policies, 34 7 there is little as yet published that
reports actual operational findings from HRIAs of WTO policies.348 But
rest-countries.
344. See REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE pt. I (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & James Harrison eds., 2005) (WTO
Negotiators and Academics Analyse the Doha Development Round of the WTO: Overview and
Summary of the Book).
345. Bruno Simma & Diane Desierto, Bridging the Public Interest Divide: Committee
Assistance for Investor-Host State Compliance with the ICESCR, 10 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. I
(2013); Diane A. Desierto, Sovereign Policy Flexibility for Social Protection: Managing
Regulatory Risks in HAs, Report to the Mauritius International Arbitration Conference (Dec.
2012).
346. See Ibrahim Salama, Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade-Related Policies, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAw 217-55 (Markus W. Gehring & Marie-
Claire Cordonier Segger eds., 2005).
347. See Fabiane Baxewanos & Werner Raza, Human Rights Impact Assessments as a New
Tool for Development Policy? (OFSE, Working Paper No. 37, 2013), available at
http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/WP37_Human Rights.pdf; James Harrison,
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements: Reflections on Practice and Principles
for Future Assessments, unpublished paper for the Expert Seminar on Human Rights Impact
Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements (Geneva June 23-24, 2010), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/chrp/projectss/humanrightsimpactassessments/harrison
background-hria 2010.pdf.
348. See Berne Declaration, Canadian Council for International Co-operation & Misereor
(2010). Human Rights Impact Assessments for Trade and Investment Agreements, Report of the
Expert Seminar (June 23-24, 2010), available at http://www.ccic.calwhat-wedo/Report
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there are some incipient examples of HRIA analysis already filtering
somewhat into the analysis of trade agreements, such as the 2011
issuance of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier
de Schutter, prescribing Guiding Principles on human rights impact
assessments of trade and investment agreements; 349 Canada's first
official HRIA report in May 2012 on the impact of the Free Trade
Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia;350 and the
WTO's own public policy efforts in 2009 to conceptualize and
implement a system of HRIAs for trade agreements. 35 1 James Harrison
and Alessa Goller have pointed out problems of methodology,
measurement, information reliability and data verifiability that afflict
many HRIA proposals.352 In a 2012 EJIL article, Philip Alston and
Colin Gillespie proposed adapting open-source technologies to diversify
and cross-verify the information gathering processes on human rights
compliance.353
There are likewise counterpart developments within the U.N. system
for the establishment of statistical and empirical databases to track State
compliance with human rights, specifically including economic, social,
and cultural rights. In 2006, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights prepared a Report ("Indicators for monitoring
compliance with international human rights instruments: a conceptual
and methodological framework") in response to the3 requests of
chairpersons of the various human rights treaty bodies. 35 The High
Commissioner stressed the particular utility of setting up quantitative
indicators for the task of treaty monitoring:
HRIA-seminar 2010 eng%5BIl%5D.pdf, Saskia Bakker et al., Human Rights Impact
Assessment in Practice: The Case of the Health Rights of Women Assessment Instrument
(HeR WAI), I J. HUM. RTs. PRAC. 436 (2009).
349. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier de Schutter, Addendum:
Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements,
AIHRC/19/59/Add.5, Human Rights Council (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.bilaterals.
org/IMG/pdf/A.HRC.19.59.Add.5_English.pdf.
350. See Annual Report Pursuant to the Agreement Concerning Annual Reports on Human
Rights and Free Trade between Canada and the Republic of Colombia (May 15, 2012), available
at http://www.codev.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/DFAITCCFTAHR.pdf.
351. See WTO Public Forum 2009, Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better
Global Governance, at 60-64 (WTO 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/books
p e/public forum09_e.pdf.
352. James Harrison & Alessa Goller, Trade and Human Rights: What Does 'Impact
Assessment' Have to Offer?, 8 HUM. RTs L. REv. 587 (2008).
353. Philip Alston & Colin Gillespie, Global Human Rights Monitoring, New
Technologies, and the Politics ofInformation, 23 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1089 (2012).
354. Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights
Instruments, HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 11 2006), available at http://hrbaportal.org/wp-content/files/
2006_ArticleEnglish.pdf.
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[I]n the context of the ongoing reform of the treaty bodies in
general, and the Reporting procedure in particular, it has been
argued that the use of appropriate quantitative indicators for
assessing the implementation of human rights - in what is
essentially a qualitative and quasi-judicial exercise - could
contribute to streamlining the process, enhance its transparence,
make it more effective, reduce the Reporting burden and above
all improve follow-up recommendations and concluding
observations, both at the committee, as well as the country,
levels. 355
The High Commissioner distinguished human rights "indicators"
(e.g., "specific information on the state of an event, activity, or an
outcome that can be related to human rights norms and standards, that
address and reflect the human rights concerns and principles; and that
are used to assess and monitor promotion and protection of human
rights"),356 from "benchmarks" (e.g., "indicators that are constrained by
normative or empirical considerations to have a predetermined value"),
which the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
particularly favors.357 Indicators may be quantitative or qualitative. In
defining the conceptual framework for human rights indicators, the
High Commissioner drew attention to several methodological matters:
First, there is a need to anchor indicators identified for a human
right in the normative content of that right, as enumerated in the
relevant articles of the treaties and related general comments of
the committees. Secondly, it is necessary to reflect cross-cutting
human rights norms or principles (such as non-discrimination and
equality, indivisibility, accountability, participation and
empowerment) in the choice of indicators. Thirdly, the primary
focus of human rights assessment (and its value-added) is in
measuring the effort that the duty-holder makes in meeting
his/her obligations - irrespective of whether it is directed at
promoting a right or protecting it. At the same time, it is essential
to get a measure of the "intent or acceptance of' human rights
standards by the State party, as well as the consolidation of its
efforts, as reflected in appropriate "outcome" indicators. While
such a focus recognizes an implicit linkage between the intent of
a State party, its efforts in meeting those commitments and the
consolidated outcomes of those efforts, the linkage may not
355. Id. para. 3.
356. Id. para. 7.
357. Id. para. 12.
358. Id. para. 8.
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always translate into a direct causal relationship between
indicators for the said three stages in the implementation of a
human right. This is because human rights are indivisible and
interdependent such that outcomes and the efforts behind the
outcomes associated with the realization of one right may, in fact,
depend on the promotion and protection of other rights
[S]uch a focus in measuring the implementation of human rights
supports a common approach to assessing and monitoring civil
and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights
. . . the adopted framework should be able to reflect the
obligation of the duty-holder to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights.359
The High Commissioner then laid out a sequence for developing the
conceptual framework defining indicators for substantive human rights:
(1) identifying the "attributes" of a right ("limited number of
characteristic attributes that facilitate the identification of appropriate
indicators for monitoring the implementation of the right"360); (2)
defining the configuration of structural indicators (e.g., "the
ratification/adoption of legal instruments and existence of basic
institutional mechanisms deemed necessary for facilitating realization of
the human right concerned"361), process indicators (e.g., "relat[ing]
State policy instruments to milestones that become outcome indicators,
which in turn can be more directly related to the realization of human
rights . . ."362), and outcome indicators (e.g., "attainments, individual
and collective, that reflect the status of realization of human rights in a
given context . . . often a slow-moving indicator, less sensitive to
capturing momentary changes than a process indicator"363); (3)
developing sources and data-generating mechanisms (e.g.,
socioeconomic and administrative statistics, events-based data on
human rights violations 364); and (4) imposing criteria for the selection of
quantitative indicators (e.g., "relevant, valid and reliable," "simple,
timely and few in number," "based on objective information and data-
generating mechanisms," "suitable for temporal and spatial comparison
and following relevant international statistical standards," and
"amenable to disaggregation in terms of sex, age and other vulnerable
or marginalized population segments" 365).
359. Id para. 13.
360. Id. para. 14.
361. Id. para. 17.
362. Id. para. 18.
363. Id. para. 19.
364. Id. paras. 24 & 25.
365. Id. para. 26.
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Using the structure-process-outcome indicators framework, the High
Commissioner has since drawn up lists of illustrative indicators on civil
and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights, and
subjected such indicators to a comprehensive validation process before
international experts, members of global academia, non-governmental
organizations, international organizations, and national level policy-
makers.366 Among the ICESCR rights covered in the list of illustrative
indicators are the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, the right to adequate food, the
right to adequate housing, the right to education, the right to social
security, the right to work, and the right to freedom of opinion and
expression.367 The High Commissioner had also previously issued a
Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions on the
implementation of the ICESCR.368 Notably, in 2012, the Office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights issued its consolidated
volume, "Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and
Implementation," 369 which further developed the structure-process-
outcome indicators conceptual framework for determining State
compliance with international human rights treaties, particularly the
ICESCR.
While the nascent state of the HRIAs thus far has not lived up to the
promise of their contribution to the assessment and strategic design of
WTO reforms, this is at least one promising area that could yield a
broader and more reliable base of information for characterizing the
success or failure of the WTO in facilitating human rights compliance
by its Member States. It would also aid towards enabling more human
rights-compliant and consistent trade and investment policy-making by
States in the future.
V. MEDIATING THE ICESCR: A HEURISTIC FOR FUNCTIONAL
DECISION-MAKING IN WTO LAW AND INVESTMENT LAW
The preceding Parts II, III, and IV laid out my contextual policy
arguments against the automatic reception of WTO law into investment
law to address the latter's public policy quandaries. In the following
366. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on Indicators for
Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008).
367. Id see annexes to the Article.
368. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/12,
U.N. Sales No. E.04.XIV.8 (2005).
369. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators:
A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/12/5 (2012).
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subsections, I contrast some differences in the proposed use of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) to justify State regulatory freedoms in WTO law and
investment law. Perhaps more than any other human rights treaty,
ICESCR obligations stand to shape and directly affect the content and
substance of a State's social protection agenda. States are more than
likely to find that public policy objectives, for which they seek to
maintain regulatory freedom in either WTO law or investment law, are
already mirrored within ICESCR obligations. To give a concrete
example of the limits to the WTO law qua investment law proposition
(or the supposed usefulness of WTO law to public policy issues in
investment law), I point out how there have been material differences in
the mediation of the ICESCR in WTO law (which reflects much of the
same public policy objectives asserted to justify a State's regulatory
freedom), as opposed to international investment law. These differences
will endure, I submit, so long as the design of treaty texts and the
composition of the epistemic and interpretive communities I described
in Part II, remain divergent between the WTO treaty regime and the
investment treaty regime.
A. ICESCR and WTO Law
The record and practice of WTO law has shown that, despite the
interpretive openness of WTO treaty texts to public policy objectives
and the broad judicial function wielded by the Appellate Body and the
dispute settlement panels, the ICESCR has not figured significantly
within the nearly thirty-year acquis of WTO law and jurisprudence,
although a few Member States (notably, Mauritius and Brazil) have
specifically invoked the ICESCR to justify State regulatory freedom to
protect non-trade concerns.370 I suggest that this is less about the actual
salience of the ICESCR to a WTO litigation, than it is a trend exhibiting
a more conservative tendency on the part of States against putting the
ICESCR into practice to lend substantive content to public policies
already textually-referred to in WTO treaty provisions, such as GATT
Article XX, GATS Article XIV, SPS Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2,
TBT Agreement Article 2.2. This view accords with Holger
Hestermeyer's recent findings on the possible uses of the ICESCR
370. See Caroline Dommen, Safeguarding the Legitimacy of the Multilateral Trading
System: The Role of Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 121, 127 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006) (citing
Brazil's leadership efforts in having a WTO resolution adopted on access to essential medicines
against pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, and Mauritius' reference to the ICESCR to support its
position that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture should allow recognition of non-trade
concerns.).
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within the WTO political organs and the DSU. 37 1 Acknowledging that
the overwhelming majority of WTO Member States are also parties to
the ICESCR, in his investigation of WTO law and practice,
Hestermeyer found that: (1) the WTO itself is not bound by the
ICESCR even if its Member States are individually bound; (2) the
ICESCR's role in WTO dispute settlement is limited since it cannot be
directly enforced or applied by the panels or the Appellate Body given
their jurisdictional competences under the DSU, but that the ICESCR
may be used to interpret WTO treaty norms in accordance with
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law" permitted
under Article 3.2 of the DSU; (3) in practice, States have not been
lodging arguments based on the ICESCR when they avail of the
extended litigation process under the DSU, preferring instead to specify
WTO treaty norms that already refer to public policy objectives; and (4)
except for a few instances involving labor rights and health rights, the
political organs of the WTO have rarely referred to economic, social
and cultural rights in their decisions. 372
Certainly, such observations regarding WTO law and jurisprudential
practices do not yet confirm the possibilities for using the ICESCR in
WTO practices that Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel have hypothesized,
finding that "the [WTO] treaties themselves have been structured in
many ways so as to ensure that the means adopted in the WTO to
achieve economic goals are not inconsistent with the human purposes
and values intrinsic to the norms in the ICESCR."373 Compatibilities
between the Preamble to the WTO Agreement and Article 2(1) of the
ICESCR,374 for example, teleologically support the human security
notion embedded in the ICESCR, which creates a "normative floor for
the interpretation and application of the WTO treaties . . . While
they concede hurdles to the interpretation of WTO treaty provisions that
specifically build in policy flexibilities (e.g., GATT Article XX), Howse
and Teitel carefully demonstrate that States' regulatory freedoms in
WTO law to vindicate ICESCR obligations could be harnessed through
371. Holger P. Hestermeyer, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the World Trade
Organization: Legal Aspects and Reality, pt. 3, http://www.boletinderecho.udp.cl/docs/Paper
Hestermeyer.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
372. Id.; on the salience of the ICESCR to the WTO, see Fons Coomans, Application of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Framework of
International Organisations, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. 359, 359-90, 372-75 (2007).
373. Hestermeyer, supra note 371; Howse & Teitel, supra note 340, at 7. The position
resembles a famous 2000 policy paper: Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human
Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK: THE MILLENNIUM EDITION 51, 52-82 (Hugo Stokke & Arne
Tostensen eds., 2001).
374. Howse & Teitel, supra note 340, at 42-43.
375. Id. at 47.
[Vol. 26142
PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TRADE LAW
programmatic adjustments of trade policies in ways that functionally
operationalize ICESCR rights to work, health, and food.376
While one can readily concur with Howse and Teitel that the
ICESCR could usefully furnish substantive guidance to WTO dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body regarding the "normative
floor" or interpretive baseline to give meaning to economic, social, and
cultural rights to "health," "labor," environmental protection, and other
public policies already textually-referenced in WTO treaty provisions
such as GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV, SPS Agreement Articles
2.1 and 2.2, TBT Agreement Article 2.2, it is indeed curious, as
Holgermeyer found in his survey, that States have not been marshalling
ICESCR-based arguments in the WTO dispute settlement process, and
that likewise, tribunals have not been independently referring to the
ICESCR for purposes of treaty interpretation. It is quite possible that
this is a phenomenon that could have arisen due to early difficulties in
framing the ICESCR-based justification within the context of litigated
issues in a trade dispute. Over a decade ago, Jose Alvarez pointed out
several difficulties in setting up the ICESCR-driven interpretation of
trade treaty norms within the framework of a WTO litigation as the
authoritative method of interpretation:377 (1) the ICESCR is not a treaty
that subordinates WTO treaties, in the sense of normative hierarchy
provided for in Article 103 of the U.N. Charter; 378 (2) the ICESCR does
not speak to the issue of NGO participation within the WTO (which, at
that time, was the immediate policy debate); 379 (3) lex specialis rules
militate against automatically applying human rights norms to avail of
treaty-based remedies;380 and (4) the lack of precision of ICESCR
obligations that make their application in adjudicatory settings
difficult. 38 1 To the extent that States have preferred to hew more closely
to WTO treaty language and the body of DSU jurisprudence
interpreting such language, the present dearth of ICESCR references is
quite understandable.
However, it is also possible that States have had some difficulty in
marshalling ICESCR-based arguments in trade disputes over the last
thirty years, precisely because the substantive content of ICESCR rights
was still in the process of development by the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (hereafter, the "Committee") at the same
time. Unlike other human rights treaty monitoring bodies in the U.N.
376. Id. at 50-68.
377. Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade
Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 5 (2001).
378. Id. at 6-7.
379. Id. at 8.
380. Id. at 9-10.
381. Id. at 11-12.
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system, the Committee382 is a creation of the Economic and Social
Council-the latter being the actual body specifically designated under
the ICESCR to conduct treaty monitoring, manage the State reporting
process, and issue recommendations to the General Assembly on
measures taken and progress made to achieve compliance with the
ICESCR.383 The Committee has thus far issued only 21 General
Comments between 1989 to 2009, with those most pertinent to the
interpretation of public policy objectives in WTO treaties (such as the
right to take part in cultural life, 384 the right to work,385 non-
discrimination 38 and equal rights to enjoy all economic, social and
cultural rights,387 right to water, right to highest attainable standard of
health 389) issued only within the last decade. Neither has it been able to
develop its own "jurisprudence" through an inter-State or individual
communications or complaints mechanism. The Optional Protocol to
the ICESCR, which creates that precise mechanism for individuals or
groups asserting violations of their ICESCR rights, was only concluded
by General Assembly resolution in 2008,390 and entered into force only
on February 5, 2013 after having achieved the tenth ratification (from
Uruguay) necessary for the Optional Protocol to enter into force.3 9 One
thus cannot rule out the future possibility of State recourse to the
ICESCR, especially as the Committee takes on a broader function in
providing authoritative guidance, not just in the State reportage system
but now adjudicating issues that apply the ICESCR in the individual
communications procedure. In any event, using the ICESCR in multiple
avenues in WTO law is a matter of framing the former properly into the
382. ESCOR Res. 1985/17, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985).
383. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) arts. 18-19 [hereinafter
ICESCR].
384. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 21, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/GC/21 (2009).
385. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 18, U.N. Doc.
E/C. I 2/GC/18 (2005).
386. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 20, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/GC/20 (2009).
387. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/2005/3 (2005).
388. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 15, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/1 1(2002).
389. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/2000/4 (2000).
390. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).
391. See Statement, Assistant Secretary-General Ivan Simonovic, Deposit of the 10th
instrument of ratification of the OP-ICESCR (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/CESCR/ASGStatement I OthRratification.doc.
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latter, from interpretively testing the permeable public policy language
in the WTO treaties and agreements, 392 to plumbing the numerous
sources of WTO law which include not just WTO treaties but also acts
of WTO organs (including waivers and decisions of specialized WTO
committees, Ministerial Conference or General Council interpretations
of WTO agreements, and DSB adoptions of Appellate Body and panel
reports) as well as the canonical sources of general international law. 393
As rightly observed in a report to the Economic and Social Council,
"[t]he WTO Agreements do not say anything about the type of policies
which a government may wish to implement to bring about the
fulfillment of human rights . . .394
B. ICESCR and Investment Law
Similar to WTO law, the ICESCR has not yet been invoked in
investor-State disputes as an independent justification for a State's
exercise of regulatory freedom, or for the framing of host State policies
under an IIA. Mediating the ICESCR into investment law will not be
framed in the same way as shown in the previous section in WTO law.
Unlike WTO law that has treaty texts, sources of law, and an
interpretive and institutional acquis that could be harnessed to infuse
ICESCR-based substantive and interpretive content to the public policy
language in WTO treaties and the acts of the WTO political organs, the
international investment law system, as demonstrated in Part II, does
not have these textual and institutional gateways.
In other works, 395 I have shown several limitations to, and prospects
of, using the ICESCR as an independent normative defense against
international investment treaty obligations: (1) a host State prioritizing
the ICESCR obligation over an investment treaty obligation finds little
practical utility in the lex posterior rule on conflict of treaties codified
in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; (2)
using the ICESCR as a "relevant rule of international law" within
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties could apply
in "legality clauses," where it can be shown that the ICESCR is part of
the corpus of host State laws that should be complied with to qualify an
"investment" as one covered by the protections of an investment treaty;
392. See, e.g., exceptions clauses in GATT, art. XX,; SPS arts. 2.1-2.2; TBT Agreement
art. 2.2; and the safeguard provisions in GATT arts. VI, XII, XVIII, XIX, XXVIII, & XXV.
393. PAUWELYN, supra note 74, at 40-51, 459-60.
394. Hoe Lim, Trade and Human Rights: What's at Issue? (Working paper submitted to
ESCOR on Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the IESCR: International
Consultation 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of
International Institutions' Organized in Co-operation with the High Council for International
Cooperation, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP.2) (Apr. 10, 2001).
395. See generally supra note 132.
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and (3) in a situation (such as an economic crisis) where neither the
ICESCR obligation nor the investment treaty obligation can be
performed completely without undermining or imperiling the other, the
authoritative decision-maker has to embrace the "principle of political
decision" and clarify its decision-making calculus to assess which
"breach" it would incur given the consequences of international
responsibility arising from the breach of either obligation, the
institutional and political dynamics of relevant internal and external
constituencies, as well as the community expectations unique to the host
State. A political decision to "breach" an investment treaty obligation to
provide compensation, for example, could be better managed if that
State's authoritative decision-makers could accurately forecast the
commercial and political risks of the arbitral process, the likelihood of
economic recovery and its estimated duration, and the margins of
tolerance of the domestic and international political elites for a host
State deliberately choosing this breach.
Given the diffuse (and mostly unreformed or amended) language of
international investment agreements (IIAs), the diversity of its
communities of law-appliers, and the lack of a centralizing political
organ (such as the WTO) that could facilitate dialogue on ICESCR
compliance within the design of IIAs, I anticipate that much of the
efforts (at least in the short-term) towards designing HAs with a view to
ensuring ICESCR compliance would very likely be unilateral (at best
regional) initiatives, set in accordance with the negotiation timetables of
individual States, their respective political preferences and foreign
policy agendas, and the nature of their current level of ICESCR
compliance as ascertained under the State reporting process facilitated
by the Committee. To this end, Bruno Simma and I have recommended
that the Committee take on a more involved role in aiding unilateral
State efforts to maintain ICESCR compliance alongside the design and
implementation of their IIAs: (1) the Committee could extend technical
assistance to States negotiating or designing HAs, model investment
contracts, template prospectuses, terms of reference and other
significant due diligence documentation for foreign investment
contracts; (2) the Committee could assist host States in designing an
ICESCR impact assessment method that could be applied during the
negotiation process between foreign investors and host States; (3) the
Committee could contribute its legal analysis as a distinct kind of
amicus to investor-State arbitrations that involve complex public
interests and ICESCR rights; (4) the Committee could contribute its
fact-finding reports in the investor-State arbitral process, insofar as
ICESCR-related conduct of host States and/or investors are concerned
(and with the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR having entered into
force on February 5, 2013, the Committee has the functional capacity to
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conduct such fact-finding); and (5) the information available under the
Committee's State reporting process and periodic review could be made
accessible to determine and anticipate the State's institutional capacities
and resource constraints insofar as ICESCR compliance is concerned,
leading to a better understanding of the risk parameters of an
investment.396
I have also proposed recently397 that the ICESCR might be
strategically deployed in a contextual manner-to redefine the
regulatory risks of an investment in ways that are more in accord with a
State's economic and social realities and institutional constraints. I
showed how the due diligence process can be revised to identify areas
of host State policy flexibility that should already be anticipated during
the life of an investment as part of ICESCR compliance, especially with
host States' ICESCR compliance increasingly being susceptible to
empirical investigation and inclusion in investors' regulatory risk
assessments. The assessment of regulatory risks in the due diligence
process should also consider the actual ICESCR impacts on specific
forms of investment. I also contended that the ICESCR may have an
interpretive function for IIA standards of treatment where a textual
nexus is established, and in the alternative, the ICESCR may also have a
significant adjusting impact to the process of valuing compensation.3 98
Finally, I have also submitted that where an investor's home State is a
party both to the ICESCR as well as to an IIA, such State assumes
counterpart duties to ensure the extraterritorial application of the
ICESCR, including in particular the duty to ensure that its (natural or
juridical) nationals do not act in ways that cause other States to violate
the fundamental obligation to "respect," "protect" or "fulfill" ICESCR
rights. Even if they do not participate in the investor-State dispute
settlement mechanism, home States still have significant roles to play in
voluntarily ensuring ICESCR compliance within the international
investment treaty system, by continuing to exercise some oversight
authority over the conduct of their nationals in other States. Regulatory
predictability does not equate to static host State regulations, and
investors cannot easily assume that legislation and regulations at the
time of the establishment of an investment will remain, and be
implemented in, completely the same manner, in perpetuity. The
ordinary workings of government recognize adaptation, amendment,
396. Simma & Desierto, supra note 345, at 4-6.
397. Desierto, supra note 345, at 92-114.
398. For new proposals to recast the valuation process, see Desierto, supra note 306; for a
new mathematical model recasting the Capital Asset Pricing Model used in investor-State
arbitrations to take into account ICESCR compliance, see Diane A. Desierto & Desiree A.
Desierto, Investment Pricing and Social Protection: A Proposal for an ICESCR-Adjusted Capital
Asset Pricing Model, 28 ICSID REv. 405 (2013).
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and change, and what is most important is to establish a legal
framework within which the investor can adequately, sufficiently, and
transparently track and predict such regulatory changes as would affect
the investment. It is in this light that I propose that the expected policy
uncertainty arising from host States' compliance with dynamic ICESCR
obligations be embraced, and framed uniquely, for international
investment law.
CONCLUSION: RESTRAINING A FORCED JOINDER
There will always be a seductive resonance to having a unifying
"principle of systemic integration"-the idea that "[r]eference to other
rules of international law in the course of interpreting a treaty is an
everyday, often unconscious, part of the interpretation process." 399
Some years ago, then-President of the International Court of Justice
Dame Rosalyn Higgins cautioned that "we should not exaggerate the
phenomenon of fragmentation," and said that she was "skeptical" that
the invocation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties "is the overall answer to systemic fragmentation," because it
"brings with it as many problems as it resolves." 400 This caution holds
true for the proposition that WTO law is somehow always instructive
for investment law, especially for the latter's issues on State regulatory
freedom to vindicate public policies. Caution is justified-even
inevitable-given the contemporary reality of how States thus far have
chosen to bind themselves to observe different types of conduct across
various spheres of international economic relations. Left unproven, the
assumption that States intend economic transactions governed in one
sphere to be equally, identically, or similarly governed for another
economic transaction, and that they also intend their agents (courts,
tribunals, political bodies) to look beyond the immediate rules States
establish to govern a particular economic transaction, can wield havoc
and instability to functional decision-making processes that have been
purposely designed and built into distinct treaty systems. Not only is
this a question of "fit," but more importantly, it is a question of
"outcome." Grafting WTO law into investment law does not ensure that
the public policy problems in the latter would indeed be successfully
resolved.
At this point, it should also be clear that mere normative or
transactional resemblance does not provide satisfactory criteria for
399. Campbell Mclachlan, The Principle ofSystemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005).
400. Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 791, 796, 803-04 (2006).
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transposing WTO law into investment law. As this Article has shown,
the public policy language in WTO treaties, and corresponding DSB
interpretations, collectively evolved according to a specific internal
logic that bridges a "non-trade concern" (e.g., human rights compliance)
to a trade liberalization and market access objective. This logic
developed in tandem with sociological and ideological shifts within the
WTO community-expectations of State regulatory freedom, as such,
are shaped by what the WTO Member States have negotiated amongst
themselves, and what public policy issues WTO Member States have
also been pressed to respond to within the political levers of the WTO
institutional machinery. Waivers for establishing a certification process
for conflict diamonds and for enabling access to essential medicines
through compulsory licensing represent hard-fought political battles
within the WTO system, but they do not encompass the full range of
human rights concerns that States may harbor when they seek to defend
their policy spaces. As such, what States may understand by "necessity"
in relation to a domestic policy measure asserted against a market
access commitment, is not automatically what they may understand
when they design a "necessary measure or measure not precluded" for
an investment transaction within their own jurisdiction. The institutional
and interpretive complexity in WTO law has to be fully grasped and
engaged, to enable one to draw feasible, transparent, and acceptable
criteria for the latter's effective infusion into investment law to
accomplish a shared objective of human rights compliance. The
responsibilities of treaty negotiators, State policy-makers, law-appliers,
and other authoritative decision-makers demand no less than a sustained
effort to wed doctrinal rigor with our political sensibilities.
To date, the WTO law qua investment law proposition remains a
forced joinder of treaty regimes and institutions that does not serve the
broader objective of reaching better-considered defenses that uphold a
State's regulatory freedom to vindicate public policy or human rights
concerns. At best, the proposition gives us a straw argument that may
appear to contribute policy analysis, but ultimately paralyzes us from
thinking more laterally and deeply on the actual reform processes and
suitable proposals for international investment law to accommodate and
fully engage public policy and human rights alongside investment
obligations. It should be a sobering reality that human rights and public
policies in the trading system remain very much a work in progress, and
advocates themselves concede that their strategic success depends on
their effective understanding and creative use of WTO institutions,
processes, interests, and constituencies. That is one analogy we can
helpfully adopt as we design and tailor our public policy solutions for
States, individuals, and groups in the diverse, diffuse, and dispersed
international investment system.
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